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PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA

LARISSA PEIXOTO VALE GOMES

**WHAT, HOW, AND WHO:**  
**the substantive representation of women in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and Sweden**

BELO HORIZONTE

2019

LARISSA PEIXOTO VALE GOMES

**WHAT, HOW, AND WHO:  
the substantive representation of women in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and Sweden**

Tese apresentada ao Programa de Pós-graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Doutora em Ciência Política.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Bruno Pinheiro Wanderley Reis

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UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE MINAS GERAIS

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## ATA DA DEFESA DE TESE DA ALUNA LARISSA PEIXOTO VALE GOMES

Realizou-se, no dia 06 de setembro de 2019, às 09:00 horas, no Auditório Prof. Luiz Bicalho, da Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, a defesa de tese, intitulada "*WHAT, HOW, AND WHO: the substantive representation of women in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and Sweden*", apresentada por LARISSA PEIXOTO VALE GOMES, número de registro 2015658828, graduada no curso de CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS, como requisito parcial para a obtenção do grau de Doutora em CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA, à seguinte Comissão Examinadora: Prof. Bruno Pinheiro Wanderley Reis - Orientador (DCP/UFMG), Profa. Teresa Sacchet (UFBA), Profa. Layla Daniele Pedreira de Carvalho (UNILAB), Profa. Elin Bjarnegård (Uppsala Universitet) - VIDEOCONFERÊNCIA, Profa. Rainbow Murray (Queen Mary University of London) - VIDEOCONFERÊNCIA.

A Comissão considerou a tese:

Aprovada

Reprovada

Finalizados os trabalhos, lavrei a presente ata que, lida e aprovada, vai assinada pelos membros da Comissão.

Belo Horizonte, 06 de setembro de 2019.

Prof. Bruno Pinheiro Wanderley Reis  
Orientador (DCP/UFMG)

Profa. Teresa Sacchet  
(UFBA)

Profa. Layla Daniele Pedreira de Carvalho  
(UNILAB)

Profa. Elin Bjarnegård  
(Uppsala Universitet) – VIDEOCONFERÊNCIA

Profa. Rainbow Murray  
(Queen Mary University of London) – VIDEOCONFERÊNCIA

Para todas as mulheres que tentaram e foram humilhadas, atacadas e mortas.

To all the women who have tried and were abused, attacked, and killed.

It is not too much to ask that you should help, Father, for it was all your fault right from the beginning. Do you remember how you used to play the piano and sing Bellman's songs to us children and how, at least twice every winter, you would let us read Tegnér and Runeberg and Andersen? It was then that I first fell into debt. Father, how shall I ever repay them for teaching me to love fairy tales and sagas of heroes, the land we live in and all of our human life, in all its wretchedness and glory? (...) Remember all who have helped me, Father! I shall say. Think of my faithful friend, Esselde, who tried to open doors for me when no one dared to believe in me. Think of others who have cared for and protected my work! Think of my good friend and travelling companion, who not only took me south and showed me all the glories of art but made life itself happier and lighter for me. All the love that has come to me, the honours, the distinctions! Do you not understand now that I had to come to you to ask how such debts can be paid?<sup>1</sup>

*Selma Lagerlöf*

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<sup>1</sup> “Det är inte för mycket, att du hjälper mig,” säger jag, “för det är nog ditt fel från början. Kommer du ihåg hur du brukade sitta vid klaveret och sjunga Bellman för oss barn, och minns du hur du lät oss läsa Tegnér och Runeberg och Andersen ett par gånger hvar vinter? På det sättet var det, som jag råkade i min första stora skuld. Far, hur skall jag kunna vedergälla dem för att de lärde mig att älska sagorna och hjältedåden och fosterjorden och människolifvet i all sin storhet och i all sin skröplighet?” (...) “Kom ihåg alla, som ha hjälpt mig, far!” säger jag. “Tänk på min trogna vän Esselde, som sökte öppna en väg för mig, då ännu ingen annan vågade tro på mig! Kom ihåg de många, som ha värnat om min diktning och skyddat mitt arbete! Och kom ihåg min goda vän och reskamrat, som inte bara förde mig till södern och visade mig all konstens härlighet, utan också gjorde hela lifvet ljusare och rikare. Och tänk på all kärlek, som har mött mig, tänk på all heder och utmärkelse! Kan du inte förstå, att jag behöfver komma till dig för att få veta hur man betalar sådana här skulder?”

mais caloroso, a preocupação mais amiga. Alguns me receberam em suas casas, outros me ouviram incessantemente, deram conselhos, abraços, foram exemplos. Eu espero poder retribuir. Os que já se foram, por existirem em mim e me darem força.

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Writing this way seems hollow and vague. There are no words that adequately reflect my sentiment of love, humility, and gratitude. A PhD doesn't only teach theories and techniques, but also that it's impossible to do everything by yourself. That it is impossible to know it all, to access it all. That knowledge is made through connections, contact, "please", and "thank you". That there are more good people in the world than bad. It was a long and arduous process that has given me so much more than this dissertation. And for that I am truly grateful.

Later on, the sciences, blessed be, would find the scientific explanation for all my ills, determining my natural inferiority to other humans, proven by the measure of my brain certifiably incapable for intellectual activity; through the evaluation of my cultural productions they noticed my insufficient capacity for self-government and self-determination; noticed the absence, in the societies from which I come from, of ways of social organisation recognisable as such; identified my ignorance which is proven by the inexistence of writing to register my feats (these being now unknown to me as they are to you) and revealed my primitive stage by the fetishes which I adore and that have not reached the meaning of true religion.<sup>2</sup>

*Sueli Carneiro*

It is the language that drinks blood, laps vulnerabilities, tucks its fascist boots under crinolines of respectability and patriotism as it moves relentlessly toward the bottom line and the bottomed-out mind. Sexist language, racist language, theistic language – all are typical of the policing languages of mastery, and cannot, do not permit new knowledge or encourage the mutual exchange of ideas.

*Toni Morrison*

Life, strife—those two are one,  
Naught can ye win but by faith and daring.  
On, on—that ye have done  
But for the work of today preparing.  
Firm in reliance, laugh a defiance,  
(Laugh in hope, for sure is the end)  
March, march—many as one,  
Shoulder to shoulder and friend to friend.  
*“March of Women” Ethel Smyth / Cicely Hamilton*

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<sup>2</sup> Posteriormente, as ciências, benditas sejam, encontrariam a explicação científica para os meus males, decretando a minha inferioridade natural em relação a outros humanos, constatada pela medição de meu cérebro certificadamente incapaz para a atividade intelectual; pela avaliação de minhas produções culturais perceberam a minha insuficiente capacidade de autogoverno, e autodeterminação; notaram a ausência, nas sociedades das quais sou originária, de formas de organização social reconhecíveis como tal; identificaram minha ignorância cujo atestado é a inexistência de escrita para registrar os meus feitos (sendo esses hoje desconhecidos para mim como para ti) e revelaram meu estágio primitivo pelos fetiches que adoro que não alcançam o sentido da verdadeira religião.

## RESUMO

A pesquisa foi feita a partir da premissa de que perguntas sobre o que queremos e o que esperamos da representação política devem ser baseadas nas possibilidades reais de atuação, ainda que partindo de ideais normativos. Portanto, perguntou-se em quais condições a representação de mulheres acontece, a partir de legislativos atuais. De forma a responder a questão, foi usada uma abordagem de “mais-diferentes” para a seleção de casos, com a inclusão de um período de análise que permitisse a variação de condições externas às instituições. A investigação parte da possibilidade de real ação de representantes, mulheres e homens, para representarem mulheres, tendo em vista os constrangimentos de seus partidos, relações interpartidárias, capacidades institucionais, posições de poder internas, relações de gênero institucionais e suas motivações individuais considerando suas ambições eleitorais dentro do possível em seus sistemas eleitorais.

Os países selecionados foram Brasil, Reino Unido e Suécia, locais com sistemas de governo, eleitorais e culturais variados. Os dados analisados são compostos das ações legislativas de cada país dentro do intervalo de tempo entre 2000 e 2017 e de entrevistas e observações feitas em trabalho de campo. Os resultados mostram que o gênero do/a representante é relevante, com mulheres sendo mais propensas a representarem mulheres, mas que isso é mediado pela ideologia partidária. Por outro lado, não se pode negar a importância de atores críticos, mulheres e homens individuais que tendem a ser os principais proponentes, seja em matérias relevantes ou em quantidade de ações. Isso é verdade para ações positivas e negativas, tendo em vista que existe, de fato, um backlash em relação aos direitos das mulheres, a partir principalmente de homens, mas também de mulheres, da direita e extrema-direita, acompanhado de uma ação de proteção a esses direitos.

A capacidade institucional media a ação de todas e todos, seja as possibilidades de ação oferecidas pelo legislativo ou a interação com o executivo. Sendo assim, os efeitos reais de ações legislativas, incluídas aquelas contrárias aos direitos das mulheres, devem ser observados em consideração não somente do que é passível ser aprovado, mas seu efeito na opinião pública e, conseqüentemente, no apoio a candidatas e candidatos ao executivo.

## ABSTRACT

The research was done based on premise about what we want and expect from political representation should be based on real possibilities for action, even if starting from normative assumptions. Therefore, the research question asks under which conditions the representation of women happens, from current legislative institutions. In order to answer the question, a “most-different” approach was used for case selection, with the inclusion of a period of analysis that allowed for the variation of external conditions. The investigation is based on the real possibility of action by representatives, women and men, in representing women, considering the constraints imposed by their parties, inter-party relations, institutional affordances, internal power positions, institutional gender relations, and their individual motivations along with electoral ambition within the capabilities of the electoral system.

The countries selected were Brazil, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, places with varied systems of government, electoral systems, and cultural backgrounds. The data analysed is comprised of legislative actions from each country between 2000 and 2017 and interviews and observations conducted during fieldwork. The results show that the representative’s gender is relevant, with women more likely to represent women, but that this is mediated by party ideology. On the other hand, the importance of critical actors cannot be overlooked, individuals who tend to be the main proponents, whether in relevance or in amount of actions. That is true both for positive and negative actions, as the existence of a backlash against women’s rights was found, mainly from men, but also women, from right-wing and extreme-right parties, accompanied by an action of protection of these rights.

Institutional affordances mediate the actions of all, whether it is in possibilities of action offered by the legislative or in interaction with the executive. Consequently, the real effects of legislative actions, including those contrary to women’s rights, should be observed in consideration of not only what is possible to be approved, but also in their effect in public opinion and in the support of candidates for the executive.

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## **List of acronyms**

### *Brazilian states*

Acre - AC

Alagoas - AL

Amapá - AP

Amazonas - AM

Bahia - BA

Ceará - CE

Distrito Federal - DF

Espírito Santo - ES

Goiás - GO

Maranhão - MA

Mato Grosso - MT

Mato Grosso do Sul - MS

Minas Gerais - MG

Pará - PA

Paraíba - PB

Paraná - PR

Pernambuco - PE

Piauí - PI

Rio de Janeiro - RJ

Rio Grande do Norte - RN

Rio Grande do Sul - RS

Rondônia - RO

Roraima - RR

Santa Catarina - SC

São Paulo - SP

Sergipe - SE

Tocantins – TO

*Brazilian political parties*

MDB - Movimento Democrático Brasileiro

PTB - Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro

PDT - Partido Democrático Trabalhista

PT - Partido Dos Trabalhadores

DEM - Democratas

PCdoB - Partido Comunista Do Brasil

PSB - Partido Socialista Brasileiro

PSDB - Partido Da Social Democracia Brasileira

PTC - Partido Trabalhista Cristão

PSC - Partido Social Cristão

PMN - Partido Da Mobilização Nacional

PPS - Partido Popular Socialista

PV - Partido Verde

AVANTE - Avante

PP - Progressistas

PSTU - Partido Socialista Dos Trabalhadores Unificado

PCB - Partido Comunista Brasileiro

PRTB - Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro

PHS - Partido Humanista Da Solidariedade

DC - Democracia Cristã

PCO - Partido Da Causa Operária

PODE - Podemos

PSL - Partido Social Liberal

PRB - Partido Republicano Brasileiro

PSOL - Partido Socialismo E Liberdade

PL - Partido Liberal

PSD - Partido Social Democrático

PATRIOTA - Patriota

PROS - Partido Republicano Da Ordem Social

SOLIDARIEDADE - Solidariedade

NOVO - Partido Novo

REDE - Rede Sustentabilidade

PMB - Partido Da Mulher Brasileira

*Swedish political parties*

S - *Socialdemokraterna* - Social Democrats

M - *Moderaterna* - Moderates

SD - *Sverigedemokraterna* - Sweden Democrats

C - *Centerpartiet* - The Center Party

V - *Vänsterpartiet* - The Left

KD - *Kristdemokraterna* - The Christian Democrats

L - *Liberalerna* - Liberals (before 2015: FP - *Folkpartiet* - People's Party)

MP - *Miljöpartiet* - Green Party

*British political parties*

AP - Alliance Party

CON - Conservative

DUP - Democratic Unionist Party

GRN - Green Party

IND - Independent

LAB - Labour

Lib-Dem - Liberal Democrats

PC - Plaid Cymru

SDLP - Social Democratic and Labour Party

SF - Sinn Féin

SNP - Scottish National Party

UKIP - UK Independence Party

O mandato de uma mulher negra, favelada, periférica, precisa estar pautado junto aos movimentos sociais, junto à sociedade civil organizada, junto a quem está fazendo para nos fortalecer naquele lugar onde a gente objetivamente não se reconhece, não se encontra, não se vê. A negação é o que eles apresentam como nosso perfil.

The term of a Black woman, from a favela, from the periphery, needs to be in line with social movements, with the organised civil society, with whoever is doing something to make us stronger in that place where we objectively do not recognise ourselves, do not find ourselves, do not see ourselves. It's the rejection of what they present as our profile.

*Marielle Franco (Brazilian city councillor, murdered in 2018)*<sup>3</sup>

## **Introduction: Gendering politics, gendering political science**

### *Research question and goals*

The goal of this dissertation is, ultimately, to gender the study of institutional politics. Rather than look at legislative institutions at the culmination point of power and a great equaliser of gendered differences, we must understand that gendered dynamics exist within it, both affecting women MPs and the representation of women in the country. Consequently, research question *under which conditions the representation of women happens, from current legislative institutions?* focuses on how the gendered dynamics of society are reproduced within a legislative chamber as well as other institutional hindrances that are imposed on the specific representation of women and the act of representing by women. This leads us again to wonder on the presence of women MPs and the representation of women and the connection between the descriptive and substantive facets of representation. This dissertation combines a comparative approach and mixed-methods in order to evaluate who is representing women and how.

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<sup>3</sup> I was writing the first version of this section in 15 March 2018. On this day, in Brazil, we were reeling from the brutal assassination of Marielle Franco, city councillor for Rio de Janeiro. Franco was a Black woman, a human rights activist, a fellow social scientist, openly bisexual, a mother, and came from Maré, a favela in Rio. She wore those identities proudly and she fought for equality and peace. Her murder is a direct consequence of the 2016 coup, which ousted President Dilma Rousseff from office. Rousseff, a guerrilla fighter during the military dictatorship (1964-1985) would have never ordered a military intervention in Rio de Janeiro, the same intervention Franco spoke against and demonstrated daily the brutality that came with it. While her killers have been caught, the person who hire them have not. I cannot pretend that this dissertation exists in a vacuum in which women do not die for who they are and for their beliefs. This is my thank you and my homage to a woman who fought and died for a better country, for all of us.



### *The structure of this dissertation*

This dissertation is structured from the general to the specific, beginning with this introduction, which serves to discuss the place of gender in political science and analysis. The goal of this section is to give the dissertation breadth and reason. Why is it important to re-consider our analyses on anything politics from a gendered perspective? Who are the authors who discuss these matters from a general perspective, allowing us to pursue more specific questions? How can power and politics be disengaged from the power struggle of our daily lives?

Giving way to this introduction is the first chapter, which brings in the theories of women in politics. My goal there is to funnel the topic further, specific political science and sociology theories that have formed our discipline and informed this study. Divided into three subsections, I discuss the *othering* of women, now not as political scientists but as political objects of study; the specific question of women within institutions that are deemed “neutral” despite their construction by men and for men; and finally, women as representatives and represented, using Pitkin’s (1972) theory as a springboard.

Chapter 2 explains the methodology and methods used throughout the dissertation, including case selection and operationalisation of hypotheses. There were many aspects when considering the countries chosen and conforming them to an approach that made them comparable. The main variable was, however, the consistent presence of women in parliament, in similar numbers, over time.

The third chapter uses primary and secondary data to analyse the infrastructure of each parliament through a gendered lens. This is something that has not been done enough and it normalised the view of parliaments as spaces in which all survive equally. However, the research shows that there are different obstacles and expectations for MPs based on gender.

Chapter 4 brings the bulk of the analyses, as the datasets are reported on there. Using content analysis, descriptive statistics, and inferential statistics, this chapter demonstrates that women are, indeed, the ones responsible for the representation of women in each country, and presents data and discuss what is the representation of women. In it, I propose that analyses on women’s representation using content analysis and/or key word search considers women’s

lives in a broader manner, in order to adequately obtain relevant data. I also present strategies used by MPs in the representation of women.

The final section concludes, presenting both a summarisation of the results, including a comparison of the countries and the analytical breakthroughs the data has allowed this study to achieve. First, the overall context of the political system, namely how the electoral system shapes representation incentives; and second, the presence of hegemonic feminist discourses that allow MPs engaged in women's substantive representation to push their agenda forward.

### *The gender of politics*

At its core, political science studies power and power relations. Although there are many conceptualisations of what power is and how it is applied, using a gendered perspective means, first and foremost, that one sees the relationship between men and women as one of power, in which the former have it and the latter do not (KENNY, 2007; SAFFIOTI, 2009). Consequently, this dissertation begins by stating itself to be feminist, that is, to come from the assumption of a gendered power dynamic between men and women.

The assumption that feminists are biased, unlike non-feminist (usually men) political scientists, is mistaken. Feminist political scientists are just as likely to be biased as any other – but the self-perception by non-feminist political scientists or, as Harding calls them (1987), androcentric, that they are impartial and objective is, in fact, the source of their bias. Haraway (1988) develops the argument that all knowledge comes from *someone* who, in turn, comes from *somewhere*. Naming it “the god trick”, she explains that none of us, no matter how scientific, has the ability of an all-seeing eye and an all-perceiving and knowing mind. We cannot shed who we are and that understanding is the only way to bring about scientific objectivity. “Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledge” (1988, p. 581), that is, the understanding of one's place and perspective and the enabling of a relationship to be formed with the object of research (which in the case of a social science can be very important). In between total relativism and single vision, there is the contextual knowable, the critical, partial knowledge. The understanding that all knowledge and knowledge production comes from a place, a context, a system. “Equality of positioning” is nothing more than a tool of pretence to equality, “a denial of responsibility and critical inquiry” (ibidem, p. 584).

Science has also been the place of Western white men (HARAWAY, 1988; SPIVAK, 1999; EMEJULU, 2018), who determine what is scientific, who is a scientist and what is good science. Even when not men, the Western perspective can be quite imposing on other scientific and social movement communities (MOHANTY, 1984; CARNEIRO, 2005; MONAGREDA, 2016). When feminist scientists demand accountability for who the scientist is and how that has shaped the knowledge they produced, they are being objective about how personal experiences and humanity affects scientific work. Knowledge is grounded and positioned and must be held accountable. As Spivak argues, any feminist theory or practice must begin with the awareness of how it is shaped and marked by prevalent discourses. The construction of “Truth” means necessarily “strategic exclusions”, the definition of what is and is not, and it means understanding the Western scientific endeavours as “recognition by assimilation” (1999, p. 281). Feminist pursuits also fall into the traps of imperialistic homogenisation through the use of this “Western” perspective and singling out sexual difference in a global way only when suitable and in a homogenising way (MOHANTY, 1984; SALEM, 2013; 2016; BALLESTRIN, 2017).

Thus, ever as we feminist critics discover the troping error of the masculist truth-claim to universality or academic objectivity, we perform the lie of constituting a truth of global sisterhood where the mesmerizing mode remains male and female sparring partners of generalizable or universalizable sexuality who are the chief protagonists in that European contest. In order to claim sexual difference where it makes a difference, global sisterhood must receive this articulation even if the sisters in question are Asian, African, Arab (SPIVAK, 1999, p. 148).

I adhere to Haraway’s point that feminism is about a critical view as much as science is as well. Feminism, as she says, is “about a critical vision consequent upon a critical positioning in unhomogenous gendered social space” (ibidem, p. 589), while location is about vulnerability and openness. Science is what is contested and contestable. I also adhere to Spivak’s critique that feminism has its own homogenising view and its own expectations of what “feminists are supposed to be”.

That is, admitted or not, politics and ethics ground struggles over knowledge projects in the exact, natural, social, and human sciences. (...) How to see? Where to see from? What limits to vision? What to see for? Whom to see with? Who gets to have more than one point of view? Who gets blinded? Who wears blinders? Who interprets the visual field? What other sensory powers do we wish to cultivate besides vision? (HARAWAY, 1988, p. 587).

A gendered analytical perspective does not imply that the scientific method is not used to its most rigid detail. Many have mistakenly attributed feminism's contributions to science as a method, that is, techniques, while the actual contribution is a different approach to evidence gathering (HARDING, 1987). If epistemology is a "theory of knowledge", methodology is a "theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed", and methods are the techniques to gather and analyse evidence (ACKERLY, TRUE, 2013, p. 136). Then following a feminist methodology means using any mixture of scientific methods available that have a critical gender perspective. No technique is inherently feminist, but its application must be.

One important aspect that Harding highlights is the contrast between feminist epistemologies and positivistic ones, positing, similarly to Haraway, that impartiality and neutrality do not exist in the moulds determined by a positivist perspective. Thus, she identifies three benefits coming from feminist epistemologies: 1) the critique of the perfection of the scientific method which, in its "perfection", allowed for so much sexism and androcentrism to go unchecked; 2) the removal of the opaqueness of woman as knower, understanding that science can reach objective results while realizing the gendered experience of the scientist; 3) the realisation that the most "objective" results from feminist research have come from studies in which the politics of the women's movement guided the research process (HARDING, 1987, p. 26).

However, if there is no feminist method, what are the method implications of a feminist methodology? Following the previous three, we have: gender as an analytical category; women's experiences as generative of research problems; and a practice of gender-sensitive reflexivity, inserting the research back into the world and their relationship with it. It is through the recognition of one's background and context that objectivity lies. The researcher is not transparent, invisible, or impartial, but has a responsibility towards the research process to account for who they are and how that might affect the research. On the other hand, once one understands how science, and political science and politics for that matter, are gendered, the methods, the techniques, they stay the same in their technical nature, but not in their application.

...the emerging practice of insisting that the researcher be placed in the same critical plane as the overt subject matter, thereby recovering for scrutiny in the results of research the entire research process. That is, the class, race, culture and gender assumptions, beliefs and behaviors of the

researcher her/himself must be placed within the frame of the picture that she/he paints. (...) Thus the researcher appears in these analyses not as an invisible, anonymous, disembodied voice of authority, but as a real, historical individual with concrete, specific desires and interests-and ones that are sometimes in tension with each other. (HARDING, 1987, pp. 31-32).

Returning to Ackerly and True (2013), a feminist methodology means paying special attention to power relations, how they are indeed relationships, how they might be expressed in inclusion-exclusion or marginalisation boundaries, and finally, as both Haraway and Harding point out, situating the researcher. When a researcher asks a question on gender but does not follow a gendered perspective, that is, does not consider the gendered (and racial, but more on that later) power relations in the context studied, that study will undoubtedly be flawed because it will not take the core issue to task. In summary, feminist researchers do not use any different methods and techniques; but they use them to reveal “concealed power dynamics” (ACKERLY, TRUE, 2013, p. 135).

This brings the notion of the politics of research. Why is this question being asked and not another? Why does this get funding and not something else? The choice of question is itself a political act. Feminist scholars do not only do their research, but they also critique the general discipline of political science. As certain concepts are developed in apparent, but not really, “gender-blind” view (WAYLEN et al., 2013; WAYLEN, 2015), feminist political scientists are forced to revisit old-established ideas, re-analyse them, and re-structure them whether that is the ultimate goal of the research or not.<sup>4</sup> This means that feminist-minded scholars will often engage in “double-jointed” research, that is, doing a two-fold study that may or may not create change in the mainstream.

The inclusion of women, feminism, and gender in political science has happened slowly and it is not devoid of some of the same tribulations and power struggles we find in the world of politics. Political science has always sought to demonstrate that it belonged in the scientific world. In between methods and techniques and the aforementioned positivistic epistemologies, the ideal of neutrality actually allowed that societal biases affected academic

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<sup>4</sup> One interesting example is Pamela Paxton’s paper “Women’s Suffrage in the Measurement of Democracy: Problems of operationalization” (2000), in which she demonstrates that the conceptualisation of democracy without considering whether women could vote has serious consequences in “(1) identifying transition dates, (2) describing the emergence of democracy, and (3) understanding the causes of democratization” (p. 97).

departments in order to become a façade of impartiality. Therefore, parallel to the exclusion and then marginalisation of women in politics, there is the exclusion and marginalisation of women as commentators of politics and knowledge producers (GONZÁLEZ, 1988; CARNEIRO, 2005; ALMEIDA, 2013; ASHER, 2013; EMEJULU, 2018). Finally, women are also excluded and marginalised as the subject of research, with the assumption of the “abstract individual”, inevitably, a copy of its creators, male, heterosexual, white. As much as in any other scientific field, women were assumed to be slightly different men, smaller, lesser, unnecessary to account for. But the models were wrong. The political scientists were wrong (NELSON, 1989). The exclusion of half of the population from research based on nothing but untested assumptions and prejudices is just “bad science” (HAWKESWORTH, 2005; LOVENDUSKI, 1998). There was nothing in positivistic epistemology that demanded it or even a hypothesis test done.<sup>5</sup>

Political science, founded at the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century chose to ignore women and their places both in the private and in public spheres, including academia. Indeed, the “founders”<sup>6</sup> of the discipline even opposed universal suffrage (NELSON, 1989; TOLLESON-RINEHART, CARROLL, 2006). Since its inception, political science made sure to render invisible or marginalise any type of gendered perspective, whether because of a true belief in the liberal ideology of the gender-neutral individual, because of small-minded sexism that does not believe that this is the role of political science or, more importantly, the former being used as a façade for the latter.

The incorporation of female political scientists brought about certain changes to the research process, mainly in an incremental way. During a first moment<sup>7</sup>, the more common efforts were what are now described as “add women and stir” (BECKWITH, 2005; LOVENDUSKI,

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<sup>5</sup> Theorists such as Carole Pateman and Jean Elshtain questioned liberal democracy and contract theory, exposing the gender-neutral individual as nothing other than a white man. In the analytical separation of the public and private spheres, the woman is made submissive and invisible in both spaces – but there is no public sphere without the woman in the private sphere (PATEMAN, 1993; WALBY, 1990; 1997; WAYLEN, 2015).

<sup>6</sup> “Founders” is a difficult word to contend with. Here, the authors cited mean the first few who called themselves “political scientists” and founded a university political science department. However, we can argue that many preceded these “founders including women.

<sup>7</sup> Phase, moment, wave, are all generally inaccurate in that they seem to determine beginning and endpoints that are clearly defined and separate, which is not really how academia or life works. However, there are contexts in which certain actions seem to be prevalent. In the case at hand, certain questions, issues, and a more generalised body of work allowed for other developments, as scientific pursuits often require one question to be answered before another is put forward.

1998; WAYLEN, et al., 2013), in which women were added as categories in surveys or became subjects of research in more traditional ways (SAFFIOTTI, 1976). What Lovenduski (1998, p. 335) highlights, is that funding issues also plagued research back then, and much of the research agenda had to be dialled back and done through reanalysis of existing data or with small, locally focused research designs, which helps to explain the association of research on women with qualitative research designs. This moment in research also focused in analysing women in traditional political arenas, discussing descriptive and substantive representation, and “presence without empowerment” (WAYLEN, et al., 2013, p. 10). The following moment was marked by studies of the politics conducted by women in the places where their presence was common: if women were excluded or marginalised from “traditional” politics, where and how were they acting politically? This brings us to the current moment in gender and politics research, in which broader gendered societal patterns are under analysis, in which gender becomes the lens through which power relationships are analysed, but also comes under scrutiny with intersectional critiques.

For the purposes of this dissertation, gender is a multi-defined and given how these concepts are linked, it is hard even to analytically separate them in order to effectively communicate them. However, one must be constantly aware that *gender* and *women* are not the same and it follows that gender studies and women’s studies, while they may be closely linked, are not necessarily the same.<sup>8</sup>

Lovenduski (1998) makes two important points when it comes to using gender as a methodological tool and as a variable. The first is the importance of using a well-theorised reference of gender, especially in quantitative studies where the gender binary seems inescapable. The parsimony of the model is not a good enough reason to ignore the existence and complexity of gender theory. The second, an extension of the first, is that any good research on gender understands its existence on a spectrum or continuum. Whether quantitative or qualitative, “the uses of sex and gender must be explicit of effective research

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<sup>8</sup> Gayatri Spivak (1999) argues that “gender” has been deployed as a neutralising tactics in politics, particularly international politics in relation to developing nations. She makes this argument by showing how the United Nations changed their slogan from “Women in Development” to “Gender and Development”, centralising the white woman as figure of modernity and fixating nationalities and cultures of the “other woman”. Salem (2016) and Emejulu (2018) argue that “diversity” has become a way to maintain the status quo while using token symbols that do not actively engage in change.

is to be designed” (ibid., p.340). There is absolutely no reason why a political scientist cannot be aware of gender differences and possibilities and include those in their studies, whether allowing for more categorisations (although I would avoid “other”) or considering the space in which those questions will be asked.



In districts of Nangarhar, there are married women between ages of 16 to 80 who are sold when either her husband needs money or wants to marry another girl. This practice has been done for years now, and it has recently increased because there is no rule of law and there is no punishment of the criminals.

*Angiza Shinwari (member of the provincial council, Afghanistan, murdered in 2015)<sup>9</sup>*

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **The theories of women in politics**

#### *Power and otherness*

Nirmal Puwar (2004) describes how being a “space-invader”, an unexpected figure in a homogenous environment can feel like being a land animal in water. While others swim along, the Other feels the weight of the water, slowing its movements, hindering its breath. In another context, this may be a river fish in the ocean. They can swim, but the water is denser, the salt is painful. Neither animal can fully comprehend how the other feels, but the land animal knows what it is like to be out of the water and the river fish knows what it is like to be in its element. I would like to use Puwar’s imagery in order to articulate the ideas of power and Otherness and how the possibility to act freely is not available to all members of society.

Power is an elusive concept in political science, as it has been defined and re-defined by various thinkers and lines of thought. Here, I will follow the summation of Allen (1998) and Lloyd (2013), who divide these varied conceptualisations into different categories. Allen subdivides feminist characterisations of power into “power-over”, “power-to”, and “power-with”. Lloyd (2013) summarises descriptions of power into power as a resource, as domination, as capacity (to act), and as productive. I will briefly explain these and how they have been structuring elements in this dissertation.

Power as resource sees power as a “having of something that is scarce”, money, property, respect even. Iris Young (1990) argues that resources are not power but merely an expression of it. Power-over, Allen states, subsumes power as domination since having power over

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<sup>9</sup> Angiza Shinwari was killed in a bombing, after alerting authorities about threats made on her life. Even though she wore a niqab, she was still perceived as too progressive, since it allowed her eyes to be visible.

something is not always a domineering act. Dominating is defined as constraining someone else's choices in such a way that they are directed to make a choice against their interests or desires. Power to act is the individual ability to desire to act and doing so without reprimand. Power-with is how Allen includes the collective empowerment of social movements, feminist movements in particular. It is through collective empowerment that one achieves autonomy. Power as productive, Lloyd explains, is Foucault's definition of power, also taken up by Butler, viewing the paradoxical nature of power as something that is done and something that does, that builds.

The critique on power as domination is its lack of view on the powerless and how it removes any agency from, in this case, women. Allen critiques feminist views of power-to as excessively focused on *feminine* empowerment and the exacerbation of difference. Power-to has no concept of autonomy (BORDIEU, 2000; 2002; BROWN, 2006; BIROLI, 2016) as the status quo of how choices are distributed is unquestioned. It follows that, if an individual cannot go outside the choices laid out for them, and they are also not able to question that context, power-to is only the ability to choose within, for instance, gendered roles.

I argue that theories of power come from either an individual or relational perspective. Conceptualisations of power focused on the individual are concerned with lack of constraints over one's choices and actions. These would be power as resource, as domination, as capacity. Although power as domination does account for the possibility of the dominated, the perspective is of the one with power. A relational perspective considers the interconnection of power as a complex web of domination, production, resistance, collective action, and autonomy (YOUNG, 1990; BUTLER, 2010; SAFFIOTI, 2009). In that sense, power can be domination, but the perspective is no longer individual. In addition, power is defined through structures that organise society. This is when feminist theorists will first expose the private and public divide as something that enables men to exist in both spheres to the detriment of women and the restriction of their choices (WALBY, 2001; BIROLI, 2016).

In power as productive, power is what binds but it is also what builds and this is its paradox (FOUCAULT, 1982; BUTLER, 1997; ALLEN, 1998). If we consider power as its most basic definition – to be able to – it is, in its first content, constructive. Building on that, while power

over something means control, it also means the capacity to shape and construct. As Butler considers the paradoxes of constructing the subject as Foucault posits, one is left to wonder the purpose of this power as well as its constitution and attributes. To perceive power as external is to miss its inner workings on the subject and the acceptance of that power, as Bourdieu himself also stated. Power is not merely an external driving force, but it is something that constructs our individual identities and our placement in society.

An individualistic account of power has the serious problem of not thinking seriously about the social group, the collective, and how that power chain is linked throughout society. Power as resource and power as capacity are narratives that can easily fall into the tale of meritocracy and individual effort which leads to the creation of what Saffioti named “alibi-women” (2009). “Alibi-women”, a notion that can be applied to any marginalised group, are the women “who have made it”, politicians, CEOs, CFOs, famous elite artists, news anchors, university professors, film directors, and pop culture stars. Women who seem to “prove” that there is no systematic gender inequality and oppression, since they have money, power, fame. Arguably, in a country with few women MPs, they can also be ascribed that title. Saffioti argues that these women are not excluded from the same issues that other women face. They are stereotyped, judged on their appearance, constantly made to justify their success and most of all, are used to justify the oppression of others. As Carneiro (2005, p. 304) argues, tutelage, being able to act only under the permission of another and as long that they allow, “is the involuntary compromise of autonomy”. With this in mind, it is only through the empowerment of all that real autonomy can be reached. Returning to Puwar’s example, I would like to consider that real power is not needing to think about or consider your power, either over yourself, others, or of others over you.

It is interesting to contemplate that in Portuguese, power can be a noun or a verb, while in English, anecdotally the language in which everything can become a verb, it is not, unless we consider an expression such as “to power up”. In Portuguese, it is possible to use the phrase “I power”, meaning “I can” or “I am able to”. “Power”, as a political concept, seems to me, to be wrongly defined as a noun or, at least, not completely defined as such. Power is doing, is acting, is existing, as Puwar (2004) would put it, like a fish in water, without pain, without fear. To be less abstract, it is walking down the street unafraid of male violence or police brutality, is defining personal identity and appearance for one’s own pleasure, is not

being concerned with where the next meal is coming from and knowing where your roof and your bed are. It is being a candidate and becoming elected without having any concern if the rules were fair or not, meritocratic or not, if the financing was unjust or not. It is going to work every day, going to the legislature, without any concern if you will be called a slur, threatened, or accused of arriving there unfairly. It is proposing a bill without worrying if your colleagues are going to ignore it based on who you are, rather than the merits, or even your party. It is being able to propose the bill at all. The issue with having power or being imbued with power is that one is able to dispense with it at every moment; systemic lack of power, being a woman, being a non-white person, being disabled, being poor are constant sources of concern for those in that situation. Being a power-holder means not having to think about that power. However, it is necessary to admit the existence of reflective power-holders, individuals who are able to consider the privilege they have and are able to act on, but choose to share it or reject it.<sup>10</sup>

In comprehending power as multi-faceted and multi-purposed, we can bring other concepts, we can bring the Other more fully. *Othering*, defining, codifying, giving shape and name to another is the most powerful act (SPIVAK, 1988; HALL, 1997; FREIRE FILHO, 2004; CARNEIRO, 2005). There are now many theories that develop how the Other is perceived and inserted into society and politics. Saffiotti (1976), Mohanty (1984), González (1988), Spivak (1988; 1999 2016), Crenshaw (1989), Walsh et al. (2006), Kergoat (2010), Patil (2013), Almeida (2013), Salem (2013; 2016), Asher (2013), Quijano (2014), Carastathis (2014), Hirata (2014), Alvarez (2014), Monagreda (2016), and Ballestrin (2017), are only a few in a multitude, that discuss class, sex, gender, ethnicity, race, colonialism and postcolonialism, and imperialism, and how the interactions of these different structures of power create different life experiences for groups of people in the world. Intersectionality (CRENSHAW, 1989) is no doubt the most *travelled* of all (SALEM, 2016), to the critique of some (SALEM, 2013; RIOS, SOTERO, 2019) given its contextual perspective to the lives

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<sup>10</sup> There is the question of power and privilege as theoretically separate. Power being something productive and privilege, something inherent would certainly point in that direction. However, while the nature of power has been thoroughly discussed, privilege has been a common sense word, and remained on theoretical sidelines. Can privilege be acquired? Is having money privilege or power? Is there a difference? These are important questions, but this is not the place to address them and shall remain using power as the theoretical reference.

of black women in the United States and its focus on juridical methodology rather than a conceptualisation of power.

Latin American decolonial thought follows the idea that modernity began with the colonial effort in America and the creation of a racial hierarchy in the division of the world (ASHER, 2013; LUGONES, 2010; MONAGREDA, 2016; QUIJANO, 2014; WALSH et al., 2006), in the formulation of “coloniality of power” by Anibal Quijano. Coloniality of power, Quijano will say, is the axis that connects labour, gender, and race in the now former colonies (LUGONES, 2010; QUIJANO, 2014). It is his argument that colonialism although having ended its formal structures, maintains through coloniality of power the classifications and power relationships developed over centuries.

In Lugones’s critique of Quijano, she designs the “modern/colonial gender system”, demonstrating that gender was always at the heart of the colonisation effort. The gender-power relations of the colonists came to be imposed on the gender(-power) relations of the colonised, peoples who may or may not have had their own conceptualisations of gender and power. For Lugones, race and gender classifications go together, separating white women from indigenous and black women. Gender and power in the colonising act go beyond the establishment of the gender binary on the colonised peoples and the subjection of sexual violence on non-white women. It is also about men and masculinity, with the representation of the “virgin lands”<sup>11</sup> being “penetrated” by the virile, heroic, courageous explorers, in contrast with the natives who were smaller in stature, represented as uninterested in work or progress and feminised. Decolonisation would not require a negation of what has been produced, but it would require “to take seriously the epistemic perspective/cosmologies/insights of critical thinkers from the Global South thinking *from* and *with* subalternised racial/ethnic/sexual spaces and bodies” (GROSGOUEL, 2007, p. 212).

One relevant aspect of discussing *othering* when it comes to political representation is the gendered aspect of the *ideal legislator* (ALLEN, 2013; BJARNEGÅRD, 2013; BERGQVIST et al., 2016b; BUTLER, 2010; KENNY, 2007; KROOK, MACKAY, 2011; MACKAY et al.,

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<sup>11</sup> Interesting to note that in Portuguese and Spanish, “lands” is a word that is gendered female which helps in this symbolic construction.

2010; MANSBRIDGE, SHAMES, 2008; PRENTICE, CARRANZA, 2006; WAYLEN, 2014). In the introduction, I brought up the issue of what is the “ideal” political scientist and how the study of women and gender is still considered niche or even outside the norm. This is accompanied by the notion of who is the representative that we conjure up in our minds – possibly a college educated, white man or, at best, a man who has made his way up in some grassroots movement, usually a union. In any case, *men* is the norm and *women*, the Other, under an expectation to do a “different kind of politics” (BERGQVIST et al., 2016b). In that sense, studies on political issues at large do not have gendered perspectives unless the issue is specifically on women, for instance, abortion or childcare. “Mainstream” research on elections, ambition, campaign finance, party dynamics, etc., rarely present gendered perspective as that would mean the research is “about women”, rather than about the object itself. Consequently, not only are white, heterosexual, cisgender men perceived as the norm, and any deviation from that, the Other, issues that may pertain to that Other more closely are also deviations and not of interest to the whole of society or political science.

Moreover, the importance of bringing in these conceptualisations of Other and their political and epistemic implications is that it helps me define a particular instance of a power relationship, which is backlash. Mansbridge and Shames’s (2008) define backlash as a process of *dynamic resistance*, in which actors who lose some or all of their ability to achieve their goals react against that loss. They characterise backlash as necessarily a reaction that involves coercive power and the reclaiming of the power as capacity that was lost. They note the importance of power as capacity in the backlash dynamic because of the sharply felt pain of loss of that type of power, more so than a material loss, and the disorganisation of what is normal and natural for the individual. The latter is what makes power as capacity not able to encompass the discussion of backlash. Shames (2008) herself argues that backlash works through cultural messages that minimise women’s efforts, reinforcing individualism, and claims that equal rights have been achieved (FALUDI, [1991] 2006; INGLEHART, NORRIS, 2016).

It is understandable that someone will react when something that belongs to them is taken away – when it is literally stolen. However if, as Foucault (1978) said, power has purpose and it does not exist without resistance – then what is the place of backlash in the formulation of society’s values, rules, norms, and expectations, beyond the reaction to the subversion of

stereotypes? In the next section, I will discuss informal rules and their use for enforcement of the status quo. Backlash would fall into this category of informal rules, being more than a mere reaction to a momentary occurrence (SUPERSON, CUDD, 2002) and reasserting the power relationships that are being subverted or rejected. While Faludi is correct in seeing it as a “system”, I argue it would be more accurately described as acts of opposition that are loosely connected.

As backlash is a movement towards regression (SUPERSON, CUDD, 2002), it makes sense that its theorisation is not thought out in the same manner as are the actions of actors for change. However, if we understand power as relational and backlash as a power dynamic, then we must see that backlash also has its leaders, its pioneers, its instigators, the people or groups who drive the movement. This is not to say that backlash is always a concerted effort. As Superson and Cudd argue, backlash must, to be considered so, have the driving force of a systematic logic behind it, although it can come in the form of a single action. Backlash can come from impromptu actions and since the advent of social media, it is often the sum of several individual actions that are, at least at first, disconnected. Consequently, backlash can take the form of a reaction to people breaking informal rules or a reaction to people questioning or attempting to change the status quo. These possible changes would mean that people with more access to any kind of power are not only being criticised for how they achieved that, but being demanded upon to give it up. The reaction to that can be, for instance, trying to formalise tacit rules such as dress codes; or it take the form of personal attacks, subversion of rules allowing power-holder to give in while taking more elsewhere, or the development of an even stricter framework. One example of the latter is the development of “gender ideology”, a smokescreen created by conservative Catholics and taken up by other Christian denominations to reinforce gender roles, which has been gaining strength since its inception in the mid-1990s.

I have described power-holders as people who do not have to (but may choose to) think about their power. They go on about their lives unconcerned about sustenance, leisure, violence. Their presence in the world is recognised and it is taken as natural, so much so, that it is not something that they have to consider in their daily lives. They work, eat, marry, buy things, run office, become elected. Backlash, seems to me, to be the reaction of power-holders when they are made to think about their power, when they are confronted with the fact that not only

do they hold power, that it is not the “natural” way. For them to have it, for them to exist as they do, means that someone else has to be, at least slightly, powerless. Backlash is the reaction they have not only when they are confronted with the existence of their power, but when they are made to share it or dispose of it.

In discussing women’s substantive representation, several of these conceptualisations will come into play. Most importantly, these perspective guided data collection, manipulation, and analyses. From the exclusion of women from the political sphere, their subsequent marginalisation, the differences among women and their access to political power and how they suffer system oppression, to how there are ultimately represented by elected officials (GONZÁLEZ, 1988; FRASER; 2010; RAI, 2018). In addition, women within legislatures face different structures of opportunities than men, and actors for women face different constraints in framing their actions. Representatives are not only subjected to their own gender roles and beliefs, but those are mutually constructed with their views of society, their ideological leanings, their goals for their own advancement, and what they believe they should do.

### *Feminist institutionalism*

At one point, the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados<sup>12</sup> had a dress code for all women, stating that they had to wear skirts. Recently, Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow decided that male MPs did not have to wear ties since women have a whole range of wardrobe they are allowed to choose from. In Sweden, unless they are attending the chamber, MPs dress in jeans or casual wear and carry backpacks; the chamber demands suits and jackets of both women and men. As I visited each parliament, I either knew or inquired on the expected dress code for visitors and researchers. I did not want to stand out, but I also did not want to be undervalued. Speaker Bercow, although having a point that women do have a multitude of choices in terms of wardrobe, does not understand that many women would embrace the chance to not have to think about what to wear that day, if it is comfortable, if it will look

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<sup>12</sup> I have chosen to keep the names of each parliament in their original language. The official translation of *Câmara dos Deputados* is *Chamber of Deputies*; notably, in Portuguese, the word is gendered, meaning only men. When discussing Brazilian representatives, I have often used the common “deputies”, but this should not be taken to signify any theoretical meaning.



good on camera, if her make-up is flattering, how painful are those heels, and did she wear the exact same thing last week on the same day of the week. Not to mention pockets.

The dress codes of parliaments are a simple, but a handy example of both the formal and informal rules that permeate parliamentary life. Studying parliament is understanding that there are multiple scopes in interaction; gendering the study of parliaments, even more so. If political science itself faces issues with gendered norms, why would it be different for one of its main objects of study?

The pivotal paper that has been the watershed in the study of institutions has been March and Olsen (1984), in which they explore what, to them, was a newfound approach to theorising institutions. The authors define this new institutionalism as a “blending” of old institutionalist theories and non-institutionalist approaches, placing emphasis on “the interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions” and “relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency” (p. 738) and re-envisioning the societal role in political and social processes. Mainly, this means a look inward for political institutions and their internal processes of creation and development. They conclude that the “institutionalism we have considered is neither a theory nor a coherent critique of one. It is simply an argument that the organization of political life makes a difference” (p. 748).

In 1986, Elinor Ostrom set out an agenda for the study of institutions, defined as rules, which were defined in opposition to “physical and behavioral laws” and to “formal laws”. For her, institutions are “action arenas”, where rules are enforced. They must be thought of not only in their existence and relationship to other rules but also as consequences of rules. For instance, Ostrom gives an example of a chamber with  $N$  members, immediately questioning why there are  $N$  members. The amount of members and the reasoning for that number is directly linked to how they are going to make decisions, or even the kind of decisions they are allowed to make. Ten years later, Hall and Taylor (1996) are able to formulate a more consistent perspective on what this new institutionalism *is* and perceive it to have three main groups: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. The first is concerned with asymmetrical distributions of power within institutions; the second, with behavioural assumptions and collective action problems; and the third with cultural practices and shared values within institutions.

In 2006, 22 years after their original paper, March and Olsen return to the topic, the theoretical definition of institutions and how to study them and state that an institution

is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances (March and Olsen 1989, 1995). There are constitutive rules and practices prescribing appropriate behavior for specific actors in specific situations. There are structures of meaning, embedded in identities and belongings: common purposes and accounts that give direction and meaning to behavior, and explain, justify, and legitimate behavioral codes. There are structures of resources that create capabilities for acting. Institutions empower and constrain actors differently and make them more or less capable of acting according to prescriptive rules of appropriateness. Institutions are also reinforced by third parties in enforcing rules and sanctioning non-compliance. (MARCH, OLSEN, 2006, p. 3).

Institutionalism, “connotes a general approach to the study of political institutions, a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between institutional characteristics and political agency, performance, and change” (idem, p. 4). In this conceptualisation, the authors allow as much variation as possible. Any institutionalist approach will face the criticism of its overt focus on balance, equilibria, and stability. It will either come from not allowing individual actors to have any sort of power, from de-emphasising structural constraints, or from ignoring unwritten rules of behaviour. Steinmo et al. (1992), Thelen (1999; 2003; 2008), Pierson (2000), Streeck and Thelen (2005), and Mahoney and Thelen (2010) all search for sources of institutional change and attempt to grapple with the possibilities of change being less than gradual. In this, concepts such as critical actors and critical junctures (NORTH, 1990; LAUTH 2000; 2004) arise, although often combined with some sort of structural-historical explanation.

One important aspect of institutional life is its daily routine. Often overlooked as relevant for the study of political processes and outcomes, I offer the example of entry into a parliament. All three parliaments have security protocols: Brazil and Sweden make use of colourful stickers, changed daily; all three have X-rays and ask why you are there; only Brazil has multiple entry points. These do not, however, reflect the experience of seeing the Swedish guard call an MP by her first name and be told that it is common when I have never seen it before; or the attempts to be sent away multiple times from the House of Commons queue because “you probably won’t be able to get in”; or, despite security at the entrance, the

easiness to go in and walk around the Brazilian legislature. These are the informal rules that permeate these places. It is likely that if I were black or Muslim man, I would have been treated differently, because the rules would not be the same. Similarly, if I were not wearing “appropriate” clothing and hairstyle.

The consideration of informal rules is not new (MEYER, ROWAN, 1977), but they have only recently (NORTH, 1990) been incorporated into the new institutionalism toolkit (LOVENDUSKI, 2011). Importantly, this is main criticism, in my view, from feminist institutionalists: other studies failed to account for the gendered and racialised modes of existence within political institutions. In part, this comes from the formal “institution” of electoral equality. Everyone who is elected to office, on the face of it, has the equal formal power (CHAPPEL, MACKAY, 2017). However, if as Lovenduski (2011, p. ix) states that “a central question of institutionalism is what it means to maximize power in a given situation”; and if as Mahoney and Thelen understand institutions as “*distributional instruments* laden with power implications” (2010, p. 8, italics in the original), then we have to take institutions to mean structured arenas of action with formal and informal rules of power distribution.

I do not mean to “frankenstein” several conceptualisations in the attempt to formulate a synthesis. Nevertheless, we have to consider that we are discussed here institutions that are recognisably bounded by history, formality, convention, as well as national and worldwide cultures and customs. Parliaments are the grand structures in which nation-states are (partly) housed (RAI, 2010). Consequently, we are not only speaking of *an* institution, we are speaking of *political* institutions. These institutions are not only bounded by external boundaries, but also internal ones. Political institutions have formal and informal existences, which are conflicting, complementary, and combined. They are subjected to several of the same societal rules that exist on the outside, but also many more that apply only to them, as the dress code example shows. And it is that same simple example that begins to demonstrate the importance of *gendering* political institutions.

[F]eminist institutionalism critiques and seeks to overcome the gender blindness of existing scholarship in the field, to include women as actors in political processes, to ‘gender’ institutionalism, and to move the research agenda towards questions about the interplay between gender and the operation and effect of political institutions. On the other hand, it responds to the considerable analytical strengths of NI and the potential use of new institutionalist concepts and tools to help answer key questions of concern

to feminist political scientists. A dialogue across the approaches, we argue, provides important new insights for understanding and answering real world questions about power inequalities in public and political life as well as institutional mechanisms of continuity and change (MACKAY et al., 2010, pp. 573-574).

Although feminist institutionalism also conforms to the variants of new institutionalism, with the recent inclusion of discursive institutionalism (SCHMIDT, 2008; FREIDENVALL, KROOK, 2011; LOMBARDO, MEIER, 2014), its main advantage lies in blurring the lines between these and borrowing from the theoretical and methodological strengths. Gender scholars, in their study of marginalised groups, will search everywhere for possibilities of subversion, resistance, and change (KENNY, 2007; MACKAY et al. 2009; KROOK, MACKAY, 2011; MACKAY, 2014; WAYLEN, 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2015).

Rather than reproducing definitions that can be found in the cited literature, I would like to highlight the aspects of feminist institutionalism that were relevant in conducting this research. The first is how formal and informal rules interact and can be emphasised and de-emphasised dependent on context. That is, rather than perceiving formal rules as static until the actual moment of enactment of a new rule, it is important to understand that formal rules are also slippery and used inconsistently. In addition, some rules are followed so strictly, that the idea of changing them would be preposterous; others, when used, cause shock and awe since they existed on paper only. The first aspect is mainly derived from Streeck and Thelen (2005), Mahoney and Thelen's (2010) writing on the aspects of change within institutions and how they may come by displacement, layering, drift, and conversion and Mackay's (2014) addition to the importance of the "stickiness of old rules" and the "nestedness of the new within the old". Institutions and their internal norms, be they formal or informal, do not happen overnight and do not change upon clean slates. The manner in which they are changed (by being removed, combined, re-interpreted, or re-purposed, respectively) is dependent upon the power of the agent of change. From that comes the considerations made by Mackay, which essentially ask if these new rules will actually be applied as intended (and what was the actor's intention anyway?) (CHAPPELL, 2011).

The second aspect comes from the second feminist adage of the "personal is political". Informal gendered rules are not only in and around legislative institutions; they work through them, they shape them. Rules on networks, party alliances and loyalty, friendships, seniority,

all have gendered and racialised aspects that keep women and a few men at the back of the line for the distribution of power within legislatures. I also would like to invert that adage to the “political is personal”, because it is no small matter that these institutions were designed, their architecture, their rules of access, their rules of engagement, *by* elite men and *for* elite men. When even the right-wing women are harassed in the chamber by their colleagues and told to “go back to the kitchen”, as I was told in Brazil (BRc3), the political is very much personal. In that sense, every aspect of politics is gendered and racialised and every political institution must be analysed as such (CHAPPELL, 2006; SMOOTH, 2011; CHAPPEL, WAYLEN, 2013; KENNY, 2014).

### *The puzzle of representation*

Look, from the institutional point of view, it's popular terms achieved through free and sovereign elections. Now, political participation, it happens in different levels, situations and moments, so I try to see politics and the participation of women in politics in a broader perspective, her as a woman, her as citizen, her as worker, her as a political being. Anyway, in the broader sense of the term and her participation, she is actually limited in principle in the various spaces of political leadership, in the unions, in the workplace, in the social world in general, in the institutional space, understanding institutional space as the one connected to the state, the state structure. Now, with the phenomenon of women's underrepresentation, it's broad too, that phenomenon is broad, and that is a result of the characteristics of Brazilian society, it's a sexist society, patriarchal, and excluding, the state is an authoritarian state, it's a patrimonial state, so the dominant culture in the country is reflected in people's formation, men and women. The exclusion of women begins in the household education, then in the school too, society as a whole. So it's a cultural given that we have to consider, women's underrepresentation, it's a product of the characteristics of Brazilian society and the type of education that is given to girls and boys in the family itself. (Interview with BRd3).<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Original text: Olha, do ponto de vista político institucional são mandatos populares conquistados através de eleições livres e soberanas. Agora a participação política ela se dá em diferentes níveis, situações e momentos, então eu tento ver a política e a participação da mulher na política numa perspectiva mais abrangente, ela como mulher, ela como cidadã, ela como trabalhadora, ela como sujeito político. Enfim no sentido mais amplo do termo e a sua participação, ela é inclusive a princípio limitada nos vários espaços de protagonismo político seja no mundo sindical, no mundo do trabalho, seja no mundo social de um modo geral, seja no espaço institucional, entendendo o espaço institucional aquele espaço ligado ao estado, a estrutura de estado. Agora, como fenômeno da subrepresentação da mulher, ela é ampla também, é amplo também esse fenômeno, isso também resulta das características da sociedade brasileira, é uma sociedade machista, patriarcal, excludente, o estado é um estado

What do we expect from political representation? Where do our eyes land when we look for it, what do our minds envision when we think about it? What kinds of words are we expecting to hear when we listen for political representation? When Hannah Pitkin wrote *The concept of representation* more than 50 years ago, her purpose was to demystify and reorganise the conceptualisation of representation and, specifically, political representation. She found that social scientists had become lost in a quagmire of analogies and contradicting subdefinitions that ultimately led either to confusion or nowhere. She went back to basics, to Latin and German, to philosophy, to Hobbes and Burke. In doing so, she created a theory of representation that allows us to build on what representation *is* today and what it *should* be.

Of course, any work is liable to be misunderstood or understood only partially. Pitkin splits her book into ten chapters and organises the facets of representation thusly: first, she presents the formalistic views; then “standing for” (descriptive); third, “standing for” (symbolic); and lastly, “acting for”. This is not by chance. She explains thoroughly how each facet is incomplete and moves on to the main characteristic that it lacks, until it forms a complete whole. However, in doing so, many have perceived her to put emphasis on “acting for”, on substantive representation, on what is being done, rather than who is doing it (and how they arrived there). Many sought this as an opportunity to deny claims of descriptive representation to marginalised groups. As long as the actions are acceptable, it does not matter who is doing it. Of course, this means completely overlooking the rest of the book and the theory. It does not question the notions of how representatives come to be; “free and fair elections” are a matter of perspective, but to the ones unconcerned with who are the candidates and who becomes elected, just the act of voting suffices. It also hardly matters who is voting, as long as there are votes to count. They also ignore important sections in the book who outright state that descriptiveness matters. Feminist critiques to descriptive representation will argue that it is not and should not be the only way to achieve women’s representation, and that it excludes the actions of male actors.

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autoritário, é um estado patrimonialista, portanto a cultura dominante no país que se reflete na formação das pessoas, homens e mulheres. A exclusão da mulher já começa da própria educação doméstica, depois a própria escola também, a sociedade como um todo. Então é um dado cultural, que a gente tem que considerar, a sub-representação da mulher, é fruto das características da sociedade brasileira e do tipo de educação que é dado as meninas e aos meninos na própria família.

When this view of representation [descriptive] is applied to the political realm, the implication is that in politics, too, the function of representative institutions is to supply information, in this case about the people or the nation. (PITKIN, 1972, p. 81).

Perfect accuracy of correspondence is impossible. (...) Even a representative random sample (...) can only yield certain kinds of information; specifically, it is limited to information about numbers of individuals in a population. So it is always a matter of our purpose: Is it information that we need, and, if so, what kind of information – what features are to be reproduced, what will be significant?

In politics too, representation as a ‘standing for’ by resemblance, as being a copy of an original is always a question of *which characteristics are politically relevant for reproduction*. In a general sense, we are very much aware that politically significant characteristics vary with time and place and that the doctrines about them vary as well. (Idem, p. 87. Italics are mine.).

But the real difficulties come if we are to use accuracy of correspondence not as a source of information, but as a justification for letting the representative act for us. (...) As soon as the correspondence is less than perfect, we must begin to question what sorts of features and characteristics are relevant to action, and how good the correspondence is with regard to just those features. (Idem, p.88).

I have selected the above passages as they initiate the arguments developed by Phillips (1995), Mansbridge (1999; 2003), Young ([2000] 2010), Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005), Dovi (2009; 2018), Saward (2009), Murray (2014), Bjarnegård and Murray (2018), Celis and Childs (2018), Childs and Hughes (2018), Lombardo and Meier (2018), and many others. Anne Phillips, no doubt has the most known defence for a *politics of presence*, and a flow from presence to ideas. However, she does assume, as others, that Pitkin made some sort of stand “against mirror or descriptive representation” (p. 3). Mansbridge (1999) defends the use of group representation in specific cases, for reparation and integration in cases of extreme lack of trust. I bring up these two arguments because despite their use of Pitkin’s work and their own defence of descriptive representation, they have also perceived the facets presented by Pitkin as distinct “types”.

Like the other views we have discussed, representing as a substantive acting for others has its foundation in familiar examples of ordinary usage; but, like in other views, it has limitations. *It is not the whole concept of representation*. Obviously it cannot account for any kind of representation, any context, in which the representer is an inanimate object that cannot engage in activity. It cannot explain representative art, the representative sample, symbolic representation. (...) Like the formalistic view, it is of use to us, is relevant, where human representatives and their actions are involved, where one man’s actions are to be ascribed to others (or to an abstraction or organization). But it deals with substantive rather than formal

reasons for ascribing action. (...) Accordingly, only this concept supplies us with standards for judging the representative's action, for deciding whether he has represented well or ill (as distinct from whether he is a good likeness, a typical man).

This substantive concept is the 'something' that was missing from the authorization view – something having to do with limits on the representative, or standards to which he must conform. In descriptive and symbolic representation we saw hints of what that something might be, but we also saw that those views could not be directly applied to the realm of actions. The fact that a man or an assembly is a very good descriptive representation does not automatically guarantee that they will be good representatives in the sense of acting for, that their activity will really be representing. *In the realm of action, the representative's characteristics are relevant only insofar as they affect what he does.* (PITKIN, 1972, pp. 141-142. Italics are mine.).

Phillips and Mansbridge's views have changed (MANSBRIDGE 2003; PHILLIPS, 2012). However, as the above passage clearly shows, Pitkin never meant for these facets of representation to be considered separately and, in fact, she advanced much of the work that is being done now in the study and analysis of who representatives are and what it is they do. The reason why I added such a long passage, flaunting all good academic etiquette, is because the demonstration is there. In understanding Pitkin's arguments as "aspects of the complex relationship called representation" (YOUNG, 2010, p. 129), Young argues that social difference is a tool in representation, and as certain characteristics are politically relevant, difference is a resource in bringing to the fore different perspectives and even different issues. This would mean that to bring in someone *because* of their difference and their belonging to a certain group would also mean a *substantively* different experience in the act of representation.

As political scientists and theorists will often attach themselves to particular ideas and conceptualisations that will assist in the formulation of their considerations, often the focus shifts based on emphases given and contextual factors. For instance, Phillips (2012) states that Pitkin, in fact, found middle-ground in which a representative acts on behalf of someone, however, using "creative leadership" (p. 514). This is, indeed, quite different from what Phillips (1995) believed Pitkin was saying. Celis et al. (2014), on the hand, choose to focus on the aspect of responsiveness, interpreting that "substantive representation deserves to be privileged above all others because it captures a relationship between the represented and



representative in which the represented are ‘logically prior’” (p. 152). The full citation from Pitkin, however, reads

It is as if the idea of representation required a relative equivalence between the representative and the represented, so that the latter could conceivably have acted for himself instead, and the representative is in that sense a substitute. As the ‘re’ in ‘representation’ seems to suggest, and as I have argued in rejecting the fascist theory of representation, the represented must be somehow logically prior; the representative must be responsive to him rather than the other way around. (PITKIN, 1972, p. 140).

Well, the section is, in fact, explaining how a parent or guardian or children or vulnerable adults are not their representatives. The fact that the represented is “logically prior” in no way makes substantive representation more valuable than others in Pitkin’s view – it is just a matter of fact, as the relevant aspects to be considered in choosing a representative must be in existence prior to sending a representative to the representative institution. As there is the assumption that there might be characteristics that do inform on the actions of a representative, they might as well be chosen because they are women, black, indigenous, trans (and possibly, connected to groups, movements, and parties that articulate some of their demands). I would like, also, to call attention to what I interpret to be the most significant aspect of this citation: *Representation requires equality of minds*. If there is one thing that all of Pitkin’s interpreters agree on, is her view on representation as a process (1972, p. 224). It is also a “power relation” (p. 108; p. 233), and as both these things, accountability and responsiveness are required in order to keep the meeting of the minds. The represented are powerful as a collective, insofar as they are willing to accept the representatives as legitimate, and they will only do so if they have the real *possibility of access to power*, that is, access to the representative. But it is clear that they are capable of representing themselves and in this, representatives are citizens like any other. Pitkin views descriptive representation, on its own, as static, but when combined with the processes of accountability and responsiveness in the construction of substantive representation, all three are interconnected and moving. Legitimacy is a constant granting of approval of this system, of accepting and voting in elections, of contacting representatives, of organising in civil society movements.

The purpose of this discussion is not, however, to glorify Pitkin’s writing, brilliant as it is. Although she did make a distinct point of how representation was the combination of these facets that connection is not always obvious and is not always how or where it should be.

Leslie Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler (2005) bring forth an integrated model of women's representation, in which Pitkin's four facets of political representation are considered not only as linked but as impossible to be seen in isolation. Moreover, they are not connected linearly but form a composite in which each acts upon the other as the image below shows. The image is a modification of the one designed by Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005, p. 411).


Three relationships have become two-way as rather than one leading to the other, they are self-enforcing. The first is the relationship between formal and substantive representations, following the notion that while one first needs to become elected, it is what they do afterwards that will keep them there (MANSBRIDGE, 2003). I also interpret symbolic and descriptive representations as a reciprocal relationship (rather than only the descriptive leading to symbolic, the idea that "role models" serve to inspire future candidates and elected officials is taken into account). The need for the symbol, in this case, for seeing women in office, is quite often the reasoning behind the success of quota rules (BJARNEGÅRD, ZETTERBERG, 2014; MURRAY, 2014).

The third point I would like to highlight is the dual relationship also between symbolic and formal representations. Pitkin (1972) will use symbolic to mostly speak about symbols that are used to represent a nation or society. Symbols and traditions that embody the whole concept of the nation or nation-state are the ones that, in fact, uphold the *belief* that the state exists at all and that it is democratic. Symbols depend on belief and acceptance and they are the ones that legitimise not only a nation and a state, but also its democratic form, its political system, its gender roles. Although Pitkin does initiate this line of thinking, she stops short. Therefore, I stress this relationship, as I believe it has been overlooked in how it sustains political institutions (LOMBARDO, MEIER, 2014).

In addition, I have highlighted the relationship deemed by Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler as "the heart" of the model. An adequate functioning of representative institutions combines all of these facets, but at the core is the representative's ability to represent and be acknowledged as doing that job. In fact, as they rename "substantive representation" and call it "policy responsiveness" they should have also renamed "symbolic representation" and called it "legitimacy", although Pitkin (1972) does not really make that claim. In accommodating

Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler's and Pitkin's views, it would seem that a responsive representative body could be deemed symbolic of representation. I, however, resist the idea of replacing "substantive representation" for "policy responsiveness" as the latter would attach a necessary "doing as society asks" which would require a method that analyses if representatives are responsive to whatever NGOs, lobbyists, civil society groups, social movements, and any other type of societal demands.

Graph 1: A slight modification on Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler's integrated model of representation



Source: the author, based on Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler (2005).

In acknowledging that representation is more than elections, it is more than presence, and it is more than actions, the idea of how to define who represents who is still floating about. When Mala Htun (2004) asked how to include gender and ethnicity as politically relevant characteristics, she made the point that these should not be included in the same way, that is, using the same toolbox of institutional possibilities. Folke et al. (2015) have a strong demonstration of this for the Swedish case, as the gender quotas in use there have not increased the representation of ethnic minorities. In order to have both, to consider both gender and ethnic minorities, one must combine these tools, although that is also not a guarantee for the election of ethnic minority women (BIRD, 2016). Htun argues that these groups are different; women exist throughout the whole of society, in every socioeconomic class, in every ethnicity, in every age cohort, in every sexual orientation. This is the argument

that plagues descriptive representation: *which women* (BIRD, 2016; CHILDS, KROOK, 2009; CELIS, CHILDS, 2012; 2018; CELIS, 2012; CELIS et al., 2014; CHILDS, HUGHES, 2018; DOVI, 2009; FREIDENVALL, 2016; SMOOTH, 2011)?

The idea that women need and should be represented as a group bring complex questions of who and how, because *women* are not a social group. They are a demographical group, a sociological category, but the ties that bind them are loose, disjointed, conflicted (SAFFIOTTI, 1976). However, so are the ties that bind ethnic minorities. And nations, and states, and nation-states, and federal entities. As Benedict Anderson (1991) and Spivak and Butler (2007) beautifully put, nations are figments of our imagination. The nation-state more so than any. So what makes the place of residence of a politician a characteristic that is more politically relevant than the fact he or she has a uterus?<sup>14</sup> Why are the state lines that divide the Brazilian federation so much more important for representation than being someone from an indigenous community? What it is important to understand is that just as women and ethnic/racial minorities are heterogeneous and conflicted, so are districts, states, municipalities, countries. Heterogeneity is not a good enough reason to deny any group place at the table or to argue that their representation is not connected to this or that group.

On the other hand, the table is only so big and not everyone has the time, the patience, or the willingness to sit at it, even if we theoretically remove all financial and social obstacles. That is the basic tenant of representative democracy – we choose someone to represent us so that we can go about our business. The fact of the matter than becomes: how do we choose the people we send? To assume that regular elections that are free of state and police interference are free and fair is more than simplistic. To ignore the exclusion of anyone not white and male for centuries from not only politics but economic endeavours that allow the accumulation of funds, as well as social and symbolic capital, is equally troublesome. Women do not have the same access as men to politics, in differing degrees of course, but something that applies to all, nonetheless. Phillips (2004) argues for an equality of outcome, randomness of results, a clear demonstration that the process has not been interfered with by unseen, informal obstacles. If women are half the population but are not even half the candidates, what is stopping them? Several studies demonstrate women’s lack of access to

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<sup>14</sup> To not want to exclude trans men, some of which do have biologically female organs.

funds, networks, social and cultural capital, and even self-confidence when considering running or running for office (MIGUEL, 2003; SACCHET, 2009; LAWLESS, FOX, 2010; MURRAY, 2010; RYAN et al., 2010; ARAÚJO, 2010; KENNY, MACKAY, 2011; GOMES, 2012; BJARNEGÅRD, 2013; BJARNEGÅRD, KENNY, 2015; MURRAY, 2015; FOLKE, RICKNE, 2018).

The vast majority of parliaments is and has been populated by men. It was men who had to approve women's right to vote, stand for elections, be members of parliament. On the other hand, as recent questions have shown, little is investigated about *which* men are present and what does that mean for the representation of underrepresented groups of men and the overall discussion on hegemonic masculinity and its effects on political representation (CONNELL, 1987; CONNELL, MESSERSCHMIDT, 2005; DOVI, 2009; CHILDS, HUGHES, 2018; BJARNEGÅRD, MURRAY, 2018) Does this mean that men represent women? Of course, but the content, quality, and intent must be questioned. Do the characteristics of the representative affect what they do? Who were the men who believed women should exercise their political rights? Why? And who is now, as women have come into parliament, the people who continue to advocate for women? Are women a group that receives legislation that is dedicated to them alone?

The complexities here are many and they are so for good reason. As the works of Smooth (2011), Celis (2012), Phillips (2012), Celis et al. (2014), Celis and Erzeel (2015), and many others show us, we do need to check our biases on what are women's interests or issues. Beginning with the basic premise that legislators do *claim* (SAWARD, 2008; 2009) to *act for* women, but do not claim to act for men in the same way, the initial interrogation lies in why that occurs. Women's exclusion from the political sphere has meant an accumulation of demands and needs<sup>15</sup> that still require particular attention. The plethora of women's and feminist movements are an indication of this, as well as the many international organisations' recommendations on women's rights. The fact of the matter is, as Phillips (2004) points out, that things do not happen by chance or coincidence. If there is marked gendered division in society, whether it is in women's political participation, access to healthcare, education,

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<sup>15</sup> For a discussion on the adequate vocabulary for women's representation – whether it be issues, interests, perspectives, concerns – see Beckwith (2011) and Childs (2013).

labour, and that division is not stimulated by formal rules, than it stands to reason that *something else* is happening that must be curbed.

Throughout studies in gender, feminism, and women's political participation, first we had the notion of analysing how many women were in parliament and arguing for critical mass; then, if they represented women; then, if they did so more often than the men in parliament; finally, we considered *which* women were in parliament and for which women were they acting; lastly, we remembered that maybe men also represent women. This is the rhythmic dance of descriptive and substantive representation. *Who is doing what and for whom* are the basic questions, looking to understand where does the link between represented and representative comes from.

Since women have access to resources in differing degrees, this means that some do have access (SAFFIOTI, 1976; 2009; WALBY, 2001; PUWAR, 2004; DOVI, 2009; FRASER, 2010; BIROLI, 2016; SPIVAK, 2016). They find themselves, through various uses of social capital, through professional or family connections, through party loyalty and working with social movements, as elected officials. They adapt to the electoral and political institutions that were devised, sometimes centuries ago, and had as one of their core beliefs that women should not participate in politics. Celis (2012) and Celis and Childs (2018) argue that a good representative must be measure by the representative process; that in order to find good representation, one must find *responsiveness*. I do not view this as such. While responsiveness can be a key aspect in the representation process, a representative does not need to be responsive in order to provide good representation. First and foremost, who would that representative be responsive to? Who are we claiming they represent? Secondly, representatives are and should be able to anticipate issues and demands, even if just to please a possible electorate (MANSBRIDGE, 2003). What Celis and Childs (2012; 2018) and Celis and Erzeel (2015) and Erzeel and Celis (2016) seem to fear is that we, women researchers, would superimpose *our* core feminist beliefs over what is representing women.

Given the importance of responsiveness, Celis (2012), Celis et al. (2014), and Celis and Childs (2018) argue for the importance of congruence between representatives' actions and constituencies' demands (in its varied forms). However, this would curtail representatives' freedom to act on behalf of the represented beyond what their constituents have requested of

them. As mentioned, their concern is with “diversity of claims” (Celis, 2012, p. 526) and our ability to move beyond our notions of what we would desire for women and who would bring them about (CELIS, CHILDS, 2012; CELIS, ERZEEL. 2015; ERZEEL, CELIS, 2016). Celis and Childs (2012, p. 220) argue that researchers should pay attention to the claims made by conservative women and how responsive they are to women in society. Dahlerup (1988)<sup>16</sup> in her discussion of critical mass, concludes that a researcher looking into women’s representation should focus on critical actors, rather than trying to find a linear relationship between a percentage of women in office and legislation passed on women’s behalf. Celis and Childs (2012) and Celis et al. (2014) propose an inductive approach, rather than assuming that women are the ones acting for women, asking under which *conditions* does the substantive representation of women occur. They suggest nine questions, demonstrating that thinking about representation should go beyond actors and institutions and have a grasp of contextual factors.

(1) how is representation done; (2) who does it; (3) in relation to which women; (4) what policies; (5) where; (6) when; (7) why; (8) to whom is it accountable; and (9) how effective is the representation? (CELIS, CHILDS, 2012, p. 215).

Therefore, although, responsiveness is a key aspect in studying political representation, it is not a necessary requirement for women’s substantive representation. Representatives of women must be attuned to their represented, of course, but that could mean a myriad of people, interests, and issues. I propose that women’s substantive representation should strive to better the lives of women. That may seem, on the face of it, simplistic, but it allows for an inductive approach and for a “thick” description of women’s representation (MACKAY, 2014).

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<sup>16</sup> Throughout political science’s history the attempts to find a “skeleton key” have been many, and that has been no different when it comes to women’s representation. Indeed, the most famous of these has become the so-called “critical mass theory”, which derived from a paper published in the field of administration (KANTER, 1977), positing that women would only be able to make extensive change after reaching a minimal presence in the workplace. While that prescription was never truly taken up by feminist political scientists (DAHLERUP, 1988; 2006), it was discussed and researched, and taken up by the political world. The 30% mark became a regular phenomenon in electoral and boardroom quotas, despite the fact that most research into critical mass ended up with inconclusive results on its effectiveness (BRATTON, 2005; CHANEY, 2006; CHILDS, KROOK, 2006; 2009; DAHLERUP, 1988; 2006; GREY, 2006).

It is understood that there are women who are conservative, right-wing, and/or religious<sup>17</sup> and at no point is it maintained that they are not working in their own best interest or for women or believe they are doing so (CELIS, CHILDS, 2012). In fact, many studies on parliamentary women's caucus have shown that women representatives are quite often in agreement, with some conflict usually on reproductive rights due to religious differences (INTERNATIONAL IDEA, NDI, 2010; LAUSBERG, 2015; PISCOPO, 2014). Previous research has shown, and as the case studies demonstrate, that women members of parliament (MPs) diverge on contextual issues, split along party lines and are subjected to party loyalty sometimes more so than men and, as the concepts dealt with would lead one to expect, have diverging experiences and beliefs across not only religion but class, race, ethnicity, and sexuality. Women in conservative or right-wing parties have been key in advancing policies on parental leave, equal pay, domestic and gender violence, women's equal participation in politics, and prenatal care and while one might disagree with their reasons for acting for these policies, it is undeniable that they were in women's interests. Although women MPs tend to be more homogenous amongst each other than women in society and MPs in general are becoming more and more homogenous (MURRAY, 2010), they still have different alliances and commitments. Men are also representatives of women and they will often not only claim that representation but take on controversial policies that women MPs would be more heavily criticised for.

What is representing women after understanding what has been presented earlier? That women are not a homogenous group, that feminism itself is a contested concept, that there any number of ways to achieve the same outcome, or different outcomes could be achieved by the same action. How can one determine a dependent variable without essentialising what women want/need (MACKAY, 2014)? Moreover, there have been several studies conducted that look to the effectiveness of representation, that rely on the relationship between

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<sup>17</sup> Political divisions are contextual, both in time and location. Each country, in a given period, has different political rifts and varying ways of naming them. Conservative, liberal, left-wing, right-wing, these are all labels that signify a host of issues, beliefs, and belief-systems that are not the topic of this dissertation, particularly in an abstract form. Therefore, I will use these terms loosely for now and turn to more rigid definitions when I come to the case study chapters.



representative and represented. There are measures of congruency, checks for periodicity, applications on anticipatory representation (CHILDS, 2013, p. 507).

Researching the substantive representation of women depends on figuring out what representatives could possibly think that representing women is. Representing women can conjure up a whole set of ideas and contexts, but when talking about a legislative institution, we need to think not of what women want, but what representatives *think* women want. Their knowledge may come from direct contact with some section of the women's movement; it may come from being an activist; it may come from their religion; it may come from contact with a constituent; it may be programmatic of the party; but it is there and it has a source and a foundation. Bergqvist et al. (2016) argue that MPs have an external mandate, imposed on them by the electorate, and an internal mandate, which comes from the personal responsibility they feel they must account for beyond their geographical mandate and their party loyalty. Women, they demonstrate, have both an external and an internal mandate to represent women and will be penalised and if they do not act on them, while men do not face any consequences if they do not argue for any type of women's issues. In addition, when women do act on behalf of other women, they are seen as just "doing their jobs", while men are seen as "going above and beyond". This means women face a double bind of having to be loyal to the party but also true to women's interests and having to respond to the rest of their electorate.

As Mackay (2014) states, the substantive representation of women is more "probabilistic than deterministic" given the institutional constraints not only upon women but upon actions that would seek to change gender relations. Legislative action is also mediated by executive action (GAINS, ANNESLEY, 2010; CARVALHO, 2018). MPs act for their constituencies in all sorts of ways, through proposing bills, presence in debate, speeches, casework, internal debates with party leadership to decide on a vote, etc (CELIS et al. 2014). A study on substantive representation cannot satisfy itself with looking only at laws or even bills proposed. The question posed by Celis and Childs (2012) is "under which conditions". That is, *how* did a confluence of factors arise in which critical actors came together within a legislative institution, agreed on an action, took that action and in that represented women?

Returning to my original assertion, that women's substantive representation should strive to make women's lives better, I do not contend that there is only one way to improve women's lives. In striving for a "thick" description, I avow myself of the notions of liberal and republican liberties and of autonomy (CONSTANT, 1819<sup>18</sup>; SKINNER, 1999; RAWLS, 1996; EVANS, 2011; PARADIS, 2017). The substantive representation of women is thus defined through whatever legislative actions are available to legislators and through the use of the key words they use to claim their representation for women. Legislative actions look to structure the lives of society within nation-states, by defining what is acceptable behaviour and what is not, what will be sanctioned or punished and what will not, what is the common good and enhancing the communal quality of life and what is not. Not only the actions themselves, but the rhetoric used in them is indicative of how a society is willing to present itself and structure its daily life. As notions of common good and acceptability are inevitably contested, legislators will present their ideas in the manner they believe to be most likely to attract others to the same belief, in the hopes that their vision is admitted (FRASER, 2010; RAI, 2018). There is no neutrality, impartiality, or objectivity to this movement. The same can be said for my operationalisation of what is positive and what is negative in these actions. After all, the basic premise is that all legislators believe they are doing *good*, they are striving for a better society. My effort here is to make my conceptualisation transparent through the theoretical concepts I have mobilised thus far and will continue in the next chapters. Celis (2012) states

These outcomes [of the legislative process] should, of course, be responsive to women in society or to women's movements demands. Whereas the possibility that not all women agree with the final outcomes does not affect democratic quality, I contend that the exclusion of specific women's interests that are supported by specific groups of women in society *in the process* leading to a law or policy on women decreases its democratic quality and legitimacy. Responsiveness during the process of representation should thus be broad and include a plurality of women, women's organizations, and women's interests. (CELIS, 2012, p. 526. Italics in the original).

This idea of responsiveness during the process of representation for "good" substantive representation is continued in Celis et al. (2014) and Celis and Childs (2018). I contend,

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<sup>18</sup> Translation by Loura Silveira.

however, that this is an idealistic view of the representative process that, to borrow from Spivak, assumes the subaltern can speak.

The focus on the inclusion of groups, interests, and demands excludes the possibility of needs unspoken, that representatives are able to articulate the needs of those who cannot be a part of the process, because they are excluded from all the possible routes of participation, including via state sanctioned homicide through police violence. There are well-articulated elites of women and men who are able to voice their concerns in ways that others, even if organised, are not. This is not only an issue of access to power and those who are “in power”, but also of access to the basic necessities of life that make political participation and the voicing of concerns possible (CARNEIRO, 2005; RAI, 2010; SPIVAK 1999; 2016). This is not to say that legislators should take paternalistic stances and view certain (demographic) groups as incapable (no groups are), but that there are, for instance, women unaware that their rates of maternal mortality and feminicide are higher than others in a structural way. Moreover, we are discussing intricate relationships between social movements (participants and leaders), party leaders, MPs, women are politically-minded but not politically attached and, of course, women who have little or no connection to institutional politics. When Spivak argues that the subaltern cannot speak, she is considering women who are in such situations of oppression that they are unable to recognise themselves as oppressed at all. I would argue that subalternity is a range and dependent on several factors, including private and public factors, education, and even psychological health. Consequently, speaking on one’s condition of subalternity is not always possible, but it can be once one’s condition of oppression is known and the space to speak is either given or taken.

To make a basic assumption that the legislative process should *always* be responsive and inclusive of *all* societal demands means that there will be equal consideration for those that exclude women from basic access to healthcare, education, transportation, labour rights. In the specific case of reproductive rights, for instance, the fact that there are religious women who believe it should not be accessible to other women is irrelevant as the legalisation of abortion increases the autonomy of *all* women, including the ones who disagree with it. To take a different example, banning the use of burqas, niqabs, and hijabs is on a similar logical fallacy as outlawing abortion: it would take away women’s rights to religious freedom and the individual expression of their religion. Importantly, women who do profess the Muslim

faith should *feel* as free and protected to wear a burqa or a bikini. If any woman decides to change her mind on her individual expression of her freedom and autonomy, she should be able to do without any sort of societal or state repression. The fact that individual religious expression should be free does not mean it should be imposed on anyone. This has been the basic premise on which the categorisation of legislative actions as bettering women's lives by increasing their rights, liberties, and autonomy.

Since responsiveness is not a requirement for substantive representation, neither is any attachment to conceptions of feminism. SRW is connected to the idea of representing women without any pre-conceived notions of that would be – at least at first. In addition, in order to conduct any study of this nature, it is important to understand that women (whether they are MPs, politically active, part of any social movement) are not a monolith in their understanding of what they need, what they believe all women need, and what feminism is. While some women reject feminism altogether, others accept some forms or aspects of it; others have different understandings of it and how it should be applied; many incorporate their views on feminism with their party views and ideological leanings. Therefore, SRW means a thick conception of women's representation in a neutral fashion; labelling it as “positive” or “negative” comes with some feminist conceptions of women's freedoms and autonomies, but it is not necessarily so. A positive label on women's substantive representation would only mean that women would have access to more rights/freedoms/autonomy, that is, more power over their own lives. This does not, however necessarily means any application of conceptions of feminism, which we must understand, are not only varied, but not always accessible to all. This means that while someone may take action on women's representation, feminism in any form might have ever crossed their mind.

It also follows that, if at first I abstain from making any sort of judgement and only later will I consider positive and negative implications, initially SRW will include actions that could be considered as part of the backlash reaction to gender equality and women's rights. There are two reasons for this. The first is practical, as key word searches (which will be explained in detail in the next chapter) do not capture content. The second is theoretical; although some MPs are motivated by a backlash against women and are able to formulate that rationale, there are several who see their actions as something that could better women's lives despite all scientific knowledge to the contrary. Consequently, it is important to view backlash as a

concerted effort, even if made up of disconnected actions, and understand MPs actions contextually.

*What are the applications for this dissertation: a summary*

The goal of this chapter is to provide the foundation upon which the remainder of this dissertation is built. Taken together, the introduction and first chapter organise and summarise the literature that points to a generalised pattern of women's exclusion and marginalisation from politics and political science. Given the overall goal to use a gendered lens for the study of political institutions, these sections serve the purpose of situating the field, the research, and the researcher.

Thus, I began, in the introduction, by demonstrating the insertion of "women" as an element of research in political science and situated myself as a researcher. The importance of this is to reject the possibility of a completely impartial eye, a researcher who is unaffected by the world that surrounds them.

Chapter 1 provides the building blocks for the research question. *Under which conditions the representation of women happens, from current legislative institutions?* What are the infrastructure available, the institutional tools, the informal rules, the internal regulations that hinder or enable the actions representatives of women? Before we can ask that, we must ask what are the issues women face; how that is reproduced in a legislative space; how representatives are inscribed within legislative institutions; and, finally, what is to represent women. As women have been excluded and marginalised for centuries, institutions have been constructed, both physically and metaphorically, considering solely the needs of (white, cisgender, heterosexual) men and taking them as the norm. As women and more sections of the population that have been *othered* enter these spaces, questions have arisen as to whether their inner working are legitimate or even functional. In addition, these *others* have brought in questions and issues that had either been ignored or mishandled. It is a new space for representation and advocacy, but how does that come about within these male-conceptualised walls?

In order to answer these questions and address the concerns of the literature presented, I chose different countries (Chapter 2), in order to evaluate their differing adaptations and strategies (Chapter 3). Moreover, I test the hypothesis that links descriptive and substantive

representation, as well as discuss at length what are the issues that represent women (Chapter 4).

Candidatei-me à reeleição e voltarei a esta Casa, graças à Deus, como terceira mais votada no meu Estado, com 55 mil votos. Naquele meu pronunciamento, dizia que partia com saudades, mas exigia, em nome de todas as mulheres que fazem parte desta Casa, que no próximo mandato uma mulher participasse da composição da Mesa. É um direito dela. Mas hoje já vejo tentarem encaminhar as coisas da mesma forma, impedindo a participação feminina. Quero também, aproveitando este pronunciamento em relação aos direitos da mulher e do homem, apelar para os nobres pares que mudem seu pensamento, a fim de possibilitar a participação da mulher, hoje tão importante no contexto brasileiro e mundial. Somos maioria nas cozinhas, nos hospitais, nas casas de saúde, mas somos minoria no Congresso Nacional. Temos de evoluir nesse sentido.

I ran for reelection and will return to this House, thank God, as the third most voted in my state, with 55 thousand votes. During my speech, I said that I left [for the campaign] with a heavy heart, but demanded, on behalf of all women who are a part of this House, that in the next term a woman was part of the Board. It is her right. But today, I've already seen them trying to move things in the same way, stopping women's participation. I want to, as well, making use of this speech on the rights of woman and man, to appeal to my noble peers to change their thinking, in order to enable the participation of women, today so important in the Brazilian and world context. We're the majority in kitchens, hospitals, healthcare facilities, but we're a minority in the National Congress. We must evolve on this.

Ceci Cunha (federal deputy, Brazil, murdered in 1998)<sup>19</sup>

## CHAPTER TWO

### **The how-to of studying women's substantive representation: methodology and methods**

The following chapter will focus on the method and techniques in gathering the data and performing the analysis. Doing research is an ever-changing action and plans shifted during the process. The comparative method, in the sense presented by comparativists, is not a technique as one would name a survey or an in-depth interview (HARDING, 1987; HALL, 2003), but seems to be closer to a “methodology”, a strategy of analysis that can use any number of methods and techniques to fulfil its data collection and analysis goals (LIJPHART, 1971; MORLINO, 2010).

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<sup>19</sup> Ceci Cunha made this speech 12 days before she was murdered by a contract killer hired by her alternate. She was the first woman elected for federal deputy from Alagoas.

In Arend Lijphart's now classic paper (1971), the comparative method<sup>20</sup> is perceived as a substitute for the statistical method, when that one is not available. Lijphart's preference for the statistical method comes from its ability to control relationships through partial correlations, given its higher number of cases (1971, p. 684). When considering *Patterns of democracy* ([1999]2012), for instance, he uses a comparative approach with a high number of cases in order to detect relationships between a small number of variables. He is not looking for situations particular to each country; he wants to see if there is a relationship between democratic rules and democratic stability. These methods do not exclude each other; however, Lijphart sees them existing as steps, rather than in combination, that is, the comparative method for hypotheses building and the statistical method for testing. I have chosen to compare as a way to direct my research because this would allow me to control the variables that have been connected with women's substantive representation, even contextually (MORLINO, 2010, pp. 22-23). Comparing has cognitive, explanatory, and applied functions, respectively, allowing the researcher to describe a different country's experience, investigate what varies among countries in search for explanations of similar phenomena, and study different solutions created in other countries (idem., p. 26).

However, countries, as similar as they may be, will not always present the same operationalised variables (MORLINO, 2010; PRZERWORSKI, TEUNE, 1982). If I am looking for women's substantive representation, I cannot expect to find it being done using the exact same institutional tools in different countries – I would not even expect it in a within-case analysis, for instance, looking at the federal and the local levels or at different timeframes. This means that there needs to be a qualitative aspect to the research that allows the researcher to get to know the cases in order to evaluate and describe properly the variables and their relationships (KROOK, 2010, p. 891; SANTOS, 2012; REZENDE, 2014). These questions also mean the space-time facet of research, the strategy of investigation that the researcher will choose for the case and timeframe selection.

In institutional studies, there is an underlying difficulty in finding linear relationships that can explain cause and effect when discussing institutional politics, given the presence of

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<sup>20</sup> I will continue to use "comparative method", as done by the authors, in order to not create any further confusion.



exogenous and possibly unseen variables (SANTOS, 2012). Institutions lead to results but specifying that relationship and how institutions act is another matter. small-n research usually is interested in *sets of causes*, rather than determining a single cause to a single effect. The use of combined research strategies can allow the research to show that set X leads to effect Y under conditions Z (REZENDE, 2014).

### *Gendering comparative politics*

Another important comment on comparative research is the gendered blind spot of political science. Caraway (2010) defines gendered comparative politics as studies that undertake the comparative method to study political phenomena while using gender as either a dependent or independent variable. By “gender” she means a relational category of analysis that defines gender not as “women”, but as a power relationship between binary identities. That is, “gendering” is not merely including or studying women, or studying men and masculinities, as long as there is an understanding of this underlying power differential. In fact, Caraway argues that understanding and incorporating gender into comparative politics research in a broad way would mean the denaturalisation of heteronormativity in studies, and I would go further as to suggest that this denaturalisation of gender and gender roles might develop more cutting-edge research as political scientists would incorporate an extra tool of analysis in their arsenal.

As comparative politics takes on an important role within political science, so much so that it has its own divisions in several associations, the exclusion of gender research within this field is quite glaring. Not only in comparative research but any politics studies that take on a gendered perspective, researchers find themselves isolated and their findings ignored (CARAWAY, 2010; SCHWINDT-BAYER, 2010). As Waylen (2010) points out, the expression “comparative politics of gender” is quite different from “gendered comparative politics”. In these papers, from a symposium organised on the issue of comparative politics of gender, they are arguing for a refocusing of comparative politics *on* gender, that is, looking at the big questions comparative researchers ask and using them to study gender, which Waylen does herself by looking at democratic transitions. In fact, Schwindt-Bayer argues for gender research to become more comparative as well as gender being integrated into comparative research. I, however, would also argue in favour of a gendered comparative

politics, as I believe it transforms comparative research, and political science research itself, at its core. Macro-comparative research always leads to unexpected results beyond the research question (RUESCHEMEYER, 2003, p. 320).

### *Choosing the cases*

As Gayatri Spivak notes when she speaks of India, my first case selection was an “accident of birth”. Since “casing” (VENNESSON, 2008)<sup>21</sup> is finding something in everyday life that is taken for granted, I began with wondering about the descriptive representation of women in Brazil and how those numbers have remained steadily low despite a proportional representation system and electoral quotas. On the face of it, Brazil has an electoral system that would be minority-friendly, but since 1988 the percentage of women in the Câmara dos Deputados has gone from roughly 5% to barely 10% in 2018.<sup>22</sup>

However, when considering the possibility not only of a higher presence of women, but also of critical actors and tokenist strategies, it is important to analyse what happens when there are different numbers of women present. However, that is not a feasible study using Brazil alone. The graph below shows the absolute number of women in the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados since women began to be enfranchised, excluding reelections (ALMEIDA, GOMES, 2018).<sup>23</sup>


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<sup>21</sup> There are three epistemological acts: case selection, theory building, and empirical observation (VENNESSON, 2008, p. 231).

<sup>22</sup> The 2018 elections brought the highest percentage of women to the Câmara dos Deputados ever, with 15%, beginning in 2019.

<sup>23</sup> The enfranchisement of women in most countries is usually a process, allowing first women with financial autonomy, women with permission from their husbands, etc. The year that marks the anniversary is usually just the year this process began. This is definitely the case for Brazil.

Graph 2: Women elected to the Câmara dos Deputados since enfranchisement



Source: Dados Abertos, Câmara dos Deputados. Does not include re-elections.

I went through the possible combinations of variables that would enable or hinder women's presence and women's substantive representation (FEARON, 1991). This was the second moment of case selection. Originally, I wanted from different cultural backgrounds, particularly in relation to their role in colonisation, hoping to have some sort of control for general cultural aspects. Considering the importance of the electoral system in ensuring greater diversity in the election of representatives, it was important to include countries with proportional and majoritarian representation, as well as with different types of quotas (or no quotas at all) (BERNAUER et al., 2015; BOIX, 1999; DAHLERUP, FREIDENVALL, 2010; HTUN, 2004; LIJPHART, 2012; MURRAY, 2014; NORRIS, 2004). After narrowing my selection down to what was feasible, including the need for qualitative fieldwork, I settled on Brazil, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, as the table below shows. Using a small number of cases does not necessarily limit the possibilities for the study, provided that case selection is done in a way that would test whatever hypotheses are under question. (RUESCHMEYER, 2003). This turned into developing a most-different systems design (PRZERWORSKI, TEUNE, 1982), in which, despite a careful thought-process of what could be the relevant factors other than women's presence, "the question of at which level the relevant factors

operate remains open throughout the process of inquiry” (idem, p. 36). As the following chapters will show, the selected countries turned out to be more different than expected in several relevant ways.

**Table 1: Selected countries’ general characteristics**

Country	World region	Electoral system	List type	Quota type	% of women in Parliament – 2000 (Lower house)	% of women in Parliament – 2018 (Lower house)
<b>Brazil</b>	South America (colonised by Portugal)	PR	Open	Candidate quota (30%)	5.7%	10,7%
<b>UK</b>	Northwestern (coloniser)	Europe Majoritarian	FPTP	Voluntary party quotas	18.4%	32.0%
<b>Sweden</b>	Northwestern (small colonising actions)	Europe PR	Closed list	Voluntary party quotas	42.7%	43.6%

Source: the author based on IPU, the Quota Project, respective constitutions.

A timeframe had to be selected, with at least one of the countries having a high and stable number of women in parliament, which was achieved in selecting Sweden. Picking a continuous period of time allows me to control exogenous variables (DALHERUP, FREIDENVALL, 2010; HUGHES, PAXTON, 2008) such as recessions and economic growth, the executive being led by a woman, critical junctures, political crises, favourable contexts, moments of controversy and backlash, etc. Choosing a timeframe is often quite arbitrary (GEDDES, 1990). I decided to have a starting point in 2000 and end it in 2017, although at some points this timeframe is slightly expanded. Any period of time chosen is slightly arbitrary, but beginning in 2000 and ending in 2017 gives me access to all possible variations in context while allowing the material to be current. At first, each data point is a political action (bill, law, public hearing, early day motion, minister questions), described by the independent variables: year of proposition, current status, number of authors, gender of first author, party/party ideology of first author, mixed-gender co-authorship, relationship with women’s autonomy/freedoms.

The last moment of case selection was turning a critical eye towards my three cases. Women’s substantive representation happened in all three countries and it happened before women were even allowed to vote.

**Table 2: Overall comparison of the selected countries**

Characteristics	Countries		
	<i>Brazil</i>	<i>Sweden</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>
<b>System of government</b>	Presidential	Parliamentary	Parliamentary
	Centralised federalism	Decentralised unitary	Devolution
<b>Electoral system</b>	Proportional representation, open list	PR, closed list with preferential vote	FPTP
	Large district magnitude	Low to average magnitudes	-
<b>% of female MPs in 2017</b>	9,9%	43%	33%
<b>Women's caucus</b>	Yes	No	No
<b>Women's committee</b>	Yes (2015)	No	Yes (2015)
<b>Political financing</b>	Heavily regulated	Restricted, but lightly regulated	Lightly regulated
<b>Gendered rules</b>	Mandatory candidate quotas; mandatory earmarked financing	Voluntary quotas	Voluntary quotas
<b>Population</b>	207 million	10 million	65 million
<b>Historic-cultural background</b>	Post-colonial; Portuguese tradition	Nordic, few colonies	Imperialism
<b>Executive</b>	Strong legislative powers; until 2016, considered strong	Strong legislative powers	Strong legislative powers
<b>Committee system</b>	Terminative powers	No terminative powers	No terminative powers
<b>Available actions</b>	Bills; constitutional amendment proposals; public hearings; requisitions, budget amendments	Interpellations; written questions; motions	Minister questions; early day motions; private members' bills, papers laid


Source: the author.

In fact, all three had male MPs who argued for women's right to vote. What I am asking is under which conditions does it increase or diminish? Who is doing it? How are they doing it? I believe that cases chosen on similar characteristics would yield similar results, although I am also inclined to say that each country has their idiosyncrasies (GEDDES, 1990; GEORGE, MCKEOWN, 1985). After making a preliminary analysis of the countries'

characteristics, I went into further detail, in order to ensure that they varied in the most important factors (Table 2). Again, the electoral system is highly salient, as it demonstrates the country’s institutional framework of inclusion.


The following graphs show the women elected to the British House of Commons and the Swedish Riksdagen since women’s enfranchisement in absolute numbers. The steady pace of growth for Sweden is worth noticing.

Graph 3: Women elected to the Riksdag since enfranchisement



Source: Statistics Sweden; [https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/demokrati/allmanna-val/allmanna-val-nominerade-och-valda/#\\_Tabellerochdiagram](https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/demokrati/allmanna-val/allmanna-val-nominerade-och-valda/#_Tabellerochdiagram)

Graph 4: Women elected to the House of Commons since enfranchisement



Source: the author, based on data from AUDICKAS, CRACKNELL, HC Briefing paper CBP7529, 2018.

### *Brazil*

Brazil has a complex cultural and political history, including changes in the system of government and coup d'états, several constitutions, and the combination of the current constitution with numerous legal instruments that pre-date it. All of this means taking into account the intricacies of the Brazilian political system and culture as developing over centuries of a colonisation that changed goals and modes, relied heavily on slavery and the imposition of gendered racial hierarchy while being glossed over with the image of “fumbling” Portuguese coloniser, and blending of colonial and imperial traits as Brazil became the centre of the dwindling Portuguese empire. Brazil prides itself on its reputation as a friendly nation, partly cemented in the myth of a racial democracy (while 70% of homicide victims are black and with ongoing land struggles between indigenous peoples and agribusiness). When it comes to political science, this shows in the production of research, which tends to, at best, marginalise gender and race to footnotes. I do not mean to say that Brazilian political science is not a rich field, with numerous researchers doing great work. However, very little of that work focuses on gender, race, and the political ramifications of

those social constructions and relationships of power. Brazilian political science and political science on Brazil tends to focus on the conundrum of coalition presidentialism, three levels of federalism, executive-legislative relations, electoral studies, and policy studies.

Perhaps because of the lack of close ties to Portugal, the image of the coloniser can be quite fuzzy. Part of Brazil was colonised by the Dutch for a time, has extensive borders with former Spanish colonies, and received large numbers of people from Italy and Spain (Southeast) and Germany and Austria (South) as settlers and had close business ties with the British and the French. Several cultural practices are regional and can be tied to the different historical experiences lived locally. On the other hand, patriarchy was very much a part of the formation of the country as whole, arguably as the uniting trait among all these different traditions (AGUIAR, 2000; REZENDE, 2016). As much as any other country, the cultural imperialism of the United States is felt routinely. Consequently, when we discuss the subaltern with eyes focused on Brazil, the picture is more complex than what we might expect (ALMEIDA, 2013). In Brazil, for instance, exists the exacerbated nationalism against which Spivak speaks; but that nationalism is used against imports from the United States, including, for some time, a rejection of feminism as a foreign thought (SCHMIDT, 2006). With that in mind, Ballestrin (2017) calls for a re-imagining on the concept of “imperiality”, as a way of denouncing the current structures of domination over formerly colonised regions. Imperiality, for her, is the force that generates coloniality.

Brazil has three electoral instances (municipality, state, union), it is bicameral at the national level, and uses a presidential system. Its legislative elections use proportional representation with an open list, with the D’Hondt formula, and no compensatory seats. Brazil is one of the few countries that combines proportional representation with the open list system and does so since 1945 (NICOLAU, 2004). District magnitude varies between 8 and 70, with these being non-proportional boundaries in order to safeguard against the overrepresentation of populous states and the underrepresentation of small states. This combination favours a multiparty system, which is combined with pre-electoral coalitions and rules that facilitate the creation of new parties (LIJPHART, 2012; NICOLAU, 2004, p. 36).

Brazil also has gender quotas for candidates, determining that 30% of all candidacies from each party or coalition be women. However, this rule was created along with an increase in



50% of candidacies that each party or coalition could present, essentially voiding the effect of the quota (ARAÚJO, 2001). In addition, the sanctions against parties are not worth the effort of complying with the law. By using an open list system and with extremely high district magnitudes, women candidates are essentially drifting in a “sea” of candidates (ARAÚJO e ALVES, 2007, p. 542; ALMEIDA e GOMES, 2018). Candidates compete within their own parties, which increases the need to raise funds for their own campaigns. Parties are interested in having as many candidacies as possible, in order to ensure the highest number of seats. Since the “well-positioned” members of the party will come out as the ones with the highest number of votes, they will be the ones guaranteed those seats (NICOLAU, 2006, p. 695). The electorate feels unconnected to the political system, since votes do not cluster and citizens feel their votes are “wasted” and do not have representation.

Women seem to have a better advantage for executive office, which is elected by majoritarian rule, although that only applies to small towns (MIGUEL, QUEIROZ, 2006; SPECK, SACCHET, 2012; GOULART, GOMES, 2018). In proportional elections, parties give support only to a privileged few, essentially forming an “invisible” list; in majoritarian elections, the support of the party goes entirely to that candidate. Most candidates, women or men, cannot count on party support and campaigning becomes the hunt for donations (SAMUELS, 2001a; 2001b; MIGUEL, 2003; NICOLAU, 2004; 2006; ARAÚJO, ALVES, 2007). Brazilian women candidates tend to get more individual donations, rather than corporate donations and are more reliant on public resources (International IDEA, 2014, p. 142). They complain about lack of everyday support from their parties and the privileging of male candidacies, regardless of party ideology (ÁLVARES, 2008; GOMES, 2015)

The Brazilian electoral system is extremely open and permeable which, paradoxically, makes it extremely reliant on the concentration of power and money. By allowing thousands of candidacies and proportional representation, the impression is that everything is in flux and that success is for anyone to grab. Nevertheless, the high level of uncertainty in the political contests leads investors and candidates to look for that certainty elsewhere: through money. The strong approximation of campaign investments and votes indicates that to ensure victory in a campaign, large amounts of funds are needed; since women are not the “typical”

candidate, they need to rely on party funds, raise money for themselves, and find other avenues for support (SPECK, SACCHET, 2012; GOMES, 2012).<sup>24</sup>

### *Sweden*

Sweden has four elections: for the Riksdag, for the district, for the municipalities, and for the European Parliament.<sup>25</sup> There are 29 districts for national elections; 20 districts for regional elections; and 290 municipalities. According to SVs1, it is possible that if those elections were not all at the same time, turnout would not be so high for local elections. Originally, and up until the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the Riksdag had four groups of non-elected members, representing the nobility, the clergy, the bourgeois, and the workers (GROFMAN, LIJPHART, 2002). In that century, a party system begins to form and from 1809 Sweden has what can be called a parliamentary system of government and separation of powers (TILTON, 1974; METCALF, SCHÜCK, 1987; HAGEVI, 2003). Women were allowed to vote in some municipalities due to the ambiguity in the law; in 1919, all women achieved the right to vote (LINDHOM, 1991).

The Swedish electoral system is an attempt to achieve balance between proportionality and party system stability. The country uses proportional representation with a closed list, but gives the option to choose individual candidates since 1994, for local elections and since 1998, for Riksdagen elections. In comparison to Brazil, district<sup>26</sup> magnitudes in Sweden can only be described as medium to small, but there are no fixed numbers and they use compensatory seats. In order to lessen the possibility of party fragmentation, Sweden uses a modified Saint-Lague formula and a barrier clause (4% of the national votes or 12% of the votes in one constituency). The modification was created by the Social Democrats, with the goal of strengthening one of their allies at the time, the Agrarian Union, and other medium-sized parties, as well as diminishing their own overrepresentation, while still blocking small parties. The change in the divisor from 1 to 1.4 was made evaluating which number (1.3, 1.4

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<sup>24</sup> Since 2014, corporate financing has been banned; however the ceiling for nominal donations is a percentage of each individual's income, which favours high-income donors.

<sup>25</sup> For the European Parliament, the D'Hondt formula is used.

<sup>26</sup> In Swedish documents, districts are referred to as "constituencies". <https://www.government.se/49150c/contentassets/4e2fdee5a8e342e88289496d34701aec/the-elections-act-2005837> and <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/SE/sweden-elections-in-sweden-guide>

or 1.5) would bring about the desired result. The modified Saint-Lägue also diminished the need for pre-electoral coalitions (GROFMAN, LIJPHART, 2002). Since 1998, the electorate has the possibility to vote for a single candidate, that is, choosing someone specifically rather than voting on the party list. A candidate with 8% of the party's vote share will be elected before any others on the party list (HAGEVI, 2003).

That combination lessens the strength of smaller parties, a goal expressed even in the Riksdag website and, although it does decrease the number of seats a large party would get with the D'Hondt or the common Saint-Lägue (Social Democrats and the Moderates), it reinforces their representation, making them unite with medium-sized parties in two voting blocs.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, the use of the modified Saint-Lägue is one of the reasons for the stability of the Swedish system, although the sustainability of the rule itself is arguably possible due to Sweden's cultural reinforcement of no-conflict politics and staying the course.

There are no gender quotas by law, a mistake often made and mentioned by several of my interviewees. Some parties have voluntary quotas, each using different rules, from recommendations (Moderate and Centre parties)<sup>28</sup> to the closed-list zipper system of the Social Democrats. That was only achieved through the organisation of the women in the party and their threat to leave it and form another (FOLKE et al., 2015; FREIDENVALL, 2016). Despite achieving stability with women's presence in the Riksdag, Folke et al. (2015) highlight that gender quotas have had none to little effect on intersectional representation.

Parties are highly organized internally and centralised, most with strong women's organisations (PIERRE, WIDFELDT, 1994; FOLKE et al., 2015, BÄCK, BERGMAN, 2016; interview with SVs4).

In the Swedish Social Democrats, Conservatives and Liberals there are three stages [of candidate selection]: putting forward names, ranking nominees, and adopting the list. The middle stage is most critical. Here the non-socialist parties often rely on meetings of activist members at the local and constituency level. In the Social Democrats the local nominating

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<sup>27</sup> After the reform that unified both chambers, in 1971, the Riksdag had 350 seats. However, the even number was problematic since in 1973 the two opposing blocs had 175 seats each and had to "flip" for some decisions (<http://www.riksdagen.se/en/How-the-Riksdag-works/Democracy/The-history-of-the-Riksdag/>). Starting in 1976, the Swedish population has 349 representatives (RAMÍREZ-GONZÁLEZ et al., 2014).

<sup>28</sup> [http://www.idea.int/news/upload/sweden\\_women.pdf](http://www.idea.int/news/upload/sweden_women.pdf)

committees and the constituency executives play a decisive role. The party lists are based on large, multimember constituencies. In ranking candidates on the party list, the party aims to produce a balanced ticket in terms of region, age, occupation and gender. (NORRIS, LOVENDUSKI, 1995, p. 202).

Sweden has little regulation when it comes to political financing and most of it has been created recently. Parties do not have to report on their campaign finances but do have to submit reports on their everyday upkeep.<sup>29</sup> Regulations reflect other aspects of Swedish politics, as I will show in the following analysis. It is the Swedish way to not control what people do, but expect that they act correctly and punish them severely with social sanctions if they do not.

Since the view of what is politically desirable varies significantly between countries, political finance regulations should vary accordingly, even between countries that are otherwise similar. An historical example of this is the regulatory system in Sweden, where a nearly total absence of limitations on the financial behaviour of parties resulted not from negligence, but rather from a political belief that the central role of political parties in Swedish democracy meant that they must be left free from government regulation. As the political culture in Sweden has gradually changed, support for this approach collapsed and, after much debate, new legislation has been developed (International IDEA, 2014, p. 14).

In researching Sweden, it became clear the importance of understanding the political system and the general political culture as how people combine their efforts in order to make change without making waves. It was also clear the need to clarify: Sweden's alleged easiness with gender equality; its political and economic stability; and following both of these, its welfare system. Whereas in Brazil it is necessary to understand the historical roots of inequality and the interference of money in politics, in Sweden the main question is the workings of the system not only as a whole, but as an integrated machinery (STEINMO, 2010). Even the parties themselves cannot be thought of individually, but as part of a system of parties that have their specific parts to play, even when that part is leadership (Social Democrats) or extremism (Sweden Democrats). The Swedish relationship with racism is also something that came into question, given the high number of refugees accepted into the country and the political polarisation that entailed, the rise of extreme-right populism, its relationship with the ethnic Finnish minority as well as the Sámi people, and its tentative past with colonialism.

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<sup>29</sup> <http://www.idea.int/political-finance/>

One aspect that was constantly highlighted by interviewees is that Swedes tend to focus on the negative rather than discuss the positive aspects of their society. This is true for their gender equality as much as anything else; Swedes are not supposed to “flaunt” their victories but point out what they could have done better and what they need to improve upon. Importantly, as most politicians and parties believe this common ground of Swedish equality, overall there is little that sets them apart. Currently, there are no large discussions on the validity of the system or the workings of Swedish society, given the proximity between parties on most issues, particularly the overarching themes of “Swedish values” such as equality, transparency, collectivity, hard work, secularism. Disagreements exist on enactment of policy, the role of the state in people’s lives, and assimilation of Swedish culture.

To find a clearly positive relationship between ‘welfare’ in Sweden and the economy, we must turn to other segments of the welfare system, only indirectly related to the economy. The fundament on which the Swedish ‘well-faring’ society rests is its system of universal and equal education, stretching from day-care to university, and including all kinds of adult schools and training programs. It is here that all Swedes are baptized in the water of Swedish culture and are taught its basic values, including work, equality, freedom, and democracy. Furthermore, it is here that they are trained in the basic skills that will turn them into good workers in their adult lives. Associated with this system are the various family-oriented programs that make it possible for women to work and adults to return to school. However, while the role of the universal school system in both inculcating the “Swedish ethos” and providing a high level of skill is critical, it should also be stressed that the students bring with them from their family environment expectations and values that are crucial to the success of their education. Indeed, as the students try to make sense out of such partly conflicting ideals as equality and cooperation on the one hand, and excellence and competition on the other, these expectations often prove crucial. (TRÄGÅRDH, 1990, p. 582).

One possible explanation for this homogeneity is the dominance of the Social Democrats for so many years, while other parties were left to be a part of the coalition or oppose it. Sweden’s party system has gone through significant changes recently, in a fast-paced manner – the Moderate Party grew and managed to form the governing coalition, it went from five to eight parties in the Riksdag, and now faces the presence of the extreme right-wing Sweden Democrats (BERGMAN, BOLIN, 2011; ERLINGSSON et al., 2014; HEIDAR, 2000). Despite all this, actual effects in policy are not as strong as it would be in other countries, given Sweden’s restraints on the Riksdag and this overall belief in Swedish values. Sweden’s welfare state has become an international staple and touching that legacy is no easy task.

On the other hand, there is still a clear divide between left and right in Swedish politics, with the blocs named the socialists and the bourgeois, and differences still ranging within economic issues with the addition of so-called identity issues. One main difference is that parties have changed their *modus operandi*, from mass parties to cartel parties, leading some scholars to believe in their approximation on the issues as a whole. The matter is, however, more nuanced: there is, indeed, a dispute for the median voter, mainly responsible for bring the Moderate Party to centre, a move by parties to distance themselves from the Sweden Democrats (while still trying to find ways to garner their votes in parliament), and diminish rates of party affiliation. However, as Hagevi (2014) discusses, Swedish parties still have much that divides them, in the traditional left-right spectrum of state involvement in the economy, and in the ideological spectrum of environmental issues, gender roles, and immigration.<sup>30</sup> Arguably, these matters are intertwined, as Bergman and Bolin (2011) note in the case of economy and environment. Much of Swedish politics is connecting issues to the economy, as I hope this dissertation will succeed in demonstrating. What is important to realise is that what is considered a large change, instability, or disagreement in Sweden, may seem small in comparative perspective.

### *United Kingdom*

The United Kingdom is the typical case of the electoral system that it invented itself, the first-past-the-post system, or Westminster model (NORRIS, 2004; LIJPHART, 2012). In a way, it is the more complex of the three, given that it does not have a cultural resource that can be drawn upon – it is the imperial cultural resource that dominated half the world for centuries. Now, the UK is faced with feelings of English isolation that had Brexit as a consequence, and it is forced to reconcile that with the more gregarious and independence-seeking objectives of Scotland and Wales. The UK is a country and a parliament with difficulty in letting go of the past and its traditions while it deals with extremely modern issues of gender equality, immigration, integration, globalisation, etc. A clear measurement of this is *The Good Parliament Report* (CHILDS, 2016), which points out several outdated aspects of parliamentary routine that could be modified in order to ensure a more representative and

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<sup>30</sup> To clarify, I have some basic knowledge of Swedish, which allowed me to use Google Translate and other online tools for any websites and texts in Swedish only, including legislative actions.

equal access parliament, not only in gendered aspects, but as a whole. As the basic descriptor and characteristic for the countries I have selected is the electoral system, there is no better example than the country that essentially created representative democracy and majoritarian rule attempting to grapple with the need for gender quotas, in the form of all-women shortlists.

The UK's strong sense of tradition and history is partly translated into a "historicisation" of its political elements. The Parliament, the monarchy, the electoral systems, the kingdom itself, all of it is inscribed with a symbolic sense of immutability and respect for the "ways things are done". In that sense, the electoral system is very straight-forward as it retains much of its "original" characteristics. Some of this history is detailed by Pitkin (1972) and Lijphart (2012), but one thing that I would like to point out is that the UK's system and history is so detailed and present in the British political routine that we seem to act, on occasion, as if there were an original system, rather than a building and re-building of rules and customs. On top that, a heavy layer of "tradition" is added that obscures the conflicting aspects of what occurred prior to the present outcomes (EMEJULU, 2018; MYCOCK, 2009). One aspect of this is the idealisation of parties and party loyalty, which from afar looks like strong ties and proximity, which for Labour and the Conservatives seems to exist for centuries, but are fraught with internal disputes. Despite the presence of other parties that undoubtedly have their part in shaping the political landscape, much of the political narrative is still centred around the two largest parties as they are the ones trading off between being in government and leading the opposition.

Nevertheless, the party system in the UK is relatively stable, more so than in Brazil and less so than in Sweden, with the typical concentration of power at the hands of two larger parties that usually comes from a majoritarian system in combination with first-past-the-post. The recent experience of a coalition government was a shock to all and has not been repeated, despite the agreement from the Conservatives with the DUP in the last government formation. There are 650 MPs, who use party funds during election, but do pay for their own internal campaigns in order to be selected to run. Internal recruitment processes are varied, not only between parties, but regionally (interview with SVs1; BJARNEGÅRD, KENNY, 2015; KENNY, MACKAY, 2011). An important change in the electoral system of the UK

has been the introduction of term limits with the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, however there has not been a five-year period without a general election since the Act came into the stage.

Because the majoritarian system allows one Member of Parliament per district, the Labour Party began using all-women shortlists (AWS) which allows the party to select candidates for certain districts only from a women-pool of potentials, meaning that recruitment is intently made towards finding a woman to be the candidate (CHILDS, HUGHES, 2018; HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2014; NORRIS, LOVENDUSKI, 1995). This has made Labour the party with most women elected and present in the House of Commons, but it is perceived quite poorly by other parties, including their women.

...the United Kingdom, where some men politicians, commentators, and academics have become increasingly critical of women's descriptive representation, frequently on the grounds that it poses a threat to other marginalized groups. Women's gains – which in 2015 reached 30% in the House of Commons – are seen as coming at the expense of the representation of working-class men, who constituted only 5% of MPs (based on occupational data; Heath 2015). The expansion of women's representation is constructed as a zero-sum game between middle-class women and working-class men. The pitting of middle-class women against working-class men has been most explicit during debates over all-women's shortlists (AWS), the Labour Party's gender quota used in 1997, and since the 2005 general election. (CHILDS, HUGHES, 2018, p. 285).

'All-women shortlists have not been a success for Labour, because instead of getting people who are high quality, what we've actually got in is people who haven't really performed as politicians for the Labour party.' (The Guardian 3rd August 2001). Employing similar a discursive frame, the Liberal Democrats rejected a motion at their 2001 conference for all-women shortlists. Delegates argued that the shortlists proposal was 'illiberal and unworkable', depriving local parties of their ability to choose the most able candidate and making women into 'tokens'. As a woman from the Lib Dem Youth and Students group argued: 'The proposers are telling me I cannot fulfill my dream of becoming an MP without this motion. They underestimate me'. (The Guardian 27th September 2001). (SQUIRES, 2005, p. 3).

In one sense, the UK is the case in the middle. It has a stable economy and political system, a "not-too-low, not-too-high" number of women in office, spread out across several parties, it is individualistic but with strong parties, it is contentious but not in a way that stops the political process. In another sense, it is an extreme, because of the high degree of decentralisation of the rules and of the parties, because of its lengthy history, its former role



as one of the main colonisers of the world, the lack of a formal constitution, but extremely regulated via formal and informal means.

### *Hypotheses*

In order to explore the methodology and methods chosen and why, I would like first to lay out the hypotheses I plan to test throughout this dissertation. I developed these in the beginning of the process and considered through a general lens, looking for comparability. I have divided the hypotheses into three general themes, using the question-words posed in the title of the dissertation. Consequently, we have, for *what*, hypotheses directly connected to what actions are taken within the institutional setting:

1. Most of the actions taken on behalf of women will be “low risk”, that is, using institutional affordances that do not risk the political capital of the individual or individuals who are leading it;
2. “Risk” is understood contextually, meaning that a bill or law that does not have a controversial proposition (i.e., naming a bridge) would be considered “low risk”, but a speech on reproductive rights might be considered “high risk”; conversely, an action that in abstraction may seem low risk may be high risk depending on its contextual factors since actions may be used as multi-pronged strategies;
3. Political action is often decided contextually, so while some topics may take decades, others will happen instantly, during moments when public opinion is instigated;
4. It is expected that women will be most likely to act on behalf of women due to their segregation to “soft” policy areas which deal with societal issues; however, it is also possible that women MPs chose their career because they come from women’s movements and that link is formed thusly; another possibility is the simplicity of the politics of presence hypothesis that women will work for women.

### *Operationalisation*

- 1.1 Women’s substantive representation is *acting for* women, that is, having women/girls as the target for institutional political action, so key words must be specific to the context both of place and time, in order to define an action as female-related;

1.2 Key words should not only be tailored to each country but should be expansive in what could include women, even if the word itself is not used; words such as *paternity* or *children* need to be considered – the latter, quite carefully;

1.3 Types of action available

1.4 Actions will be defined as positive or negative in relation to their proposition or suggestion of increase/removal of women's rights and autonomy

Hypotheses connected to *who* are the ones that directly apply to who is taking the action, women, men, individuals, groups of legislators, parties, thematic caucuses, or committees:

- I. It is expected that women are the ones leading with more actions on behalf of women, however, that margin might not be as large as one thinks given women's other political interests and their smaller presence in legislatures in general;
- II. It is expected that the men who act for women tend to be on the left-wing or highly-polarised conservatives, with the latter being a recent change in a backlash movement;<sup>31</sup>
- III. As women's numbers rise, they tend to not work across party lines, but try to effect change through their own parties;
- IV. As women's numbers rise, there are two expected shifts in men's behaviour:
  - a. Initially, women newcomers will try to assert their presence, increasing legislation on behalf on women and incentivising incumbents to do the same;
  - b. In the long run, as numbers stabilise, so will that behaviour and gendered legislation will become less visible through the process of gender mainstreaming

### *Operationalisation*

- i. Names, genders, parties of representatives

Hypotheses linked to *how*, ask what are the strategies used by representatives when they take their action, alliances within and outside the house, backdoor strategies, public hearings:

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<sup>31</sup> Another aspect of *when*.

- A. Women MPs will look for strategic alliances and societal support in addition to strength in numbers, particularly on “common sense” content such as domestic violence;
- B. Depending on the strength of ideological polarisation, women MPs will bond over gendered rules within the legislative institution and act on them;
- C. Women MPs will avoid high risk action for controversial topics, especially if they are in the minority as women and in the minority party, but will support men who take such actions;
- D. MPs will signal the executive through public low-risk actions and lend support to actions taken by the executive both helping the writing process as well as getting any action through the legislative house;

### *Operationalisation*

These hypotheses can be evaluated through some quantitative measures, but will mostly rely on qualitative analyses of interviews and process-tracing of single actions. Strategies tend to go the informal route, although institutions have formal ways of creating paths for legislators to accomplish their goals. Indeed, what these strategies are, depend on a deeper understanding of the case being studied.

### *Electoral systems*

The overarching presence of the electoral system as a constant variable cannot be disregarded. While all representatives will likely have certain goals they would like to see achieved, these do not exist in a vacuum in which they are allowed to go through with their ideas without consideration for their promises to their party and to the electorate. This is, of course, if we take as a given that parliamentarians have the ultimate goal of being reelected.

Consequently, it is relevant to hypothesise on the effects electoral systems could have on the actions of the MPs, especially given the importance they were given in case selection.

As it has been discussed, each country has different processes of candidate selection, being more or less centralised and formalised, with the UK being particularly strong in that aspect given its majoritarian system. Brazil sits at the other end of the spectrum, with parties

virtually denying no one the chance to run under their label, but giving little to no assistance to most. A preliminary interview with a Brazilian MP, coded as BRd1, gave rise to the notion of *electoral autonomy* and the freedom that a representative has to act on their beliefs and wishes *if* they possess it. This concept may play out differently in various places – overwhelming support from the populace, enough funds to run their campaign, strong networks with other high-powered politicians, favourability in the media, or a combination of some or all – electoral autonomy allows representatives to take risks others cannot. This autonomy may exist within some form of spectrum – there are always no-go zones. But when analysing the data, it is important to keep in mind that some MPs, men and women, have certain freedoms others may not because of being independent from the party in order to run. The main expectation here is that electoral autonomy has a very low relevance in Sweden, where the literature review and qualitative data show programmatic parties are at the core of political life.

#### *Databases*

The databases compile the different political actions available in each legislative house, described by the independent variables. There are several possible actions and these were chosen as most used, most likely to have an impact, and most comparable, based on the literature of each country and interviews with specialists, politicians, and civil servants. As noted in the table above for Brazil all ordinary bills, constitutional amendment proposals, legislative decree proposals, public hearing requests, other requests, and budget amendments were included. Brazil is a presidential country and thus has, expectedly, a much more proactive legislature. There are proposal for legislative decrees, for instance, to overturn executive decrees. All were downloaded combining the common interface of the Câmara dos Deputados as well as the open data system (*Dados Abertos*), since each gives different amount of information regarding each legislative action. The goal was to get as much text as possible in order to not miss anything in the key word search. Deputies were categorised as either men or women, also using the open data information available, and parties were

categorised along the left-right spectrum using the votes for the coup against President Dilma Rousseff and for the Constitutional Amendment 55.<sup>32</sup>

For the United Kingdom, early day motions (EDMs), private members' bills (PMBs), papers laid, and minister questions (including prime-minister questions) were used. The UK Parliament API was used with the `hansard` package developed by Evan Odell in order to download all of data with the exception of PMBs, as those were available on the House of Commons's website.<sup>33</sup> The British API, however, only makes available questions from 2013 on, which means that the dataset is only complete from that year. For PMQs, I was given a dataset by a House of Commons clerk, which included questions from 2010-2012, which were added. In addition, since the data from the UK comes by session, rather than year, and the legislative year begins in the second semester, there were 15 EDMs that came from 1999, which I have chosen to keep within the database when it was possible and appropriate.

For Sweden, interpellations, written questions, and motions were used. Originally, the Riksdag's open data (*Öppna Data*) system was used with specific code in R to download the data.<sup>34</sup> While that code allowed me to extract the first few lines of several cases, that was

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<sup>32</sup> Categorising Brazilian parties can be a daunting task and it is definitely a controversial one. Political scientists who study Brazil tend to remain conservative in their measures in order to avoid discrepancies and controversy. While I relied on Power and Zucco (2009), Zucco and Lauderdale (2011), and Tarouco (2013) the fact is that Brazilian parties shift too fast and decide their allegiances depending on the issues. Gomes, Almeida, Goulart (forthcoming) demonstrate that during the coup of 2016, there was a clear division along the expected programmatic party lines such as economy for the "old-right" and labour for the "old-left" and conservative-progressive values, including gendered roles, for the "new-right" and the "new-left". For a further check, I used the so-called Spending Ceiling Amendment, which blocks any investment in education, healthcare, and other key areas for 20 years. Brazilianist political science, for instance, traditionally places the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement, which recently returned to its dictatorship name of Movimento Democrático Brasileiro) as a centre party, while this is only because it is, literally, a catch-all party, containing representatives that lean from the extreme-right to the centre-left. The Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Party of Brazilian Social Democracy, PSDB), which was always economically conservative, aligned itself with former dictatorship supporters and was an avid supporter of the coup – but it is typically placed as a centre party. These measures, often based on voting records removed from context, create severe distortions, especially for the case at hand. That being said, although the internal procedures of most Brazilian parties are "black boxes", they are quite strong, especially within the Câmara. Moreover, their positioning on the left-right scale is, in fact, relatively stable, although hard to capture. My argument is that key moments of polarisation make that positioning much clearer than more "mainstream" methods.

<sup>33</sup> Mr. Odell was kind enough to develop a separate code that allowed me access to the full text of the EDMs. That code can be found here: <https://gist.github.com/evanodell/5a47a68df758f8bfa92f729a18e71bb2>.

<sup>34</sup> That code was mostly written by Stack Overflow user DS\_UNI, who declined to give their real name for credit. The code can be found here: <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/54639133/a-follow-up-to-extracting-data-from-an-api-using-r>.

only a fluke and did not give me access to the whole set of data. Therefore, I had to use the pre-made datasets from the Swedish Öppna Data, which only have the title of each action. Therefore, not only did each country offered different quantities of text; in the case of the UK and Brazil, each type of action had their own variation. The key words used determine only if the issue has been mentioned, for example, if the word “woman” was used in any of the spaces made available for text by each of the open data systems, which for Brazil and the UK, depending on the type of action, included summaries, extended titles, key words, and for EDMs, the complete text.

Although the initial goal of this categorisation was to analyse the areas around which negative proposals appeared, whatever they may be and however many they may be, afterwards it became clear that the goal should be modified. Rather than look at the quantitative only, it was relevant to consider and analyse the qualitative significance of negative actions in order to investigate the possible increase of a backlash against gender equality and women’s rights. The overwhelming majority of cases are positive; the Brazilian dataset has 9.22% of negative actions and the British, 5.12%. The Swedish data on this matter is, unfortunately, not representative.<sup>35</sup>

While the issues can be sifted through with relative ease, determining if they are “good” or “bad” for women is another matter. The representation of women can be done by people of any gender or party since women are a heterogeneous group and there are several issues that pertain to them. But that representation must be done with the goal of bettering women’s lives. Therefore, as mentioned, an evaluative category was created, which analysed if the action increased/decreased women’s autonomy or liberties or if it had no impact. Because the Swedish data was more succinct, slightly more than half was categorised, while the Brazilian and British data was done completely.

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<sup>35</sup> The dataset has 6155 cases, with 2097 categorised, and 173 labelled “negative”. The initial dataset yielded 5.10% of negative actions, while the complete data would mean 8.25% if considering only the ones categorised and 2.81% if comparing the negative cases with the whole (categorised and non-categorised). Again, these numbers are unrepresentative but I have added them here for the sake of complete information and because they lead to an educated guess of between 3-8% of negative cases for the whole dataset, which would put Sweden in congruence with the UK and Brazil.

In any case, it is important to highlight that categorising each database as if they were identical in form and content proved to be impossible. It was necessary to refer back to the categories for action – what was each legislative action able to do? Consequently, all three databases have negative and positive actions, but one has to remember that often these are position-taking statements, rather than proposals for change. In the Brazilian “not applicable” category, items that have no impact one way or another were included (mostly these are bureaucratic changes; relate to children in non-gendered ways; related to men only in a way that does not impact women). I also included a fourth category, which was named “social prejudice” as it encompasses legislative actions that call for incarceration, harsher penalties, and/or added jail time for men who are violent towards women. With the third largest prison population in the world, of over 600 thousand people (BRASIL/CNJ, 2018), understanding the role that socioeconomic inequality plays in creating that population, and knowing the conditions of Brazilian prisons, categorising any addition to that context could not be construed as positive. Men come out of the prison system worst off than they were, and women take the brunt of that violence. On the other hand, since incarceration is often the only recourse to peace that many women have, it could also not be placed in the negative. Any measures that called for the rehabilitation of men who were guilty of gendered violence were categorised as positive as long as they did not rely on the woman’s presence, such as mediation and couple’s counselling.

For the United Kingdom there was also a “not applicable” category and a fourth, named “symbolic”. The NA category, for this case, often includes the Royal Family. The symbolic category included the commemoration of something that was included via the key words but was not relevant, some sort of designed conflict as British MPs often used irony and sarcasm against each other, or asking for the agreement of the Prime Minister on something.

Because of their focus on gender equality and their quibbles on what is necessary to accomplish that, the Swedish database was much harder to categorise. It was often required to read go through the entire text in order to find what the MP meant and what the goal of the action was and if women’s rights had actually anything to do with it. Given the lack of complete data, this made it impossible to categorise the whole dataset.

There is no way to adequately convey the care taken in making these categorisations as unbiased as possible. One particular aspect was being mindful of not looking at party affiliations or names, although the Swedish database, given the way it is constructed made that quite difficult.

All of that said, after various pre-tests and checks, I decided to single-out the issue of reproductive rights for analysis and only use positive and negative categories, excluding anything that was coded differently. These are definitely not representative of the whole; they are, however, *qualitative* expressions of the strongest gendered and women's rights contestations in each country (AMERY, 2015; JUNGAR; 2016; LACERDA, 2016; NYSTRÖM, 2016; VAZQUEZ, 2016; MIGUEL, et al., 2017). By choosing this issue I not only chose something that is extremely salient for feminist and women's rights demands, but that deals with several theoretical perspectives of feminism, as well as cuts across all possibilities of intersectionality. Moreover, because of the religious connections and polarisation offered by these issues, it was noticeable that MPs were more "sincere" when it came to their beliefs on the subject.

Importantly, this analysis is about the MPs' signalling their representative claims and, in this case, making their stand against the autonomy and rights of women. Particularly in the case of Sweden, negative actions and positive actions were a matter of hue, rather than direct oppositions; often the debate was around who had the best concept of gender equality and feminism, rather than a clear dividing line (which was clearer especially for Brazil). Consequently, it is important to heed the warnings regarding the inclusion of MPs who are not left-wing women. However, this turned out to be true only for Sweden and excluding the issue of reproductive rights. For all countries, deciding to act or speak on reproductive rights extremely meaningful in evaluating the MPs beliefs and representative claims given the politically risky nature of the subject.

There is a clear distinction between the two parliamentary systems and the presidential system analysed: the former require that its representatives rely on speech much more heavily than the latter. In Brazil, the use of ordinary bills is quite common, but direct interactions with the executive are few when compared to the parliamentary systems. Although there is the use of speeches in the Câmara dos Deputados, they are not necessarily perceived as an



important action or something to remark on. Ministers may be called to answer questions in committee, but there are no dedicated minister questions or “president question time”. Therefore, while the British and Swedish MPs have both speech and writing as legislative actions, but the relevance of each type is debatable, Brazilians focus their individual actions on writing, and use debates and speeches as tools for what it is arguably their main focus – getting legislation passed.

The coding was done on Excel, using the formula =ISNUMBER(SEARCH), allowing me to search all the text columns at once (the Brazilian database included title, summary, and key words, for example). The coding process began, for all countries, with using the basic root words for *women* in each language, in order to encompass both singular and plural uses.<sup>36</sup> The same was done for words such as “girl”, “sex”, and “gender”. Gender as a concept, that is, beyond the use of the word, was also contemplated, and words and expressions such as “female”, “feminine”, “male”, “masculine”, “both sexes”, “boys and girls”, “men and women” (and “girls and boys” and “women and men”) were also searched. “Boy” and “men” were also individually categorised. Then came words such as “mother”, “maternity”, “motherhood” and “father”, “paternity”, “fatherhood”, and “parent-” as a root for “parental”, “parents”, “parenting”, etc. Also, “family”, “custody”, “adoption”, “divorce”, etc. “Pregnant-” and “gravid-”, root words for issues relating to pregnancy in English and in Portuguese and Swedish. All databases were categorised for any use of “abortion”, “termination of pregnancy”, “reproductive rights”, “contraception”, etc.

The issue of violence, which was categorised as a single word, filtered through the “women” and “girls” categories, but then added to using specific words such as “rape”, “domestic violence”, and “sexual abuse”. This, however, required words that were specific to each country as well since the way this issue is dealt with varies. For Brazil, the specific legal names were used, as that is the preferred usage by deputies. The category for domestic violence was made separate from violence in general, and combined with any and all appearances that made reference to Ordinary Law 11.340/2006, also known as Maria da

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<sup>36</sup> For the British database “woman” and “women” were searched; for Brazil, the singular form “mulher” is the root for the plural “mulheres”; for Sweden, “kvinn-” was used, which also ensured words such as “kvinnlig” which means “female” or a gendered word.

Penha Law. The Brazilian database also required specific references to domestic labour, paedophilia, pornography, child prostitution and sexual tourism, and indigenous populations.

The British database required the specific use of “women and children” in order to separate non-gendered uses of the expression such as “save men, women, and children”. The expression “men and women” was also found to clutter the “gender” category, as it was mostly used to refer to the “brave men and women” in the Armed Forces. “Women and men”, however, referenced women’s issues. There were, however, several uses of “a) men and b) women” or similar expressions, which were usually asking for information with a gender breakdown. For the UK, domestic violence and other gender-based violence against women were all in the same category. A category relating to issues relating to women at work, such as “equal pay” and “discrimination at work” was found to be needed. One category was created to include all instances in which MPs would congratulate or commemorate something, since those were found to be many and clutter the data. Another specific category was created for British vocabulary regarding people who are not white or not British, such as “BME” (Black and Minority Ethnic), “South Asian”, or “asylum”.

Similar words appear in Sweden, such as “immigrant” and “asylum” and they also tend to use the expression “foreign-born”. Sweden has some similar categories to the UK, such as a focus on the pay gap and a category for “prostitution” for both. In addition, both countries spend a lot of time discussing other countries’ situations and for Sweden in particular, United Nations efforts. Therefore, a category for “international” was created. It encompasses mentions to other countries and questions to ministers of foreign policy and international development. All key words are in the Appendix.

Importantly, Sweden has its own word for gender equality, and a characteristic of the Swedish language is that words are often combined in order to form other words. Consequently, gender equality is “jämställdhet” and “jämställdhetsbonus” is the parental leave bonus. Parents is “föräldrar” and parental leave “föräldraledighet”. Sweden required the creation of category relating to “care”, and be it childcare, obstetric care, healthcare in general, or social care. A category for “quota” was also created, which included both quotas for corporate boards and for parental leave. In addition, a category which includes words related to labour market policy was also created.

It is important to highlight that some inductive reasoning was used. This categorisation is an attempt to operationalise the thick description of women's substantive representation (MACKAY, 2014) and is inspired by Celis et al.'s suggestion. This inductive logic comes at realising the cultural, political, and language differences between the countries while working on the databases. The various affordances from each institution, as well as their traditions, tailors how representatives speak and perform, and also what they discuss. There are also qualitative differences, cases that did not warrant a particular categorisation but that lifted out as particular for each country, such as female genital mutilation in the UK and HPV vaccination for boys in Sweden. The Maria da Penha Law in Brazil created a completely different way deputies in that country discuss domestic violence; in Sweden, domestic violence is not a term usually used, with a preference for "violence in close relationships" or "men's violence against women". These differences will be detailed in the coming chapters and they are relevant in explaining the efforts, failures, and successes in seeing the advancement of women's liberties and autonomy as well as studying them.

Interventions can be recognized as representative claims about women when the questions addressed are (1) directly constructed as being of importance to women, (2) presented as only affecting women, (3) discussed in terms of gender difference, (4) spoken of in terms of gendered effects, and/or (5) framed in terms of equality between women and men. These five criteria center the investigation on "women" as a category, eliminating more generic references that do not involve representative claims about women per se. (CELIS, et al., 2014, p. 159).

As far as replication goes, while anyone has access to the same raw data, these categories are based on my scientific interpretation of the literature, the interviews conducted, and my *in loco* observations. However, by using the key words available in the Appendix, the results should be equal. Finally, not only representatives act within a legislative house. There are actions taken by committees or speakers of the houses, and these were named "institutional" and some were missing. These were excluded for the final analysis. The Swedish dataset has several motions coming from committees, but they have an individual MP attached to them, the committee chair and thus, they were not differentiated. The table below shows the original count of all the data downloaded, before categorising for women's substantive representation. Women's participation falls within similar numbers of presence in each parliament during the timeframe, although there are almost 10% of institutionally authored

actions for Brazil. If considering only actions by deputies for Brazil, women would have 12.25% and men, 87.75%. For the UK, 73.33% of all data pertains to written questions, which are instruments that service MPs in providing information for further action, be it debates, EDMs, a private bill, or casework. These are particularly interesting for the analysis of the possibility of deeper interests from the MPs in the SRW since, while they are public knowledge, they are not publicised. The same is true for written questions in Sweden, although they are not used as often (33.64% of the total). However, it is possible that once analysed, an entirely different proportion of types of actions surfaces, given the specific needs and constraints of women’s substantive representation.

**Table 3: All data downloaded by gender for each country – 2000-2017**

	Women	%	Men	%	Institutional/NA	%	Total	Total %
<b>Brazil</b>	16596	11.04	118834	79.07	14853	9.88	150283	100
<b>Sweden</b>	42828	47.40	47517	52.60	20	00.1	90345	100
<b>United Kingdom</b>	65472	27.63	169693	71.62	1775	0.75	236940	100

Source: the author. British data includes data from the second semester of 1999, does not have written or oral questions before 2013 or prime-minister questions before 2010.

*In loco observations and interviews*

Chappel and Galea (2017) suggest the use of “rapid” ethnography in order to compensate the need for qualitative data and the lack of time to get it. Indeed, in studying the legislative process and gendered rules of engagement, it is impossible for a research to stick to formal rules and statistic data. It is necessary to understand the obstacles on the ground faced by women representatives in general and by anyone attempting gender equality action. It is through this process that I will be able to shed some light into the unwritten rules in each country, specifically as they relate to women, but also the general process of legislating. Mapping the informalities discussed in the theory and, importantly, the critical actors attached to them, require presence in the legislative house as well as interviewing key individuals in those processes.

Each country was visited with at least two visits to the legislative house. I was able to take pictures and notes and observe the overall dynamic of these institutions. In the case of Brazil, while a specific visit for this work was done, I had already done surveys with the representatives and had been there for three weeks in 2011. The visits to Sweden and the United Kingdom<sup>37</sup> allowed me a unique insight as I was there looking for cultural clues as well, that would enable me to better understand the political culture of the country as a whole. This is referred to by Chappel and Galea as “building up a picture”, while experiencing contextual elements first hand.<sup>38</sup>

In order to confirm those observations, but especially to gather the in-depth knowledge that my “rapid” ethnography would lack, I interviewed key individuals in each country’s political scenario, in mildly structured conversations that were recorded. In the case of Sweden, four political scientists were interviewed (two who are professors, one doing her post-doctorate, and one on loan to the executive), two women representatives, and one civil servant. In the United Kingdom, one political scientist (who had done extensive work in the Parliament) and three civil servants were interviewed. In Brazil, five interviews were conducted with deputies, two in the city of Belo Horizonte, and the remaining over a two-week period in Brasília. In addition, three legislative consultants and one civil servant for the Women’s Caucus were also interviewed.

Although anonymity was not assured to the MPs and the specialists, I have chosen to keep their names private along with the names of the civil servants. Although some of their characteristics can make them evident, there is no need to expose them further. Each citation is used *verbatim*, with minor edits to shorten them. Speakers are identified by their country (BR for Brazil, SV for Sweden, and UK for United Kingdom) and their role (d for deputy, s

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<sup>37</sup> Sweden fieldwork took place late May and June 2017; UK fieldwork in September 2017; Brazil, in November/December 2018. For Brazil, two interviews were conducted earlier: BRd1 in 2016 and BRd2 in 2017, both in cities other than Brasília.

<sup>38</sup> The visits to Sweden and the UK included museum trips, working in public libraries, making conversation. I also started to learn Swedish and used the literature and television production from both countries as ways to understand their everyday lives and cultures. I kept up with local news, read blogs by people who had moved to these countries, and followed the social media of all three parliaments. All these resources were particularly important in understanding my cases, especially Sweden since I am Brazilian and had lived in the UK. British cultural imports are also more prevalent, as well as their news.

for specialist, and c for clerk/consultant/civil servant). They were all numbered for unique identification, but as there is only one British specialist, their code is simply UKs.

The following chapters analyse the data. The first deals with the institutional affordances of each parliament, in attempt to answer the question “what can MPs do?”. The chapter takes into account not only what MPs *should* be able to do, but what they are *actually* able to do, considering the informal rules of engagement, the relationship between MPs, parliamentary infrastructure, and overall relationship with the executive. With a gendered perspective, this chapter demonstrates the difficulties in everyday parliamentary work and how one would go about using all the tools that are available in order to achieve their goal.

The second chapter looks at women’s substantive representation through the quantitative data with support from the interviews and observations. While each country had their idiosyncrasies, and those rose to the surface quite obviously, the general concerns for women’s lives and how they are able to live it were the same. By first using extremely general key words such as “women” and “girls”, I was able to find, without imprinting any bias, what are the themes connected to these words. Each country deals with them in their own way, discusses them differently, and has different populations, but the overall themes were always there.

I found that a whole series of people opposed me simply on the grounds that I was a woman. The clerics took to the mosque saying that Pakistan had thrown itself outside the Muslim world and the Muslim umar by voting for a woman, that a woman had usurped a man's place in the Islamic society. I found that my opponents reduced themselves to verbal abuse rather than discuss issues, the very mere fact that I was a woman seemed to drive them into a frenzy. So that was the biggest challenge. I don't know how to deal with that, I can deal with political differences, but how do you deal with it when someone says "I don't like you because you're a woman and you've taken a man's place".

*Benazir Bhutto (former prime-minister of Pakistan, murdered in 2007)*<sup>39</sup>

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **What can an MP actually do? Institutional affordances in the way of representation**

This chapter presents information and data on what each parliament offers as a workspace and a representative's "toolkit", as it were. Institutional theory demonstrates that change happens mostly at a gradual pace and that the institutions that we have today are not the ones that were conceived centuries ago. This is particularly true of parliaments, institutions often existing not out of design, but happenstance; developing as needed to incorporate the demands of contemporary society; made into the centre of conflict between elite forces that look to control processes of distribution of resources; becoming a symbol of nation and power; and a goal for those excluded from those initial processes. It is easy to forget that parliaments were not only the home of elites but were made in their image with the objective to exclude. The parliaments of today call themselves houses of the people, but many of those structures and traditions still remain. While inclusionary and democratic processes have happened over the years, we cannot forget that parliaments are still those institutions from "way back when", and that critical eye is necessary in order to find and dismantle the remaining exclusionary processes within it.

With that in mind, let us, for a moment, imagine being Benedita da Silva, for many years the only Black woman to be a deputy in Brazil, among 513 others. Let us imagine being Dawn Butler, in the elevator in the House of Commons, being told by a colleague that she should not be in there because that elevator was not meant for cleaners. Let us imagine being Leila

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<sup>39</sup> Benazir Bhutto was the first woman to lead a Muslim country. She was killed by a suicide-bomber after a rally, when running for a third term, after a time of self-imposed asylum.

Ali-Elmi, wearing a hijab in a parliament in which many believe that should not be allowed to have it in there, because it is a public space.<sup>40</sup> Let us then think about the lack of space, bathrooms, parental leave for MPs, day-care, travel arrangements, dress codes and every single piece of background planning required to be an MP.

Let us then think about Young's (1991; 2010) discussion on how women participate in politics. Let us consider how many women have been called "shrill" or "loud" and consider how that affects a woman MP recently elected and trying to do her job. Let us consider this space of exclusion and the informal friendships and networks that have been formed before entry (BJARNEGÅRD, 2013).

I, if I was looking for differences, I think I would probably be looking at an ethnographic level about how women and men do their politics differently. That's from the, from the from being there and the conversations I've had with clerks. I sometimes think the hard data doesn't reveal the networking, the friendships, the informality that sustain women in Parliament, and sometimes... (...)And I think although I'm not someone who believes that women are nice and friendly and caring, you know, biologically, the more I see and hear from clerks, about how women and men do politics, I think that's quite interesting. So for example, I mean, again, I talked a bit before about what happened last night, and then we're drinking and staying up and not having to worry about who's actually putting their kid to bed. And I think some of that gets lost in the hard data analysis as if those, those relationships don't get public airing. (...) If you want to understand about substantive representation in the House, you want to know what the women [in the party] are talking about, but you wouldn't see that I mean, you will, because you're an academic, but other people wouldn't see it. (Interview with UKs).

Let us consider that women are told all their lives to talk softly, to downplay, to convince, to subtly sway - even women who have been in party politics and in parliament. And now let us think about how parliaments expects representatives to act. However, there is a problem here. The institution does not care how people act, it is neutral – it is designed by people, by elite men. This means that parliament was designed in the way that men were socialised to think and act and women that are now a part of it have to adhere to these institutional norms. But the societal expectation and the institutional expectation are different and they are in conflict and women must tread this double-edged sword in order to be effective.

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<sup>40</sup> In fact, some actions to that effect exist in the Swedish database.



The chapter is subdivided into six sections that paint the picture of how MPs go about their jobs. The first section of the chapter deals with infrastructure and how daily routines play out in these spaces. The second section briefly discusses the MPs access to staff and assistance in order to do their jobs. The third, explores the committee system, details the sexual division of labour among MPs and furthers the knowledge on the daily routine of representing. The following section discusses the positions of leadership and decision-making that can be found in each parliament and the insertion of women into these roles. The fifth section discusses dedicated structures for women's substantive representation, further exploring details from the two previous sections. Finally, the chapter closes with a description on the types of legislative actions studied here and a discussion on strategies and how MPs may combine actions in order to be effective.

### *Infrastructure and plenary*

There is something to be said about how the environment one is in shapes the work one does (GOODSELL, 1988; RAI, 2010). When it comes to parliaments, there might be a “chicken or the egg” discussion on what came first, the shape of parliament or the political culture, but undoubtedly, they feed off each other and help determine what can be achieved. As the documentary *Inside the Commons* (BBC, 2015) shows, there is a hierarchy in office distribution in the British parliament, as when the bell rings indicating a vote, MPs have only eight minutes to arrive.

Brazilian deputies, on the other hand, are on a more equal footing. All offices are placed in the same annex and they have dedicated lifts that work for them alone. On the other hand, deputies are hardly ever at their offices – that space is used mostly by their staff or whenever they need a place for an interview with an academic.<sup>41</sup>

No, no, the office is a place where you're not gonna find [us]. You find the deputies articulating, talking to each other in the committee [room],<sup>42</sup> ok? You, everyone works, and people say “no, they don't do anything”; they do, for good and bad. I think for bad is faster, but for good you take longer,

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<sup>41</sup> In 2011, on fieldwork, I conducted an interview in an empty committee room and in the plenary, which has a coffee room for deputies to unwind without having to leave. I was trained to offer to conduct interviews anywhere, even in the car as they were taken to the airport.

<sup>42</sup> In Portuguese, “committees” are called “comissões”, that is, “commissions”.

you're in those committees, you gotta make those plays, go in a plenary, go out of a plenary. (Interview with BRd5).<sup>43 44</sup>

The Swedish Riksdag is, out of the three parliaments, the most closed-off for visitors and observers. Although the House of Commons also blocks access to MPs' offices, there is ample cultural access to images. The Câmara dos Deputados is completely open and, although the gallery to the plenary has been shut<sup>45</sup>, is still a place that anyone can walk in and go to a representative's office without being disturbed.<sup>46</sup> The Riksdag, on the other hand, makes use of separate buildings and a visitor is received at the door by whomever they are coming to see – otherwise they can only access the gallery for the plenary.<sup>47</sup> According to one of the interviews, offices are in another building and in the building where I was, only the Speaker's and Vice-speakers' offices could be found.<sup>48</sup> However, votes in the Riksdag are scheduled quite ahead of time, usually on Wednesdays and on the occasional Thursday, so there is no rush to get there.

Both the House of Commons and the Riksdag were designed in the late 1800s although, for the former, it was decided to create a medieval, Gothic look. For the latter, after the decision to make it unicameral, in the 1970s, a new chamber was designed. The inside of the building does feel like a completely different place than the outside. The Câmara dos Deputados was part of President Juscelino Kubitschek's grand view for a new capitol, one designed for that purpose, which could also strengthen Brazil's foothold on its Midwest region. That design is decidedly modernist and grand-standing, especially considering that no building in Brasília

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<sup>43</sup> Original text: Não, não, gabinete é um lugar que você pouco encontra. Você encontra os deputados articulando, falando um com outro, na comissão, né. Você, trabalhar todos trabalham, aí vem pessoa 'não, não faz nada', faz sim, faz pro bem e faz pro mal. Eu acho que pra fazer pro mal é muito mais rápido, agora o bem cê demora um pouco, cê fica naquelas comissões, você tem que fazer aquelas jogadas, sai de plenário, entra em plenário.

<sup>44</sup> All translations by the author, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>45</sup> I could not find accurate information on how long the gallery has been closed.

<sup>46</sup> There are, of course, caveats to this. I did not attempt to "dress down" at any point and was, eventually, being greeted by people I did not know because they assumed they must know me. That is, I looked the part. When going to the Câmara, it is helpful to be able to say to the guards at the door which committee room or event you are attending, so I always knew which committees and events were on, even if I was not going to any of them. Someone who dressed differently, had a different skin colour, and/or kept different company might have had another experience, i.e. people in indigenous or black social movements.

<sup>47</sup> During my first visit to the gallery, I was properly warned by a stunned security guard that the meeting was in Swedish. Also, the gallery has a rule of complete silence and I had forgotten to turn my tablet on before going in.

<sup>48</sup> How the Riksdag and the House of Commons are closed off was an unexpected twist for a Brazilian researcher, used to walking in and out of MPs offices looking for them and wondering with their staff if they have an opening in their schedule.

is allowed to be taller than Congress.<sup>49</sup> Creating the symbol of a country is quite a daunting task (ROBERTS, 2009). As Pitkin (1972) argues, the process of developing a symbol is quite complex, dependent on the creators' ability to evoke emotional responses from their audience. At least, in the case of a national symbol, such as a flag or, in my extrapolation, a parliament. These parliaments are symbolic of their countries because, globally, we believe in the institution of countries. Nationally, people may or may not think positively on these places, but they still house their elected officials – whether they feel represented or not.<sup>50</sup> On the other hand, these may not be symbols of representation; while they represent the country, they may not represent the people or rather; the people may not feel represented by that symbol. In that sense, it is interesting to think about countries with administrative and symbolic capitols, such as Bolivia, that separate these functions. When considering the representational functions of these spaces, I wondered what they would look like if women had designed them. If the Câmara dos Deputados would have such long hallways that women have to walk around in heels in; if the House of Commons would have been quite so Gothic, dark, and menacing; if the Riksdag would be so imposing, but the way in is actually the back entrance. Would offices be more accessible despite security concerns?<sup>51</sup> For instance, BRc3 mentioned that many were opposed to the art work placed outside of the Women's Caucus's offices.

Parkinson (2012) argues that the symbolic and working functions of these spaces cannot be separated. The grandeur of these places and where they place in each country's history and ethos cannot be overlooked, but that also includes the fact that these spaces were designed by men and for men. The Brazilian Congress, the only one designed and built after women got the right to be elected, did not feature a women's bathroom inside the Senate plenary,

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<sup>49</sup> In time: Brazil has a bicameral system, therefore all mentions to “Câmara dos Deputados” refer to the lower house only. When speaking about both houses, the adequate nomenclature is “Congresso Nacional” or “National Congress”, or “Congress” for short.

<sup>50</sup> An interesting difference between these three places is that Kubitschek, by deciding to build an entire city away from the most populated areas of the country made it so attending Congress is actually incredibly difficult for the common Brazilian. Brazil occupies an area of 8.516.000 km<sup>2</sup> (in comparison, the whole of Europe occupies 10.180.000 km<sup>2</sup>) and although Sweden and the UK have their own travel difficulties, it makes it nearly impossible for people to constantly be present and in protest as they are able to in Parliament Square in London, for instance. Logistically, whenever important votes or events take place, organisations have to find ways to rent buses to travel all over the country to reach their house of representatives. I have to wonder if the reason the Brazilian Congress is so much more open is the fact that it is so far away from the people.

<sup>51</sup> Security concerns in the Riksdag were increased after the assassination of Anna Lindh in 2003 – as SVs4 stated in her interview, Sweden stopped being such a naïve nation. However, in 2015 the threat level in Sweden was raised and it seems that that was the reason behind most security measures.

which was only added in 2013. Enough facilities are also in discussion in the House of Commons (CHILDS, 2016), as women's presence and their rise in numbers seems always to be unexpected.

Graph5: National Congress, Brasília, Brazil



Source: Official image, Câmara dos Deputados.

Graph6: Riksdagen, Stockholm, Sweden



Source: the author.

Graph7: Back entrance to the Riksdag



Source: the author.

Graph 8: British Parliament, London, United Kingdom



Source: Official image, UK Parliament Flickr account.


However, Parkinson assumes that a parliament that is more open will have more women, forgetting the interaction of variables such as the electoral system. Although he accepts Goodsell's premise that party systems that encourage more violent interactions will do so regardless of the shape of the plenary, he still seems baffled that, within his sample, there are more women in oppositional-shaped parliaments. Architecture firm XML released the book *Parliament* (2010), also in an attempt to point out the connection between the design of plenary floors and the deliberations that go on there. Their typology matches Parkinson's and so we have, using their schematics: Brazil with a classroom shape; Sweden with a semi-circle; the UK with oppositional-benches.<sup>52</sup> Beside each schematic are images of each plenary on days in which I was observing.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> The legend is that the red line on the floor on the House of Commons plenary is the distance of two swords, keeping member just far enough away to prevent (lethal) injury.

<sup>53</sup> These images showcase regular debate moments, on Tuesdays, rather than Prime Minister Questions, votes or, in the case of Brazil, a polarising legislation.

Graph 9: Comparison of design and real-use, Brazilian chamber




Schematic for the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados.  
Source: *Parliament*, XML (2010), website.



Câmara dos Deputados, chamber.  
Source: TV Câmara, 27 November 2018, timestamp 3:52:04.

Graph 10: Comparison of design and real-use, Swedish chamber




Schematic for the Swedish Riksdag.  
Source: *Parliament*, XML (2010), website.



Riksdag, chamber.  
Source: the author, 07 June 2017.

Graph 11: Comparison of design and real-use, House of Commons chamber



Schematic for the UK House of Commons.

Source: *Parliament*, XML (2010), website.

British House of Commons, chamber.

Source: Screenshot from the Guardian's live stream, 11 September 2017, timestamp 44:22.

The relevance of this might not be evident. However, when a space is designed for a polity and that polity is designed considering only the needs of men, that dominant perspective is obviously privileged, even if altered down the line. The Brazilian plenary is not made for calm and thoughtful deliberation. It was made for people to sit down and pay attention to what is happening in front of them, which explains why deputies are usually standing up, huddled in groups, waiting for their turn to speak, or trying to say something got the Speaker. The table for the Directing Board towers over the plenary floor, demonstrating the hierarchy between who gets to sit there and who does not. Speaking time in the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados is highly regulated. It is determined by a list in which deputies put their names down. The allotted time to speak is pre-determined and unless a vote or debate on a bill is scheduled, if they are in the plenary, rather than a committee room, they are free to speak on whatever they choose. In fact, even during a specific debate, they are free to use that time to say what they want – it is just less common to hear deputies straying from the topic at hand during these moments. The plenary and the committee rooms everywhere there are large timers showing how long they have left. Once the time has run out, the microphone is

automatically disconnected. It is within the chair or Speaker's power to grant another minute for the one speaking to conclude.

In the House of Commons, backbenchers<sup>54</sup> depend on the Speaker's<sup>55</sup> good graces to speak. It is quite an odd sight to see MPs "bobbing", that is, standing up and sitting back down, trying to "catch the Speaker's eye", to show that they have something to say. It is expected that the Speaker will alternate between benches and be fair in terms of gender and seniority, but he or she does not have to (CHILDS, 2016). The Speaker also sets how long MPs are allowed to speak for; if the plenary is crowded, it will be less, if it is empty, they might not set a limit at all.

The Swedish plenary, although made for calm and thoughtful deliberation is never used as such. MPs crowd it for votes, but each is assigned their own desk per constituency and there are no debates at this time. Everything has been decided at committee, which was previously discussed with party leadership and that same leadership tells non-committee members how to vote at the party Tuesday meeting. The plenary, or chamber as they call it, is also used for parliamentary questions and those usually only involve the people asking and the ministers answering. If a debate on a motion is scheduled, only committee members attend – a plenary for 349, unless there is a vote, is full if it has 20 people, including from the Speaker's table. Quite clearly, the images on the screen which show the broadcast for the whole country show that the video focuses on the faces present; the empty chamber does not make much of an appearance.

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<sup>54</sup> In Brazil, the term for "backbenchers" would be "baixo clero", which literally translates to low-ranking Catholic Church members ("low clergy"). However, the meaning is not exactly the same. In the UK, backbenchers literally refers to those who sit on the backbenches, that is, who do not have a position in government or in the opposition. However, backbenchers may have some form of status and/or notoriety and may serve on committees. Brazilians in the "baixo clero" are deputies who do not have an informal type of status; they are viewed as unimportant, with few connections, and little power.

<sup>55</sup> In the House of Commons, a Speaker must leave their party in order to demonstrate their impartiality. After leaving the position, they move on to the House of Lords. In the Riksdag, the Speaker position is also not viewed as a political role, albeit a powerful one; however, they do not need to leave their parties to occupy the office. In Brazil, the Speaker position and all others on the board are fought over and highly politicised. In fact, the Speaker is the one who decides if an impeachment proceeding will be debated or not and that led to the coup of 2016 - when the Worker's Party chose not to support the Speaker in an ethics investigation, he retaliated by accepting one of the impeachment requests against President Rousseff (GOMES et al., forthcoming).



The House of Commons is under heated debate for Restoration & Renewal.<sup>56</sup> Its opposition benches, however, will stay. They create a crowded feel and spur animosity on as the prime-minister sits across from the leader of the opposition, both scouling at each other or scoffing at their statements. MPs shout in support or derision of each other. The chamber does not have enough seating for all its members, so on a likely busy day, MPs must arrive before prayer and add a card to their seat in order to save it. This was done on purpose, on the suggestion of then Prime-Minister Winston Churchill, during the re-building after World War II. According to Churchill, “logic” would be no match to custom and

If the House is big enough to contain all its Members, nine-tenths of its Debates will be conducted in the depressing atmosphere of an almost empty or half-empty Chamber. (...) But the conversational style requires a fairly small space, and there should be on great occasions a sense of crowd and urgency. There should be a sense of the importance of much that is said and a sense that great matters are being decided, there and then, by the House (HC Deb 28 October 1943 393 cc403-404).

The House of Commons plenary, however, is not always crowded and loud, as much as the Câmara dos Deputados does not always have its members standing and yelling for the microphone. These are, however, situations that are unheard of in Sweden and have come to be expected in the UK and in Brazil. There is likely a connection with the culture at-large, but that is far too broad for me to say. What it is important to bring in is that women and men are, for the most part, trained to act in different ways, that is, socialised in gendered patterns of behaviour. Those patterns reward cisgender, white, heterosexual men acting in ways that are considered proactive, authoritarian, loud, aggressive, and penalise men who act subtly, meekly, consociative, patiently. (Cisgender) Women, on the other hand, face the delicate balance of not being able to be either one or the other – or at least not too much of it, or they will face even harsher consequences than the men who break their expected stereotypes (MOSS-RACUSSIN, et al., 2010; FALUDI; 2006). These stereotypes apply to houses of parliament, and women are expected, since they are there, to be coy, silent, patient, collaborative, but also get things done, even though for that, they might need to be loud,

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<sup>56</sup> The Riksdag is also under discussions for renovation and the Câmara dos Deputados always has some repair work underway. However, the place of the British Parliament as a historical site for democracy but also British tradition seems to make that debate quite acrimonious. In her *Good Parliament* report (2016), Sarah Childs suggests that they should attempt a different room shape, since for R&R the MPs will have to move to a different location for a period of time. That suggestion was not adhered to.

aggressive, and proactive (KENNY, 2007; CHAPPELL, WAYLEN, 2013; CHILDS, 2016; HOLMAN, MAHONEY, 2018).

I mean, it's, I mean, you'll have seen how much the House of Commons is like a gentlemen's club. And it's also, it's very, it's very adversarial. You'll have seen what the chamber is like, it lends itself to shouting at each other and displaying very kind of masculine behaviour. And a lot of the women politicians who have gotten the kind of highest profile, or most noticed in the chamber, people like Jess Phillips, or Anna Soubry they tend to be displaying a lot of that kind of behaviour [in] many ways themselves (...) So it's, it's not necessarily, what you see is, is more kind of typically feminine, consensual behaviour, or whatever, it tends to be when politicians behaving like men in those public forums, particularly like PMQs, or very adversarial debates. I mean, Select Committees are a very different way of working. And I suppose that they lend themselves to much more considered consensual ways of working (...) In themselves. I think it's probably just the way that select committees go about their work. (...) [B]ut it's still all set up for, I mean, the chamber is all set up for, for adversarial... male behaviour. (Interview with UKc1).

Notably, committee rooms in the House of Commons are horseshoe shaped, more conducive to debate than opposing benches (GOODSELL, 1988). In Brazil, they maintain their classroom shape, even more evident than in the plenary, and have entrances on both sides, leading to a constant shuffle of people coming in and out, particularly staff coming to assist their representatives (that is, in committees that are highly populated, as I will discuss later on). Committee rooms in Sweden are closed and there are few images of them; they are small and have a circular-shaped table with some added desks for Riksdagen support staff.

Graph12: Câmara dos Deputados, Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship Committee, 27 November 2018.



Source: the author.

Graph13: Foreign Affairs Committee, Riksdagen, November 2018.



Source: Riksdagen website.

Graph14: Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons.



Source: UK Parliament website.

### *Legislative consultancy and staff*

In general, representatives may have several sources of support for their work: party staff, parliamentary staff, and their own staff. The Swedish Riksdag only offers the first two types. MPs other than the Speaker and vice-speakers do not have any personal staff and answer their own emails and phone calls (WALLIN, 2017; interviews with SVd1; SVd2; SSs4). House of Commons and Câmara dos Deputados representatives get funding for staff; the

former has some pay scales and job descriptions to adhere to, but generally speaking,, both are able to hire and spend that funding anyway they like. I have been in offices in the Câmara with three secretaries, seen deputies who rely completely on a chief of staff, and others who always have a press officer at their side.<sup>57</sup> Rather than individual funding, the Riksdag distributes funding for each party to set themselves up within the parliament, including their own research staff. In Brazil, some parties also offer their own legislative consultancy services to their members.

All three parliaments offer a team of specialists at the MPs' disposal; in the Riksdag, it is Riksdagens Utredningstjänsten (RUT), in the House of Commons, the Library, and in the Câmara dos Deputados, the Consultoria Legislativa. All these services have their own idiosyncrasies, however, all work at the behest of representatives or their staff, answering inquiries, assisting with legislation, and providing research.<sup>58</sup> Since Riksdagen MPs do not have their own staff, meetings are staffed by Riksdagen independent employees. Committees in the House of Commons have their own clerks, who staff each specific committee. In Brazil, there is technical support in charge of making sure the equipment works, but whoever is in charge of that committee usually has their staff members running things.<sup>59</sup> Legislative consultants may or may not accompany it, but it is not up to them to staff the meeting and their presence is wholly dependent on their sector's coordinator and their own interest or connection to the agenda (BRc1).

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<sup>57</sup> In terms of scheduling, it is always important, in the case of Brazil, to find that key person who is not only in charge of the deputy's schedule, but has the power to change it and add to it. One of the deputies I interviewed was no longer doing academic interviews due to their schedule at the end of the year, but by persuading their chief of staff, I managed to get some time assigned to me. Getting the attention of Riksdag members is a matter of time and luck, since they are in charge of answering their own emails and scheduling their own meetings. Speaking to a British MP is nearly impossible (PUWAR, 1997), and even getting an email response from their staff proved difficult and only one replied saying the MP was unavailable.

<sup>58</sup> Notably, only the RUT does not have a public "face"; while all three offer confidentiality, the House of Commons Library and the Consultoria Legislativa of the Câmara dos Deputados have publications that are accessible to the public. The Library offers a newsletter that delivers new data to a subscriber's email account and has a podcast. In order to access a published investigation by the RUT, one has to send an email request, rather than just download it for themselves.

<sup>59</sup> Wallin (2017) describes the RUT as something out-of-this-world because consultants are not publicly linked to any parties and are civil servants who work for the Riksdag, that is, not liable to lose their jobs because of an election. However, the same is true for the Brazilian Consultoria Legislativa. Consultants are extremely specialised, with the latest incoming group all, but one, having their PhDs. In Brazil, civil servants are hired based on public examinations that are conducted anonymously; after a probation period, the position is permanent and the employee can only be dismissed with cause.

The interviews for the Brazilian service showed a staff that is dedicated, but overworked, underappreciated, and in a hostile, gendered and generational, work environment. For instance, I was told that they now perform tasks that should be performed by the deputies' staff, such as speech-writing. I was also described several situations in which women, particularly older women, have been yelled at publicly by her own male peers, who faced no consequences. They also are in fear for their job stability, despite being tenured civil servants, since the service exists in connection to the Speaker's office and they are the one who decides on the Consultoria's existence, despite their tenured status. As far as the deputies go, one interviewee stated that "the first thing you gotta do is forget about ideology. You gotta think that there are deputies who are good to work with and deputies who are bad to work with" (BRc1).<sup>60</sup> They also stated that there no were gender differences in that sense.

The rush of deputies' work was emphasised by both Consultoria staff and Library Clerks (BRc1; UKc2; UKc3), although the latter were more understanding of MPs hectic schedule and their lack of time to actually do the work of researching and writing. On the other hand, the main issue brought up by the Consultoria staff was not that they had to do this work for the MPs; it was that their staff should be able to do it.

House of Commons Library clerks sometimes seem like they are researchers at a university or a research institute. Although their work is connected to their sector or area, they are expected to produce research briefings, which become public, on bills being discussed in Parliament. For every debate, they produce information briefings for MPs. If they are getting too many inquiries on one particular topic, they will likely produce a research briefing on that in order to direct the MPs' staff towards it. As one said to me: "particularly in England, (...), a lot of people would be more comfortable (...) picking up a publication and reading that for themselves, rather than picking up the phone and asking someone a question" (UKc1).

It is important to highlight the structures present in each parliament and recognise the accessibility that MPs have to these resources. Representatives who hold positions within these parliaments, for instance, Speaker or committee chair, have access to more resources

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<sup>60</sup> Original text: primeira coisa você tem que esquecer ideologia, Você tem que pensar, tem deputado bom de trabalhar tem, deputado ruim de trabalhar.

than other MPs (O'BRIEN, 2012; REZENDE, 2017). Parties will also offer different resources to their members, something that also depends on their size in parliament and the amount of funding they get (ERIKSON, JOSEFSSON, 2016).

In addition, being able to use these services wisely is also a matter of experience (CREWE, 2015). All interviews show employees who are highly experienced and determined to do a good job. Part of that job is guiding MPs through the sea of possible actions to take and a more experienced MP not only will have a good rapport with the consultants as a whole, but know which ones to look for with specific issues or have an established relationship with one or two. They will also know how the turn-around of the work and be aware of how and when to ask for help. On the other hand, given the impartiality of the services, it seems that MPs who have already made up their minds about something will not ask for assistance, particularly in controversial matters (UKc2).

Sometimes you have to getting into what the representative wants, take out what you want and what they want, think about what is the representative's deal and wonder: if I went there, if that was my constituency, I would want this. (...) And sometimes you have to say to the representative that something is not possible and if they still want to do it, you write a note saying you warned them. (...) I always managed to convince them.<sup>61</sup> (Interview with BRc1).

I mean this House of Commons staff you kind of, you work impartially, so you're treating them all the same. I mean, some of them make better use of services on offer than others. I mean, that's a case of the library. The case with my current job, I mean, we have more demand from some MPs, than others. In the library, I think it's, it's more about that they're kind of managing their own deadlines, and how much work can be done in the, in the time scale. And, of course, some members if they're asking, they're being more demanding or asking, you know, asking more questions or more difficult questions or something, they may get more out of it. (Interview with UKc1).

But a lot of our regular users will know that the less time they give us, the less will be able to provide. So there are some that will give you a short deadline, because they know if you give a longer deadline, it'll get pushed. And they just know, they don't want to be at the back of the queue. So they'll give you an artificially short deadline. But it is also sometimes

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<sup>61</sup> Original text: Às vezes, você tem que entrar meio no que que o deputado quer, você tem que tirar o que que você quer e o que o deputado quer, você tem que entrar na qual é do deputado e pensar: se que fosse por lá e trabalhasse em tal lugar o meu eleitorado fosse tal pessoa eu ia querer tal coisa. É assim que você tem que pensar. (...) Você tem que pensar assim, eu acho, só que as vezes você tem que falar pro deputado que isso não dá, se ele falar que ele quer do mesmo jeito você também, você escreve uma nota, 'olha, eu avisei que não dava'. (...) [E]u acho que sempre consegui convencer o deputado de que não dava mesmo.

driven by you know, there's a-, if something happens the night before, and there's emergency or just event driven, then then something you sometimes get phone calls where I'm going into the chamber in half an hour, what do you know, what can you tell me? Or can you ping me a quick email with clarifying x, y, and z so that I can pick up on my tablet and then I can use it in the chamber? (Interview with UKc2).

Seniority and gender are inextricably linked when the reality is that women have been excluded and marginalised for centuries. Women tend to be excluded from positions of power within their parties and within parliaments, meaning men will have access to resources that women will not. Of course, these positions are rare and only go to a few men; however, they tend to *mainly* go to men. However, elite men do not tend to think of themselves as a political group; this lends itself to the idea that they are individuals striving for their success. Along with the small number of positions available, this reinforces the discourse of meritocracy and naturalises the overwhelming presence of white men in these positions. When this “natural” circumstance is challenged, the individualism, meritocracy, quotas, and whether someone has earned their positions is always debated.

#### *Committee systems*

In all three countries, the division of labour through the committee system is extremely important in how things get done<sup>62</sup> (KING, 1976; SANTOS, 2002; MARTIN, VANBERG, 2011; O'BRIEN, 2012; MATTSON, 2016; SANTOS, et al., 2016). Overall, there are two aspects to consider. A leadership position in a committee is valuable in and of itself given the resources and notoriety attributed to it. However, some committees are more important than others. How women and men are distributed within these positions is of relevance in women's access to power and resources. Often, the debate on men's and women's interests comes into play here, suggesting that women and men have divergent interests and those “happen to coincide” with *soft* and *hard* politics committees.<sup>63</sup> However, we must ask ourselves where do these divergent interests come from and why do men and women seem so neatly divided among them? Not only do we have to consider gendered socialisation as it

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<sup>62</sup> Although for the House Commons that importance has been growing since the late 70s and more so since 2010, when elections of the whole House were introduced for select committee chairs (O'BRIEN, 2012; interviews).

<sup>63</sup> Soft politics would be connected to areas of politics that deal with care and hard politics connected with constitutional, financial, and security issues (HEATH, et al., 2005; MIGUEL, FEITOSA, 2009; BÄCK, et al., 2014).

is done in studies on women and men's career divergences, but we also need to think about which women break the barriers of political careers. Araújo (2010) indicates that women go into politics because they see it as a means to end, unlike men who see it as an end in and of itself. Does this mean that women have a stronger sense of social justice and therefore are more interested in care themes? Or that most start their political lives in social movements and grassroots party organisations? These attributions, in fact, seem to fall within what Walby (1990) described as the transition from private to public patriarchy, whereupon women occupy positions in public life that reproduce their private life care obligations.

Generally, the committees in which we work, the thematic committees also, have everything to do with our options. They are always connected somehow to our agenda and the committees in which we participate, right, as principal or alternate members. Since our [party] caucus is small we don't have too much room in the committees, and it's not the committees with more power, it's the committees with less power. (Interview with BRd3; Translated by the author).<sup>64</sup>

For this section, only permanent committees<sup>65</sup> are considered given the stability and structure they bring to parliamentary work and the possibility to compare them across countries. A few differences are important to highlight, therefore I will begin with a brief description of how committees work in each parliament considered. In Brazil, all 513 deputies are distributed within the committee system, unlike the other two parliaments studied here. The actual distribution of work between the committee system and the plenary is fuzzy since some actions must be analysed by the whole house, but most have their process ended within the committee system itself (CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, Regimento Interno, 2016, Art. 24). In addition, extremely polarising actions will get the attention of the whole house. The Constitution, Justice, and Citizenship Committee and the Finances and Tax Committee have terminative power, which means bills can be deterred without even reaching their thematic committees (idem, Art. 54).<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Original text: Em geral as comissões em que a gente atua, as comissões temáticas também tem tudo a ver. Nossas opções são sempre no sentido de ter uma certa afinidade em relação a nossa pauta e as comissões onde nós participamos né, como membros titulares ou membros suplentes porque como nossa bancada é pequena a gente não tem muitos espaços nas comissões não né e não são as comissões de mais poder são comissões de menos poder.

<sup>65</sup> Also referred to as standing or select committees, depending on the country. However, in the UK, Public Bill Committees used to be called standing committees, which did cause some confusion during fieldwork.

<sup>66</sup> In Brazil, the internal rules are called Regimento Interno; in Sweden, Riksdagsordning; in the UK, Standing Orders.



The executive has the constitutional prerogative to initiate legislation that requires expenditures and it is the one that writes the budget, but deputies are allowed to create expenses through their bills (though it is rare). Most budgetary bills were in fact associated with a committee, not an individual MP. There are, presently, 25 permanent committees, but unlike their British and Swedish counterparts, Brazilian committees are not necessarily connected to ministries in existence. They are also less stable than in the UK and Sweden. Committees scrutinise legislation from the executive and any legislative action from the deputies within its purview; the two with terminative power determine if all proposals are acceptable considering the Constitution and spending rules. If a deputy within a committee wants to hold a public hearing, they must propose that request and put it up to a vote, which will happen between committee members. All committees are allowed to call on ministers to answer questions, but this is not as common as it is in the UK or Sweden.

Committee meetings in Brazil are usually empty. Only the people interested in whatever is being discussed that day will appear and, of course, whoever is chairing the meeting. A chair or vice-chair may open the meeting, pass the gavel to a committee member and then leave, something I witnessed several times while in Brasília. Meetings need a quorum to open, so deputies who are members will come, sign-in using the electronic system, and leave. Often, this is done by friends and allies of the deputy with something on the agenda. This, to BRc2, indicates something wrong with the system, possibly its weakening. Deputies are expected to make an appearance at their committee, often being alternates in others; to speak and/or vote in the plenary; to be there on Tuesday morning and in their states Friday morning<sup>67</sup>; to participate in party events and meetings<sup>68</sup>; in electoral years, to elect their towns' officials and/or get re-elected.<sup>69</sup> If a committee is not doing something controversial or polarising, it will not be highly populated, either by deputies or citizens. On the other hand, a committee that is usually empty can become incredibly important when some topic rises, such as the Education Committee, with the "School without Party" bill, which essentially censors

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<sup>67</sup> One deputy I met had just arrived and was leaving on the same day to participate in a conference in their state; they would then come back early the next day. Our interview was two days later.

<sup>68</sup> I managed to interview two deputies on Friday, at the meeting for their national party's directory.

<sup>69</sup> Brazil has elections every two years, on even-numbered years; one for municipal elections and another for state and federal elections, including the presidency. Deputies are relied on to be the capillary access of state and federal candidates in their home towns and state regions in which they have a large amount of votes.

teachers in what they are allowed to say in a classroom, particularly regarding gender. Hallways were cordoned off and an exact amount of supporters and critics from civil society were allowed in along with only deputies belonging to the committee. Special committees, such as committees to evaluate constitutional amendment proposals (PECs) and Parliamentary Inquiry Committees (CPIs) are significantly fought over and the latter tends to receive a good amount of news coverage.

CPI, I have never participated in a CPI, nor do I want to, I, [it's] a waste of time, of energy, it's a stage built for the guy to show himself off during the time of the CPI. Then at the end, you know when it starts but you don't know when it ends and sometimes it ends without a vote on the report or with two or more reports. (Interview with BRd3).<sup>70</sup>

Committees have a chair, referred to in Portuguese as a president, four vice-chairs, one rapporteur, and a vice-rapporteur. They are decided by appointment through party leadership and suggestions to the Speaker and the Directing Board and party composition of the house must be considered “as much as possible”; the inclusion of at least one Minority member is mandatory (CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, Regimento Interno, 2016, Art. 23). Santos et al. (2016) point out that while expertise is relevant in the leaders' decision-making, loyalty is more important. What one learns from observing long enough is that committees in Brazil exist on an informal hierarchy and deputies take what they can get, since everyone has the right to be a principal member of one.<sup>71</sup> How deputies are distributed among committees will say a lot about the legislative year and it also says plenty about their legislative priorities. Chairs have agenda-setting powers which can lead to a busy committee.<sup>72</sup>

In the UK, select committees go through internal elections of the whole house in order to decide its chairs and internal elections within each Parliamentary Party<sup>73</sup> in order to decide its members. This process came about what is known as the Wright Reforms; and further

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<sup>70</sup> Original text: CPI, eu nunca participei de CPI e nem quero participar, eu, um desperdício de tempo, de energia é um palanque que é montado pro cara aparecer durante o período da CPI. Daí depois no final, você sabe quando ela começa mas não sabe quando ela termina e as vezes termina sem ter sido votado o relatório ou com dois ou mais relatórios.

<sup>71</sup> A few committees allow “double-booking”, but as a general rule, deputies are allowed only one principal membership to a committee and one as alternate.

<sup>72</sup> When Marco Feliciano (PSC-SP), a neopentecostal preacher, was chosen as chair for the Human Rights and Minorities Committee in 2013, human rights organisations rallied during his entire presidency against his policy positions.

<sup>73</sup> In Brazil, these would be called the “bancadas partidárias” and translated as party caucus.

legitimised and strengthened the role of select committees within the House of Commons, creating even a stepping-stone or alternative career path for backbenchers' political trajectories (O'BRIEN, 2012; CREWE, 2015; UKs; UKc1; UKc2: UKc3). Each select committee mirrors a government department<sup>74</sup> and rather than scrutinise legislation, it follows the activity of that department, essentially being a way to hold government to account (UKs; UKc1). Select committees can call on witnesses, have ministers in, and investigate any piece of work done by the government within their purview.

I think a chair of a select committee is a relatively powerful position in the British Parliament in a way that it wasn't 15 years ago, so being elected by the whole House has enhanced the post itself. So you get paid more by being elected from the whole House, you get an independent authority. And I think you could also see an indication of that by looking at how many former Labour ministers are now chairing. For some of the really good Labour people, in my view, but I think through also you can look at where they were in previous governments, are chairing committees. So there's there's a debate in British politics about whether there's an alternative to career. So the career path is up through the ministerial ranked cabinet to PM and there wasn't an alternative kind of parliamentary legislative career path that was had any great credibility. And the argument is, is that select committees have created that so actually, it's, it's felt to be more powerful position as a consequence of changing the mode of composition through election of the chair in particular. But just to recognize it means that, they don't have powers to initiate legislation, they don't get scrutinised legislation, much of what they might do is information giving and critiquing, rather than necessarily influencing. (Interview with UKs).

Committees have specialised clerks who divide their time between working for committee members and the committee chair. Clerks ensure that the committee stay within their assignments, but are also effective in their work. They assist members in drawing up questions for witnesses<sup>75</sup> and writing reports for the committee to eventually agree on. Committees are judged to be most effective when they do not vote on a report, but agree unanimously. In fact, one of the most relevant aspects of the select committees is that their meetings are closed, except for witness hearings, and it is a contempt of Parliament to divulge anything that goes on in it.

“[T]he clerk's job at the committee is to make sure the committee stays within the remit it's been given by the House of Commons as a whole. So

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<sup>74</sup> In Brazil, a ministry.

<sup>75</sup> “Witness” and “evidence” are unusual words, but in this context is only means someone who provides information during an information-gathering process not unlike the Brazilian public hearing.

they're delegated work to do by the House, essentially. So it's making sure they stay within the rules. But provided they're staying within the rules, it's making them as effective as possible, within those constraints. (...) [A] big part of my job is trying to get 11 politicians that don't agree on anything to agree on a report. And the nature of a select committee is, it's cross-party, and it's most effective if they come to cross-party conclusions. (Interview with UKc1).

Select committees are predicated on a different set of rules and expectations, down to their architecture. Their composition reflects that of the House of Commons, but as members are not entitled to a position and must be elected to them, meaning expectations on expertise raise much higher. There are also large expectations put on cooperation, since the ordinary shouting of the plenary does not lend itself well to this deliberative setting. On the other hand, members may use this privileged space to, for instance, “show off” by being tough on witnesses or ministers or protecting their party's minister. MPs' motivations vary depending on the day, the setting, and their immediate and ultimate goals. However, select committees create a sense of routine to parliamentary work in the House of Commons as well as proximity among members, given that they are placed there due to expertise and need to strive for quality. On the other hand, same as the Brazilian chairs, select committee chairs have agenda-setting powers and if they have any “pet projects” (UKc2), that can determine the focus of the committee's work, especially regarding post-legislative scrutiny.<sup>76</sup> After the committee clerk assists the chair with their draft report, he or she will assist the other ten members in writing amendments to it in order to get a final version. Committee meetings are closed but have minutes, which would show if any discussion or disagreement occurred during the meeting.

Now the thing about that is the committee's will generally do their report consideration informally first. (...) And they might bargain with each other, so they'll say, 'you can have this amendment, if I can have mine', or some member will try and come up with a compromise or they will rally to give their views and someone from my team might go out the room and go and draft something completely new. And they'll come back a bit later with a new version that they can look through and see if they can agree it. And we do all of that kind of *horsetrading informally*, and then we'll get through all of it. And hopefully, they will have agreed on everything. And then at that point, we go to the formal bit. And the formal bit, the evidence says

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<sup>76</sup> Post-legislative scrutiny is the process by which committees in Parliament evaluate Acts a few years after they have received Royal Assent (that is, were made into law). Arguably, all work done by select committees is post-legislative scrutiny, however this process means that a specific Act is being systematically scrutinised and recommendations are suggested if they are not working as intended (CAYGILL, 2019).

paragraphs one to 112. And they will all agree unanimously in one go, because the committee's united in agreeing this report. *So you get all of the disagreements done informally first.* (Interview with UKc1).

The Swedish Riksdag has currently 17 committees, with roughly 17 principal members, appointed by party leaders and reflecting the composition of the Riksdag. Mattson (2016, p. 681) defines the Swedish committee system as “permanent, specialised, small, closed, given strong legislative authority and the right to arrange public hearings”. Similarly to the British system, the Riksdag’s committees also have closed meetings, being present only members, staff, and guests of members (a rarity, I was told). It is important to distinguish the meaning of “public hearings” as they are more similar to the witness hearings in the UK than the Brazilian public hearings. Committees are allowed to propose legislation that falls within their purview and the Finance Committee can introduce proposals on topics that affect other committees (RIKSDAGEN, Riksdag Act, 2016, Art. 16).<sup>77</sup> Anything that is decided in committee must be voted in the plenary by the whole house.

Understanding the Swedish policy process as whole is important in order to understand how committees work. Executive and legislative relations are, in any country, affected by informational asymmetry, in which the executive controls more information than the legislative given its capacity to organise, distribute labour, research, and centralise results. Ministries and federal agencies work under the president or prime-minister’s office, who has a clear mandate from their elections. In Sweden, this process is exacerbated by their political tradition of thorough research and civil society involvement. When the executive is made aware or takes on an issue, it creates a commission of inquiry, which develops one, maybe more, reports. Those reports are distributed among the legislative, parties, local political officials, interested stakeholders, etc. In addition, any individual may submit a comment on that report. After all the responses are analysed, including all the MPs’ motions, interpellations, and written questions, then that report *might*, turn into a bill. Then that bill is submitted to the appropriate committee within the Riksdag which, in turn, will again make motions (to amend or change), ask questions, and make recommendations. After the whole house votes on the committee’s report on that bill, then it goes back to the executive, either

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<sup>77</sup> The Riksdagsordning or Riksdag Act used here is a translated version by the Riksdag itself, although the original in Swedish was also used in order to verify words and expressions.

to be changed or enacted (BERG, 2016; PETERSSON, 2016). It is, in Sven Steinmo's words (2010), more of an mechanical engineering perspective, rather than policy.

[It] is a long discussion about this, that this is the way we do it in Sweden, you know, all these kind of investigations, right? Experts being involved. And it takes years, then whenever, before we wrote this, this one whenever this one was submitted to the government it was sent out to civil society organizations for comments and questions and also to state agencies and state bodies for comments and questions. Which means that about you know, we received about 500 answers, from the women's lobby, from (...) those working with the LGBT questions, right? Also civil society organizations that were interested in the issue, but also to state bodies, state agencies and to ministries and to universities for comments. And these comments was integrated into this, right. So that means whenever it's, you know, there's a bill or communication lots of people have been involved in it, you know. Not only the civil servants here, but you know experts here, the entire civil society organization of Sweden, our society they have at least had the chance to read this and commented it and send it to the government to be incorporated to this. And, exactly, and here they did a list of organizations and state agencies that they thought would have a say, positive, negative, but, you know, organizations that were concerned. And, you know, might have an opinion on this and the proposals, right. But, then it's it's a right of every organization and, in fact, it's a right of every Swedish citizen to send in his/her comment. So I could, you know send in a comment to whatever investigation I wanted if I had time to read them, right? So whenever there is a decision, my point is, whenever there is a decision to be taken, for instance, in the parliament, it has been discussed for years and for years, and probably all the major issues have been solved. So usually, there's not too big discussion. (Interview with SVs4).

That being said, MPs are highly specialised in their fields, as they are expected to be experts in whatever topic comes up within their committees and have little outside support. It is common that they become spokespersons for their parties in each area (MATTSON, 2016), and are originally selected because they worked within the field prior to becoming a candidate. What Mattson (idem, p. 683) points out is that due to the asymmetry of resources and prior negotiation for bills, committees do not make too many drastic changes. However, this does not mean that MPs do not try to make those changes – only that they are mostly rejected in the chamber.

Yes, I came to the parliament in 2010 and I'm a member of the education commission and I work a lot with teachers question, it's my area, I'm responsible for that. And before that I was county council. (...) I, I was interested when I was young (...) and joined our [party] youth organization, then I was 16, 17, I think, and then I have a break until I was 28, 29 something... I think I've always been engaged in political questions, but I,

I took my first mission when I 32 years in a local committee at home, at the local school committee. (Interview with SVd1).

I'm a teacher, and I'm from [...] of Sweden, and I became an MP in [...]. So I have been around a long time now. (...) And I'm still [active] on the local level. (...) I work a lot with gender equality issues. (...) I, I was very, very active in the party. And I was active for a very long time in the youth part of the party. And then in the women's part of the party. And then and then the head of party (laughs). So I know a lot of people in the party in my constituency. So yeah, there were people who asked me, but they [had] ask already for years before the election for years before that, but at that time, I was on the lower place on the list. So I didn't mention to be an MP for years before but [in] I was higher up on the list. So then I became an MP. (Interview with SVd2).

One curious aspect that separates the two European parliaments from the Brazilian parliament is the secrecy of committee work. The Riksdag's committees have closed meetings without transcriptions. All three mostly view their system as better, that is, closed meetings create a sense of camaraderie and the possibility for innovation without party or electorate judgement and interference, and open meetings are transparent, democratic, and inclusive.

...it's open, everyone watches the debates, puts pressure, protests. I don't think [being able to speak freely] justifies closing it, talking doesn't have to necessarily be in the committee, these are public spaces because transparency is a part of democracy. If you don't have transparency, there's no democracy. What is done backstage is not necessarily something that can't be made public. It's a strategy for you to get..., it's a practice of the parliamentary, legislative process, but it's not what it's done from the point of view of political bargaining, of the horsetrading. (Translated by the author).<sup>78</sup>. (Interview with BRd3).

Because, actually, in a way, this, this spectacularisation, let's say, it's not necessarily a bad thing, in a way it gives a degree of transparency. Because, after all, people do have to know how you're positioning yourself, they're your voters, the people who lead that mandate. On the other hand, I think it bring a bad cycle, which is politics as theatre, and I'm saying this because I don't have this, I won't call it a gift, it's my way of... I can't act, I definitely can't (laughs). The TV Câmara is there all the time filming, so you're saying things to people in a way, but really it becomes this sort of theatre of the someone opposing, and then the opposition, as if they were

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<sup>78</sup> Original text: é aberta todo mundo assiste os debates, pressiona, faz atos... acho que isso não justifica o fechamento, você pode ter conversa não necessariamente na comissão, são espaços públicos, a transparência é parte da democracia. Se não tem transparência não tem democracia. não necessariamente aquilo que se faz nos bastidores é algo que não possa vir a público. É uma estratégia pra você conseguir... é uma prática do processo parlamentar, legislativo mas não é aquilo que se faz sob o ponto de vista da barganha política, do toma lá dá cá né, da troca.

fighting, the ones who are fighting in there are fighting [so people see].<sup>79</sup> . (Interview with BRd4).

I think it's because you should know that you could speak open, and it's not on a tweet or Facebook or something like that. You know when you are in the particular it's a safe space. You could propose strange things and no, no one will tell it outside that room... I think it's important. (Interview with SVd1).

Yeah, I think we have to do both. We have to be open and people have to know what we discuss. But we also have to have those meetings who are just for for a few people. Because it's easier to get along. (Interview with SVd2).

So you'll have seen in the chamber how adversarial it is. I mean, they're sitting on opposite sides, they are shouting at each other, they're finger-pointing. I mean, it doesn't lend itself to consensus at all. If you look at a Public Bill Committee (...) they are similarly set up on adversarial grounds. And they are whipped, so the government members are told how to vote, the opposition members are told how to vote and they vote all the time. (...) And all their debate goes on in public. So debate in the House of Commons is always in public, almost always in public (laughs). (...) And the debate happens in public so people can call them out on what they're saying. Their voting record is entirely public, same in the Public Bill Committee. In the select committee, the oral evidence that we take is in public. So once we've gotten the witnesses in, and the public sitting at the back of a room, that's televised, almost always. But the debate within the committee, their deliberations and how they come to their decisions about what they're going to do and what they're going to publish and so on. That's always in private, and strictly in private. So things like draft reports, things like that are private for the committee and the committee only. And there's not a tradition of whipping on select committees at all, I mean. [Whips] can't go they can go in, I mean, they can tell their members what to do. But because it's much more of a, I mean, it can be quite unpredictable. We don't know what we're doing in there. And it enables members to be more independent. And because they can't be called out on every compromise they're making, or every bargain they might be doing with the other members. They get, I mean, they don't hate each other as much as you would think from the House of Commons' chamber. A lot of it, it's for show. And they're picking a side; when they're in the Select Committee, they have to work together. And they actually get on across party lines quite well. And they can find common areas and things they agree on and disagree on and so on. So that's,

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<sup>79</sup> Original text: Porque na verdade de uma certa forma é, isso daí essa espetacularização, digamos assim, que não necessariamente é uma coisa ruim que de uma certa forma dá um grau de transparência. Pois afinal de contas as pessoas têm que saber mesmo como você está se posicionando, são seus eleitores as pessoas que lideram aquele mandato. Por outro lado eu acho que ela traz um vício muito ruim, que é a teatralização da política e estou dizendo isso por que eu não tenho esse, nem vou dizer dom, eu não tenho, não é a minha forma de, eu não consigo teatralizar, não consigo definitivamente (risos). TV Câmara tá ali o tempo todo colocando, então assim você tá falando pras pessoas de uma forma mas vira uma coisa meio teatro da pessoa se opor da oposição e como se os opositores já tivessem digamos assim, os que brigam lá dentro eles estão brigando mas pra poder [ser visto].



it's a fundamental difference between select committee (...) and it's because the debate is private. (Interview with UKc1).

Despite their praise for whatever advantage their system brings, whether it is freedom to create or transparency, all highlighted the informal way negotiations go about, either prior meetings or in hushed conversations during meetings. Especially in the Brazilian case, anyone either watching a committee meeting on television or the internet or observing in person can witness deputies and/or their staff in small groups of two, three, maybe four, discussing away from microphones and others. What a gendered perspective leads us to wonder is: how are women inserted into these informal rules, expectations, and networks?

There's usually, whenever comes to a decision-making process, there're two meetings. So for every bill, if you will, there're two meetings. The first meeting, the staff members of the committees present the bill or whatever is, you know, is going to be decided and then the members of that committee state their preliminary opinion. If they will vote against it or for it, right? Or if they will make a reservation, right? (...) The second meeting, that meeting they formally tell the discussion, their final decision, their view, right. And then a committee report is being written and finalized and decided upon by a vote, in that chamber, right, in that committee, sorry, in that committee. And once the report is decided upon, it's sent to the chamber for a formal vote. And vote usually takes place on Wednesday in the Parliament. Whenever there's a vote, this let's say, stop, you know, let's go back one step. Whenever this report is decided upon in the committee, it's sent to the chamber. The plenary, the plenary starts with that discussion on the report. In this discussion, normally, only the members of the committee take part. Because they don't have time, they are specialized. (Interview with SVs4).

Another gendered aspect of committee work is how members are distributed among committees. While representatives have their interests and specialisations and that is taken into account in all three legislatures to some degree, they also want to be re-elected and effective. Both these desires usually come by being in a leadership position and/or being a member of a powerful committee. Powerful committees are divided along gendered lines: either the committee is powerful because it handles issues that are stereotypically male, or a powerful committee is populated by (mostly) men. These differences can be quite self-evident for women and people who research gender issues, but sometimes it is not quite so clear for people outside the field or structure of marginalisation. Issues of care are often viewed as less important to "Politics" than foreign policy, finance and tax, and constitutional issues. There are, however, exceptions to this. In all three countries, healthcare is public and universal, meaning that there is a lot of debate and funding that goes through parliament on

the topic. Therefore, that issue has to be studied contextually and empirically. The previously mentioned “School without Party” bill, in Brazil, mobilised a committee that is usually lacking in conflict and men’s presence. It did so through a mainly gendered issue since the bill’s main goal was to ban “gender ideology” from schools (by banning “communism” from schools, which supposedly indoctrinates children with such ideology)).<sup>80</sup>

The dynamic of committee membership is quite different from Brazil and the European countries. The former has significant changes every year, in addition to having large committee membership. Since committees themselves are viewed in a hierarchical fashion, not only their internal positions, deputies are always hoping to get a more visible and important committee assignment.<sup>81</sup> In the UK, as mentioned, select committees became internally elected positions only in 2010, and the data available for that membership is cumbersome to get. Not only is it not available through the open data system, one needs to look at the minutes or attendance records for each year in order to find the membership of previous years. Assignments to committees in the House of Commons are quite stable, so the data only refers to election years, when available. For Sweden, the records are available, but committee assignments are stable; consequently, the graphs focus on the years immediately after elections. In order to increase the data points, years 1998 and 2018 were also included. For both Brazil and Sweden, the data presented here is comprised of principal and alternate members, showing a fuller picture of membership. For each country, committees were selected based on their *contextual* importance and on their focus on care issues. Below are the graphs showing trends in men and women’s membership. In Brazil, MPs are allowed to be principal members of only one committee and alternate in another, with the exception of


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<sup>80</sup> Not only that, in Brazil, most teachers of children are women, with a closer split between women and men in secondary and tertiary education. By silencing teachers, the bill would silence mostly women, something that did not come up in discussions. <http://www.oecd.org/education/education-at-a-glance-2018-data-and-methodology.htm>

<sup>81</sup> The data on the Brazilian committee system is not available on the open data system yet. The results displayed here come from data kindly given to me by the *Dados Abertos* staff, after they warned me profusely that it was test data. The issue that they are having with it is that chairs are mentioned twice, also as principal members of the committee. However, since I analysed membership and leadership positions separately, I would only like to warn the reader that when I discuss numbers for members, I am including chairs and other members of the committee’s board.

the recently added Defence of Women’s Rights, Defence of Elderly Persons, and Defence of Disabled Persons, which allow double membership.


Graph 15: Percentage of women, Finance and Tax Committee, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2003-2018



Source: the author, based on data from the Câmara dos Deputados. Logarithmic scale.

In the case of Brazil, it is important to remember that women have only recently exceeded 10% of the house. Therefore, I have used the percentage of women in the committees and their numbers in committee need to considered relative to how little of them there are in the Chamber. The first two show the Brazilian committees with terminative power, the Finance and Tax and the Constitution, Citizenship, and Justice Committees. Notably, for the former, only in 2018 did the number of women reach double digits, while in 2014 there were no women at all. For the former, there have only ever been two women sitting on its directing board and only twice has membership come close to 10% women.


Graph 16: Percentage of women, Constitution, Citizenship, and Justice Committee, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2003-2018



Source: the author, based on data from the Câmara dos Deputados.

It was only in 2015 that a Women’s Rights Committee was instituted in Brazil, and that will be analysed a little further. Two others were chosen as the “care” committees: Social Security and Family and Human Rights and Minorities. As discussed, while committees in Brazil may become relevant when polarised by an issue, for the most part their work is routine and concerns only the members with something on the agenda. The Human Rights and Minorities Committee is one that “polarises” relatively often, given the nature of its remit, so I decided to include it in order to give balance to this analysis. The trend clearly shows that women are a large part of the Social Security and Family Committee, given their small population within the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados; their overall presence in the Human Rights and Minorities Committee is also quite high, reaching 35.71% in 2012. This shows that women in Brazil are segregated when it comes to committee assignments and that, despite their lower numbers, it is possible to have them be overrepresented in any given committee. Their lack of access to the most important committees, however, indicates that their perceived power and value within their parties and the Câmara as a whole is not on par with the men.

Graph 17: Percentage of women, Social Security and Family Committee, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2003-2018




Source: the author, based on data from the Câmara dos Deputados.

Importantly, and this is true for all countries, while aggregate data tells us the gender of members and year of selection and lack of change between those years denotes stability, it is likely that many members are the same over legislatures. In Brazil, although to a lesser degree than Sweden and the UK, deputies are specialised and interested in certain areas, often the areas that brought them into politics in the first place.

Erikson and Josefsson (2018) explain that women and men share committee responsibilities and that there has been a concerted effort by parties to indicate gender-balanced rosters to committees. On the other hand, the authors recognise that some gender imbalance may still exist regarding chairing and thematic assignments, as per their report from 2016. However, these publications do not explicit what these differences may be, although they are demonstrated by Bolzendahl, et al. (2014), Bäck et al. (2014) and Wängnerud (2010). Below are graphs of the committees chosen based on the literature and their importance in the Instrument of Government (the Swedish Constitution).

Graph 18: Percentage of women Human Rights and Minorities Committee, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2003-2018




Source: the author, based on data from the Câmara dos Deputados.

While the budget bill may go through all committees if the expenditure area is within its remit, its full content is received by the *Finansutskottet* (Finance Committee). The *Konstitutionsutskottet* (Constitution Committee) oversees constitutional matters and has oversight over ministers of government. At no point, between 1998 and 2018, did women’s number rise higher than men’s in these two committees, with the difference being larger in the Finance Committee.<sup>82</sup>


<sup>82</sup> Committee membership in Sweden must always be in odd numbers, so there will never be an even split.

Graph 19: Finance Committee membership, Riksdagen, Sweden, 1998-2018



Source: the author, based on data from the Riksdag.


Graph 20: Constitution Committee membership, Riksdagen, Sweden, 1998-2018



Source: the author, based on data from the Riksdag.

The “care” committees chosen were *Kulturutskottet* and *Utbildningsutskottet*, respectively, the Culture Committee and the Education Committee. The former shows women in higher number only in 2014, which was surprising. The Education Committee membership, on the other hand, has a quite clear switch in women-to-men ratio. However, these shifts seem to denote something characteristic about the Swedish dynamic: highly-valued committees have a slight majority of men; care committees, rather than a constant majority of women or a gender-balanced committee, “switches” majorities. What does that say about the value given to these committees? Are men and women interested or disinterested in this work, given the highly specialised nature of the Riksdag? Does the view on gender-balance actually play out in sliding majorities, despite what the discourse of gender equality may say? Indeed, Bolzendahl, et al. (2014) argue that men have become more interested in *soft* politics areas and occupying those spaces in committees more often in Sweden, but the path for women towards the committees that are perceived as *hard* politics is still somewhat blocked.


Graph 21: Education Committee membership, Riksdagen, Sweden, 1998-2018



Source: the author, based on data from the Riksdag.



Graph 22: Culture Committee membership, Riksdagen, Sweden, 1998-2018



Source: the author, based on data from the Riksdag.

In light of these questions, I also wanted to check the presence of women and men in the *Arbetsmarknadsutskottet* (Labour Market Committee). The importance of the welfare state and the focus on labour market policies in Sweden and its overall culture cannot be underplayed (TILTON, 1974; TRÄGÅRDH, 1990; LINDHOLM, 1991; STEINMO, 2010). In particular, the role that *work* and welfare and, most importantly, the freedom to *go out* to find work and have real access to work, has to be highlighted.<sup>83</sup> This will come into play in the next chapter, with the legislative data, but I would like to point out the aspects that make the focus on labour so important. As mentioned, Sweden has its own word for gender equality, *jämställdhet*, which developed from its constant use when discussing the topic. Its initial definition, however, is much closer to equality as a whole and the words for gender

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<sup>83</sup> While in Sweden, any tourist visiting historical museums can see the difference on how women are portrayed. It seems to be a *relative* historical constant, that women were allowed to perform several tasks and labour that women in other countries did not have access to. While this is a matter of degree and only an anecdotal observation in my part, it did make sense to perceive this country as laying down its gender equal basis in practices from long before. On the other hand, this does not mean that these historical accounts were showing men doing “women’s work”. The depictions focused on women and their “freedom” to be overburdened.

are *kön* (more specifically, sex) and *genus*. The first<sup>84</sup> concern with gender equality came via the commonly known *Jämställdhetslagen*, or Gender Equality Law, but its full name is *Lag om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet*, that is, Law on equality between women and men in working life, written in 1979. This means that the first major consideration about equality between women and men was about work and, in a very Swedish perspective, working life.


Also, whenever a communication or bill is sent to Parliament, it's sent to one of the standing committees. Right? So this one was sent to the committee on the labour market. Why, why, you would ask, why? The Swedish Parliament practices gender mainstreaming which means that if it's a question about education and gender equality, [it] should go to the committee on gender equality. If it's a question about social concerns and gender equality, it should be sent to the sent to the standing committee on health or on social affairs, or social security affairs or defence or foreign affairs or the constitution, blah, blah, blah. But this was about everything, you know, and in the Swedish parliament, it's stated that if there is a question that concerns everybody it goes to the committee on the labour market. And the reason for that is that, originally, when gender equality and the gender equality law was adopted in Sweden in 1979, it concerned primarily working life. Gender equality in the labour market. So, so that's so in the Swedish Parliament in those 15 standing committees, the principle of gender mainstreaming is practiced, but in case it cannot be decided who should have it, it goes to committee to on the labour market. The committee on the labour market also decides on the state budget for gender equalities. So that's a specific task in that committee. (Interview with SVs4).

With this in mind, I checked the presence of women and men in the Labour Market Committee as well and found that it was the most gender-balanced over time of all five, as the graph below shows. Its overall importance but also its connection to gender issues seems to have made it a committee assignment that appeals to both women and men, possibly for different reasons.

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<sup>84</sup> "First" is a terrifying word, especially since Swedish women achieved the right to vote early in the 20<sup>th</sup> century (although it was the last of the Scandinavian countries to do so). My use here of "first" primarily reflects that of my interviewee; it is also important to differentiate "feminism" and "women's movement" from gender equality as, particularly in Sweden as I will show, these can be considered very different things (LINDHOLM, 1991; WÄNGNERUD, 2012).

Graph 23: Labour Market Committee membership, Riksdagen, Sweden, 1998-2018



Source: the author, based on data from the Riksdag.

Similarly to Sweden, data points for the House of Commons refer to years when elections happened and MPs re-settled into the House of Commons to elect among themselves who would participate in select committee work. At this point, I would like to bring up the distinction between frontbenchers and backbenchers. The House of Commons is a place of multiple points of conflict and they are not all aligned with party allegiances and electoral competition. Frontbenchers exist in both sides of the House and are deemed “successful” MPs, either by achieving a ministerial or a shadow ministerial position.<sup>85</sup> Backbenchers form the unsung majority of the House of Commons and are given very little space to act beyond conforming to government’s policies or rejecting them. This, in part, brought about the aforementioned changes, included in the Wright Reforms, as they became known. Crewe (2015) details the combination of events that permitted the inclusion,<sup>86</sup> in those reforms, of a

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<sup>85</sup> The concept of a shadow cabinet is quite interesting given its popularity in parliamentary European countries, but its lack of presence in presidential systems, even those dominated by two parties. The official opposition builds what would be its cabinet had it won however, sticking with the ministries government has decided upon. That shadow cabinet is then responsible for “shadowing” the legislation and other actions coming out of the government and positioning themselves on what they would have done in the same situation.

<sup>86</sup> These included the expenses scandal of 2009, the new Speaker coming into his seat, and the retirement of several MPs, who essentially has nothing to lose.


Backbench Business Committee (BBBC), extending some agenda-setting and debate power for backbenchers, whether from the government or not. The BBBC has become famous for its transparency, accountability, and friendly-natured environment. The creation of this committee did not come about without a “fight” as frontbenchers and whips from all parties placed themselves against it.

In addition to this committee, I have also chosen the Public Administration and Constitution Committee, which changed its remit from being the committee that oversaw the government’s accounts to also add constitutional matters as part of their priorities. Consequently, it only offers membership data for 2015 and 2017. In keeping with policy interests usually attached to women, I looked into membership of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, as well as the Health and Social Care Committee. However, because of data being so recent, I decided to also check the Education Committee and found that its website also gave information on its predecessor, the Children, Schools and Families Committee.

O’Brien (2012) tested whether election to select committees had helped or hindered women’s presence in select committees in general, and found no evidence of either positive or negative gender bias, although she admittedly: took on a new parliament that was using a new process; did not evaluate gender bias in committee remits.

The graph below shows the four committees analysed, with data from the first year available, either 2010 or 2015. While it is too much to ask for a trend from this data, it clearly shows that women are only the majority, by large amounts, in the Health and Social Care Committee.


Graph 24: Committee Membership in specific committees, House of Commons, UK, 2010-2017



Source: the author, based on information from the House of Commons website.


Below are the graphs for the Children, Schools and Families Committee and its replacement, the Education Committee. O’Brien’s (2012) analysis might be in line with the results of this committee over time, as it went from a significantly soft politics theme with a large men’s presence, to a less overtly feminine-gendered remit, with a slight majority of women in it. Could this be because education in the UK is viewed differently than in other countries? Was the presence in select committees so hard-won previously, despite their unimportance, that even in a “women’s committee”, men were the majority? Are backbenchers still settling into their new roles? Or did the new process create a more effective way to *gender* committees and stereotype roles?

Graph 25: Children, School and Families Committee membership, House of Commons, UK, 2006-2010



Source: the author, based on information from the House of Commons website.

Graph 26: Education Committee membership, House of Commons, UK, 2010-2015



Source: the author, based on information from the House of Commons website.

Committees are a necessity. In evaluating parliaments as a more typical work environment, as the Swedes do, one cannot help but see committees as the various departments within a company.<sup>87</sup> The resemblance, of course, stops there. While parliaments are workspaces that should adhere to several work-like routines and rights, such as parental leave, adequate office space, harassment policies, etc, these are not common workspaces. They are temporary, predicated on elections, and filled by people who might be power-hungry, looking to help others, or both. Individual MPs come from different backgrounds and interests; different parties, with different party organisations; have different motivations; and different modes of working.

Therefore, while one can say that “you’ve seen a committee system, you’ve seen them all” and that is true to a certain extent, they are actually filled with large and small unwritten rules, and are subject to the power relations within the parliament as a whole. While being a committee member or chair in the UK or in Sweden is valuable in and of itself, in Brazil any deputy would leave all their interests behind for a chance to be the chair or even just a member of the Constitution, Citizenship, and Justice Committee (CCJC). This is likely due to the few positions available for the two European parliaments and the informal hierarchy of the Brazilian committee system. This could also explain members’ attendance in all three countries, although the fact that British and Swedish MPs are likely in committees closer to their original interests also could be a factor.

One aspect that I would like to highlight is the difference in expectation of members’ specialisations. Particularly in the UK, with access to information packs for debates, committee clerks, and Library clerks, British MPs seem to be able to “switch” specialisations more easily. As UKc1 mentioned regarding a specific MP they had clerked for, once an MP chooses a topic, for whatever reason, that is when they become specialised. The same MP

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<sup>87</sup> One of my most interesting experiences at the Riksdag was after being baffled by the security guard talking to the MP I was going to interview and referring to them by their first name. As I was leaving, I asked her if she talked to all MPs like that and, if so, if all workers of the Riksdag had such a familiarity with the MPs. She looked at me, stunned, and replied that it was the latter. In Brazil, even the closest staff to an MP will refer to them by “deputado” or “deputada”, respectively, for a man or a woman (with some exceptions, of course), which is what led to my astonishment. As I have learnt, and it makes sense given the cultural aspects of Swedish society, everyone in relationships of authority will be referred to by their first names. While Brazil has that kind of informality in most situations (for instance, professor and student), that is not the case with elected officials. In the UK, the House of Commons website has, for each MP a page where how they prefer to be called is stated. That is likely very helpful, since there are so many titles there.

was mentioned by UKc3 as being specialised a completely different topic. In Sweden, the opposite seems to be true, with MPs being expected to remain where their party needs them the most and although there is a higher importance given to certain committees, MPs “stay in their lanes”. These features also seem to rise out of the lack of assignments for all MPs and how you can find yourself in a committee assignment in the next term. Another factor that could influence the way British MPs go about selecting their topics is the majoritarian system, as they are more possibly more influenced by individual constituents’ needs. One way that could impact their actions is the realisation of a larger problem. In any case, their different link with their constituents must not be overlooked.<sup>88</sup> Brazil sits in the middle, having positions for all, a strong hierarchy among committees, deputies with strong social movement connections and deputies without, and an overworked consultancy service that only works by demand.

In uneven playing fields, where access and power are intertwined, an analysis with a gender perspective becomes even more important. If it is agreed that being in parliament is important and it is agreed that there are committees that are more important than others, the equality in these spaces, not only of gender but any politically relevant minority, has to be discussed.

#### *Leadership and agenda-setting positions*

This section, quite possibly, exposes more differences among these parliaments than any other. Being a leader is having a very powerful resource: other MPs. It is being to negotiate not only what you can do, but to guarantee what other people will do because you tell them to. In order to be an effective leader, you also need resources – access to offices and staff that other MPs do not. While leaders also have to make small trades with their more valuable MPs, who may have a leadership role themselves, a leadership position brings visibility, re-electability, and effectiveness. Which is why parliaments are often reluctant to create more of them – these are not spaces of equality, but hierarchy and power.

As mentioned, in Brazil, the Speaker position and the Directing Board as a whole are extremely political, unlike in the UK and Sweden. The Speaker has the power to decide on

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<sup>88</sup> For instance, almost all my attempts at contact with British MPs resulted in an automatic email telling me what steps I should take if I were a member of their constituency. Although some Brazilian deputies might be a little more open once they know you are from their state, this type of action was only found in the UK.



the agenda, to set debates, to join legislation that seems similar,<sup>89</sup> to accept impeachment proceedings. Until 2005, Speaker and the positions on the Directing Board were decided based on the largest party caucuses and internally within parties. Since then, they have been hotly contested elections. There has never been a woman Speaker of the Câmara dos Deputados and between 2003 and 2018 they made up only 4% of the Directing Board.

Another group with agenda-setting powers is the College of Leaders, a group comprised of all party leaders, majority and minority leaders, parliamentary bloc<sup>90</sup> leaders, and the leader for the government, who meet regularly to decide on agenda for committees, plenary, and negotiate.<sup>91</sup> Meetings are not public and are not transcribed. Since 2013, this group includes the coordinator for the Women’s Caucus, something I will discuss further in the next section. There is no information on previous members of the College of Leaders – one can only know its current members. However, women are a rarity in it. One only needs to look at internal rules (*Regimento Interno*) of the Câmara to see the importance of the College of Leaders; the expression “ouvido o Colégio de Líderes”, that is, “having listened to the College of Leaders”, is sprinkled throughout the decision-making process of the Directing Board. Party leaders are also responsible for directing their caucuses’ votes; in highly-polarised situations, they will use “leadership speaking time” in order to reinforce what members should do. That speaking time exists in addition to their MP speaking time and can be used for any purpose the leader chooses.

[We] are not treated equally. I went, the first meeting of the College of Leaders that I participated in, [Name of another congresswoman] was also a leader in [Year], we arrived at the first College of Leaders’ meeting and we were standing. The whole table, everyone sitting, and the two of us standing, the advisors who sit at the back also in their chairs, no one cared. (...) It was obvious, we were liked this, around the table, so it was clear, explicit, that there were two congresswomen standing. Usually, those who aren’t leaders, sometimes deputies stand behind the leaders, but in the heads of those sitting there it didn’t fit that the two women there were leaders. (...) The routine, it expresses itself. There was another meeting, for the two College of Leaders, the Senate and the Chamber, a decision, complex deliberation and everything, there were three women representing their parties (...). Several signed up and maybe by coincidence, our names were

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<sup>89</sup> No one know exactly how the decision to join two or more bills is done and it can often come at a price for individual legislators, either removing their credit or joining bills that are actually in opposition (BRc2). In Portuguese, when bills are joined, it is called “apensado”.

<sup>90</sup> These are parties who officially cooperate in the Câmara dos Deputados.

<sup>91</sup> Party leaders who are members of parliamentary blocs and the government leader have voice, but not vote.

the last three. Then, when the last man finished speaking [name of the president of the Senate] said ‘so, the opinions of the parties are more or less understood’. There were three women left and he ‘no, we’re short on time’. (Interview with BRd1).<sup>92</sup>

Yeah, I mean, for example, I had a really bad relationship with [Congressman 1 who was party leader]. When [Congressman 2 who was party leader] was the leader I got along with him, but [Congressman 1] was someone I never respected. I was there because I had been nominated and he was the leader, but I also noticed that he had problems with me, that he was intrinsically sexist, I felt his rejection. Even with the way he related to women in general, with his wife, other women workers, it was a man I did not admire, so it’s hard, being led by a guy you don’t like, you don’t admire, and you don’t respect. (Interview with BRd2).<sup>93</sup>

... very authoritarian, the house, the statute, the internal rules of the house are draconian, there is no space for debate, not just among the women, not just with the women, the entirety of it, so I call it the dictatorship of the College of Leaders. It’s the leaders who rule and not the other sectors of the [party’s] caucus, get it? The Board is also discretionary, I mean, most of the decisions by the presidency are decisions [that are] unilateral, monocratic, he makes the decision and doesn’t even consult the Board, I used to be a member of the Board, (...) it is a monocratic decision taken by one person. And it is characteristic of the authoritarianism of the Brazilian state and the Brazilian state in the Câmara is that. Now, the more women in here, things change, slowly, but they keep changing, little by little, it used to be much harder. (Interview with BRd3).<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Original text: Não é tratado igualmente. Eu fui, a primeiro reunião do Colégio de Líderes que eu participei, a [Nome de deputada] também era líder em [Ano], nós chegamos na primeira reunião de Colégio de Líderes nós duas em pé. Toda mesa, todo mundo sentado nós duas em pé, a assessoria que fica detrás também sentada nas suas cadeiras, ninguém cuidou. (...) Era visível, a gente ficava assim, em torno da mesa, então era claro, explícito que tinham duas deputadas em pé. Normalmente quem não é líder, às vezes deputados ficam em pé, por trás dos líderes, mas no imaginário de que tava ali sentado não cabia que as duas mulheres que ali eram líderes. (...) O cotidiano, ele se expressa. Houve uma outra reunião dos dois Colégios de Líderes, do Senado e da Câmara, uma decisão, deliberação complexa e tudo, estavam representando os partidos três mulheres (...) Vários se inscreveram e a gente talvez por coincidência nossas inscrições eram as três últimas. Aí quanto terminou o último homem que falou, o [nome do presidente do Senado] disse ‘olha então já tá mais ou menos entendido as opiniões dos partidos’. Faltavam três mulheres e ele ‘não, já tá já tamo passando da hora’.

<sup>93</sup> Original text: Sim, eu acho assim que, por exemplo eu tive uma relação muito ruim com o [Líder 1]. Quando o [Líder 2] era o líder eu me dava bem com ele, mas o [Líder 1] era uma pessoa que eu nunca respeitei. Eu tava ali porque eu fui indicada e ele era o líder, mas eu percebia também que ele tinha dificuldades comigo, ele era intrinsecamente machista eu sentia que a rejeição dele. Até a própria maneira que ele relacionava com as mulheres em geral entendeu, com esposa, com as funcionárias. Era um homem que eu não admirava então era difícil você ser liderada por um cara que você não gostava que você não admirava, não respeitava.

<sup>94</sup> Original text: muito autoritária a casa, o estatuto, o regimento interno da casa é draconiano, não oferece espaço de debate. Não é só entre as mulheres também, não é só com mulheres, no conjunto, portanto eu chamo de a ditadura do Colégio de Líderes. São os líderes que mandam e não os outros setores das bancadas, entendeu? A mesa também é discricionária quer dizer a maior parte das decisões da presidência são decisões [que são] unilateral, monocrática, ele toma a decisão nem consulta a mesa, já fui membro da mesa, nem consulta a mesa é uma decisão monocrática tomada por uma pessoa só. E é um traço do autoritarismo do estado brasileiro e o estado brasileiro na Câmara é isso. Não é que ele é democrático. Agora quanto mais mulheres aqui dentro as

Lastly, there the positions within committees, the most important being president (that is, chair) and rapporteur. The chair has the duty to keep the committee functioning and on task and, since they are a part of that committee, likely pursuing their own legislation goals within it. They are the connecting link between the committee and the College of Leaders, they moderate debates, assign rapporteurs and sign with them their report. One particular aspect of the Brazilian legislature is vote by acclamation. In the case of committees, chairs will call a vote and ask for those who are for it to “remain as they are”. Whenever a vote by acclamation occurs, either in the plenary or in the committees, this means that there is no real accountability of who voted and for what. In the case of committees, since they are often quite empty, votes might be taken with only two deputies in the room, sometimes the chair and the deputy who has a request being put to a vote. This becomes a strategic opportunity as well, as when there are situations in which the committee might be missing some key actors, but about to vote on something relevant. An allied deputy will request a quorum count, and should that fail, the vote cannot go through.<sup>95</sup>

Each bill<sup>96</sup> is assigned to a rapporteur who cannot be the author of the bill and must report on its merits. The graph below shows women and men’s percentages over time for each position available in the data. Rapporteurs give recommendations, such as whether the bill should be amended, move forward, or if it should be voted down. For instance, a rapporteur in the CCJC will report on whether that bill is constitutional or not, which could be its end right there. Both positions have constant access to the legislative consultants, who work with them often in order to organise the committee and produce reports.

The rapporteur asks the Consultoria to make an assessment. Then what happens is, the consultant makes their assessment and submits it to the rapporteur, they read it and go ‘no, no I don’t like this section, include this, and such’. The rapporteur signs, but the consultant sort of builds it along with them, right? So, it’s their political feeling because it’ll always be a political position. This is really good about our work, which is having this clarity of this link between the content and the political view. (...) [T]hey already give me some guidance, ‘I want a favourable or contrary position’,

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
coisa vão se mudando, muito lentamente, mas continuam mudando mas vai mudando aos pouquinhos, já foi muito mais difícil.

<sup>95</sup> This was something I witnessed many times, especially during my visit in 2011.

<sup>96</sup> I am using the word bill to describe anything that a Brazilian legislator can propose that would mean a change in legislation, including an ordinary bill, a legislative decree, a constitutional amendment proposal, etc.

which gives an indication, right, ‘I’m in favour of this subject’, ‘why am I against it?’. (Interview with BRc2).<sup>97</sup>

Graph 27: Committee positions by gender, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2003-2018




Source: the author, based on information from the Câmara dos Deputados.

In Sweden, the Speaker’s office is less politicised, although they are not required to renounce party ties as the British Speaker is. They are, however, barred from voting. For this, a Speaker is given an alternate, who replaces the Speaker in their MP duties (RIKSDAGEN, 2016, Chapter 4, Art. 13). Although the Speaker has managing powers over the Riksdag, their powers are no so extensive as to shape the decisions being made in it. On the other hand, the bills and communications sent by the executive seem to have a larger agenda-setting impact. Speakers are given the assistance of one clerk. Committee chairs follow similar rules, having deputy speakers and an alternate. There have been two women Speakers in the Riksdag Ingerd Troedsson (M) and Birgitta Dahl (S).

<sup>97</sup> Original text: O relator pede pra Consultoria fazer um parecer. Aí o que que acontece, o consultor faz o parecer e submete ao relator, aí ele le, fala assim, não não gostei desse ponto, inclui esse aqui e tal’. O relator assina, mas o consultor meio que constrói junto com ele, né? Então assim, é o sentimento político dele porque sempre vai ser uma posição política. Isso é muito bom do nosso trabalho, que é você ter uma clareza desse vínculo do conteúdo com o viés político. (...) [E]le já dá a orientação ‘eu quero o parecer favorável ou contrário’, isso já dá uma grande linha, né, “ah eu sou favorável a esse tema”, “eu sou contrário por quê”?

The Riksdag has a similar structure to the Brazilian College of Leaders, which also confers with the Speaker. The *gruppledare* (group leader) is appointed by the parties which had at least four per cent of the national vote; each party also has a leader in each committee. The graph below shows the gender breakdown of group leader and deputy group leader between the years of 2006 and 2019, the timeframe available in the *Öppna Data* system. It shows how women tend to fall towards the “deputy” category, rather than be the leader.

Graph 28: Group leaders and deputies by gender, Riksdagen, Stockholm, 2006-2019



Source: the author, based on data from the Riksdag.


Yeah, I mean, recently, we have had quite a few female party leaders, I mean, I think now almost half of the parties have a female leader. I mean we didn't have, we haven't had a female prime minister so far. Yeah, during the last 10-20 years, I mean since the mid-90s it's been very, the parties have been very aware of trying to have a sort of a balance, even if they don't have formal quotas. Even if they sometimes they have like recommendations or more like a policy or so... (Interview with SVs2).

Party loyalty in the Riksdag is extremely important; every Tuesday, parties have their meetings in order to discuss upcoming votes and strategies. These meetings are closed and leaders guide members in their future actions. That being said, rather than the verticalised notion of loyalty, parties in Sweden seem to work from an idea of division of labour,

cooperation, and trust. That is, members are specialised and they trust others to be as competent as they are and make the right decisions within committees so that they, in turn, can support them in the plenary vote.

Consequently, standing committee chairs have a large degree of influence, as they are tie-breakers in tied votes (RIKSDAG, 2016, Riksdagsordning, Chapter 10, Art. 11) and the ones who inform the Speaker on the goings-on in committee. In addition, committees are the *de facto* deciders on issues coming from the government, calling on debates in the plenary and having the power to call on ministers. Since 1978 until today, the Constitution Committee has had four women chairs and the Finance Committee has had three (each had had nine men as chair). The Labour Market Committee has had nine men and six women. Looking at the specific timeframe for the research, there have been 125 men in standing committee chairs and 82 women, according to the data collected from the Riksdag's open data system. Although there are only 15 to 17 committees each legislature, committee chairs change more often than once every four years; in addition, there are joint temporary committees. Although this displays a relatively gender-balanced distribution of positions, it would be important to consider the committees that women are chairing and how long they are chairing them for.

Graph 29: Standing Committee chairs by gender, Riksdagen, Sweden, 1998-2019



Source: the author, based on data from the Riksdag.

The House of Commons is also based on extreme party loyalty. However, the tone becomes completely different from then that of the Riksdag: it is almost adversarial as members are told to “toe the line” by “whips”. I have refrained to discuss whips so far in order to dedicate this space to them. The word “whip” can refer to a person or to a document that MPs receive from their parties, letting them know upcoming votes and actions they need to take. A “three-line whip” means that the issue has been underlined three times and presence is mandatory. Rebellious MPs could be excluded from the party whip, meaning they would fall out of favour with the party and essentially work as independents.

In terms of what they are able to and how they might treat party members (with either carrots or sticks), whips are closer to Brazilian party leaders. However, there is no limit on the number of whips, although there are a fixed number of paid positions that could refer to them (UKc1). Whips are also referred to as “the usual channels”, and that seems to function as the College of Leaders as well, deciding and negotiating on the agenda and votes. They are, however, backstage actors, serving the party, and they tend to go unseen by the general public. In creating the new form of the select committees, whips were quite set against it, as

it gave too much freedom to individual MPs, since select committees are not “whipped”, that is, whips do not get to go in or tell their MPs what to do (UKc1). They also lost the power to appoint chairs to those committees, although they are still responsible for choosing Public Bill Committee members and chairs. According to data published by the House of Commons Library, there have been 15 whips and 10 deputy-whips between 2000 and 2017, with four women within the first group and only one in the latter.

The whips mediate between backbenchers and frontbenchers; they act as the glue that holds the political party together so that the frontbench can run government, or oppose with controlled conflict and the minimum of fuss. (CREWE, 2015, p. 129).

So whips are losing some of their weapons and gaining critics. Partly due to the growing number of more soothing women MPs, but also because the combination of deference and occasional violence that once characterized the whip’s office is evaporating, whips have become less intimidating. (CREWE, 2015, p. 133).

Another valued position in the House of Commons is the unpaid Parliamentary Private Secretary, essentially someone who is in-between government and Parliament. These are people selected by ministers to be their “eyes-and-ears” in the House, and while they are known and have restrictions on posts they can hold in the House and information they can have from government, it is a very “hush-hush” position to be in (SEARING, 1994). Someone who is perceived as thoroughly loyal may be considered for such a position, which is seen as a stepping-stone to minister (UKs). There is very little information on who they are and how many PPSs there are; all that I could find was by the House of Commons Library, and it listed all Private Secretaries for prime-ministers since 1906. Over the period of 2000-2017, there have been ten of them, three being women.

[I]f an MP is a PPS, they won’t be doing anything hostile to the government. If you’re a PPS or a government minister, you’re never going to sign an EDM, right, or table a written question. (Interview with UKs).

...a PPS is the link between a particular Minister and Parliament: a bag-carrier, intelligence agent and advocate. When your Minister speaks in the Chamber you sit behind them and pass notes to or from the civil servants sitting in the officials’ box. Even in committees officials can’t advise Ministers directly during the session and if they require information, they have to pass notes via their PPS who sits directly behind them. (CREWE, 2015, p. 115)

Brazilians and perhaps Swedes will find this relationship strange. While Brazilian deputies will defer to their minister if they are in the Câmara, that type of link simply does not exist.



As Crewe (2015, p. 127) points out, PPS's are not in the habit of making themselves known; they tend to be discreet and fly under the radar. Searing (1994) points out that a critique made to the increase in numbers of PPSs is that government might, essentially, rule Parliament, and silence dissent. That is unthinkable for a Brazilian deputy, as being known is how they might get a ministerial position one day (or any executive branch position). In the case of Sweden, deputies and ministers in the same party meet regularly to discuss what deputies would like government to put forth in terms of policies.

...every, every week we meet our minister. I meet, we have three ministers in my committee and I meet them every week with, with my group, the [] committee, so that that's why we could say that 'I've heard this, I want it', we could put order to them. So if it's something that's important in the committee of social insurance, for example, then we have to talk to people sitting in that committee, say 'you must tell your minister this'. When, when we are in opposition we, we could put question or interpellation, we have a debate in the chamber, but we don't do that[ when] we have the Prime Minister, so it's a different way to work, we go [back] and talk to people. (Interview with SVd1).

Given the importance that select committees have gained over the last nine years, I also checked the gender breakdown of select committee chairs. Committee chairs not only enjoy the visibility and legitimacy of having a position that is elected by the whole House but as discussed in the last section, have access to different resources, including the assistance of the committee's clerk.<sup>98</sup> Evidence hearings being public and televised display the committee chair moderating and leading the debate. The graph includes not only the typical select committees, but joint committees, and the administration of the House committees (including the Backbench Business Committee). In Diana O'Brien's study (2012), she actually found that for select committee chair, women had a higher likelihood of becoming elected.


Although candidate quality influences the choice of select committee chair, candidate sex is the best predictor of election results. Holding all other variables constant, in a two-person election between a male and female candidate, the woman MP enjoys a 0.98 probability of winning the chair.<sup>25</sup> Generating predicted values by comparing an inexperienced female candidate to more experienced men further illustrates this effect. The median probability of a woman with no experience winning a two-person race against a male candidate with related experience is 0.94. (O'BRIEN, 2012, p. 199).

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<sup>98</sup> In that sense, a committee chair in the UK seems to combine the duties of Brazil's chair and rapporteur, although it is worth reminding that select committees do not scrutinise bills.

Indeed, women are present in select committee chairs in a similar percentage as their presence in the House of Commons. What may have been a “fluke” in O’Brien’s study, since it was only after the first election, seems to have become the pattern. While women are not overtly advantaged in the sense that they do not occupy more committee chairs than what is expected in a random distribution, there also does not seem to be a gendered pattern for which committees they chair, with women sitting in the Backbench Business, Finance, National Security Strategy, and Public Accounts committees. Continuing to observe their overall membership in committees would be relevant though, since there seems to be some gendered pattern as we have seen above, as that might indicate internal issues with the parties.

Graph 30: Select Committee chairs, by gender, House of Commons, UK, 2010-2017



Source: the author, based on data from the House of Commons Library.

Party loyalty in Brazil was once seen as something inexistent and that the executive negotiated individually with deputies on the basis of pork. That has been shown, time and again, to not be true. Party loyalty is not only relevant, but a strong predictor of deputies’ actions (FIGUEIREDO, LIMONGI, 1999; SANTOS; 2002; ZUCCO, LAUDERDALE, 2011). Gomes, Almeida, and Paradis (forthcoming) show how women voted for the 2016 coup against their own wishes, with two even stating it in their speeches.

I don't think party loyalty interferes in the women's agenda, I would say that, let's say, the discriminatory practice and underappreciation of the female presence within the party are what makes a woman's position frail. We had, in the impeachment vote, deputy [name of congresswoman] who belongs to a party that voted in favour [of it], but she voted against [it] and didn't suffer any sanctions. But she has electoral autonomy which gives [her] strength, a traditional family which gives strength, she is a medical doctor, has a structured life, she has political autonomy, a determination, her position isn't frail. (Interview with BRd1).<sup>99</sup>

The term “electoral autonomy” definitely resonates. This is something possible in Brazil, but unlikely in the UK and Sweden, where elections are centralised in the parties. Loyalty can also be achieved or reinforced through the promise of better positions or support.

I mean, the most loyal, maybe you've seen in Prime Minister Questions. There would be some Conservative backbenchers, who would have stood up and asked the Prime Minister, you know, 'would the Prime Minister agree with me when she's the most wonderful thing in the world ever'. Now, she's he, they've been given that by the whips, it's, they're buying them off for loyalty. I mean, they know they're ridiculous. (...) Have you come across Heidi Allen? She's quite an unusual MP. (...) She became the Conservative candidate for a safe seat, but stated really, that she just thought that the the Conservative Party was kind of, she had faith in David Cameron, and they were kind of closest to what she thought at the time she never purported to be a kind of party loyalists or anything like that. Yeah, I mean, what she would do is she follows the party line, a lot of the time, it gets a lot of criticism for doing that. But it's part of her leverage. I mean, she needs to, she needs to keep contact active in their parties. I mean, it's quite difficult for MPs to be, I mean, they do rely on on kind of central support and the kind of, the party whip and so on to a certain extent, I mean, there's is there are there's diminishing marginal returns on on rebelliousness (laughs). I mean, we're, I think we're a long way from having a kind of cohort of, of MPs who, who operate entirely as, as independent kind of entities entirely following their conscience at all times and weighing up every single decision they're required to make on an individual basis. (Interview with UKc1).

Another important difference is the actions taken within parliament and the avoidance of limelight. While whips and PPSs are re-elected because of the British majoritarian system and their party's support, in Brazil, a deputy who is not seen by their electorate<sup>100</sup> is bound

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<sup>99</sup> Eu não considero que a fidelidade partidária interfere na agenda das mulheres eu diria que a, vamos dizer, a prática discriminatória e pouco valorizada da presença feminina no interior do partido é que fragiliza a posição da mulher. Nós tivemos na votação do impeachment, a deputada [nome] que é de um partido que votou favoravelmente, ela votou contra e ela não sofreu sanções. Mas ela tem uma autonomia eleitoral que dá força tem uma família tradicional que dá força e ela em uma, ela é uma médica, tem uma vida muito construída, ela tem uma autonomia política, uma determinação, ela não tem um posicionamento fragilizado.

<sup>100</sup> Because of its very large districts, Brazilian deputies tend to have informal regions of their states in which they concentrate their campaigning efforts.

to loose re-election, even if they have a leadership position. The situation seems similar in Sweden, as the connection between the people and MPs seems to be quite fragile (SVs1; SVs2; SVs4). If one does not know who their MP is, why would they know that they have a leadership position?<sup>101</sup> This means that leadership is more about party dynamics and achieving a goal that will be recognised by voters.

### *Dedicated structures*

This section describes the dedicated structures each parliament has in terms of representing women. When formal in existence, these also seem concerned with creating spaces for women to participate more fully. There are three types of formal structures: the committee, the caucus, and the parliamentary group. The first is found in both the Brazilian and the British legislatures, coincidentally, both were established in 2015. The second, while common in several countries, among the three considered here, can only be found in Brazil. Finally, the parliamentary group is from the UK, although Brazil has a similar structure, just not one dedicated to women. Because of Sweden's focus on "gender equality", their strategy is of gender mainstreaming, rather than dedicated structures, which brings both pros and cons.

The committee in Brazil is called the Defence of Women's Rights Committee and while it was created in 2015, it only came into force in 2016. It came about along with two new committees, one on people with disabilities and another on the elderly. In its short history, it has only been presided by women, with one being from a centre-left party, and its existence is still fragile, both from outside threats and lack of participation. Its very existence is judged by some as a strategy to spread thin women's efforts towards human rights by removing them from that committee (BRc3). While most of its members are women, there are a few men in its roster.

Actually, the women's committee was created to give space for right-wing women, it fell into the hands of the left this year by chance. Actually, because it's a committee, let's say, less important, in the list of priorities, the PCdoB had the right to a single committee and this was what was left, because nobody wanted it first. The women's committee before the PT,

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<sup>101</sup> In Brazil, elections have a high number of candidates, which means a small number of winners. Because of the open list system, people often feel that since their candidate lost, they do not have representation. In Sweden, no one could direct me to the Riksdag, even though it sits at the end of the busiest shopping street in Stockholm (the irony of which was not lost on me).

before the PCdoB, had been Shérídan's and before Shérídan, it was deputy Gorete, who belongs to the PR, so it's not really a tool of the left. The PCdoB, they're really centralising, so the PCdoB, the next in line to get a committee was a *male* deputy and they couldn't let a *male* deputy lead the women's committee. But, it was the guy's turn and he couldn't do it, so the PCdoB made a deal with the PT: 'let's switch, we'll switch, we're allies, I defended you like crazy last period,<sup>102</sup> so let's switch because it can't be a man, it has to be a woman we can't put in a woman because they're all assigned'. (...) The trait of giving the stage to women and even the agenda created there, deputy Ana, she's the chair of the women's committee, but she's also an adjunct in the Women's Caucus, so I end up having both feet in (...). Obviously you can imprint a more progressive agenda, suggest themes for debate that are more progressive. We had a lot of vacancies, so we managed to fill it to a degree with women, for instance, (...) Luizianne is the first adjunct, but we put in deputy Laura and deputy Zenaide who, even though they aren't entitled to be there, we gave them the space because we know that those women, even if they don't belong to the left, do defend women's rights. (...) And the women's committee it was created to give space... space, period. And it is a committee that runs the risk of being shut at any moment.<sup>103</sup> (Interview with BRc3).

The committee, among other things, analyses legislative actions pertaining to women's rights and welfare. It also holds events and seminars on women-related topics.<sup>104</sup> The committee publishes a somewhat regular publication called "Woman" and bestows the award Woman-

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<sup>102</sup> The coup of 2016.

<sup>103</sup> Original text: Na verdade, a comissão da mulher foi criada pra dar espaço para mulheres de direita, ela caiu esse ano na esquerda por uma mera casualidade. Na verdade, como ela é uma comissão, digamos, menos importante, na lista de prioridades o PCdoB tinha direito a uma única comissão e aí sobrou, por que ninguém quis primeiro. A comissão da mulher, antes do PT, antes do PCdoB tinha sido a Shérídan e antes da Shérídan tinha sido a deputada Gorete que é do PR, não é um instrumento da esquerda próprio. O PCdoB, eles são muito centralistas, então o PCdoB, o próximo da vez de assumir uma comissão era um deputado e eles não podiam permitir que um deputado ficasse a frente da comissão da mulher. Mas era a vez do cara e ele não podia fazer, então o que o PCdoB combinou com o PT: 'vamos trocar, vamos trocar, a gente é parceiro eu defendi vocês pra caramba agora no último período, vamos trocar porque não tem como ser um homem, tem que ser uma mulher e a gente não pode colocar outra mulher porque todas já tinham assumido'. (...) A característica de dar o tribuna das mulheres e até mesmo as pautas que são feitas lá, a deputada Ana, ela é presidenta da comissão da mulher mas também ela é adjunta na Bancada Feminina, então eu acabo tendo dois pés. É obvio que você consegue imprimir uma pauta um pouco mais progressista, sugerir temas para serem debatidos que são mais progressistas. Nós tínhamos muitas vagas então a gente conseguiu compor em alguma medida com mulheres, por exemplo, (...), a Luizianne é a primeira adjunta, mas a gente colocou a deputada Laura e a deputada Zenaide, que mesmo não tendo o direito a tá ali, a gente cedeu vaga pelo entendimento de que aquelas mulheres ali, mesmo não sendo de esquerda, defendem sim os direitos da mulher. (...) E a comissão da mulher ela foi criada pra dar espaço... espaço, ponto. E é uma comissão que corre o risco de acabar a qualquer momento.

<sup>104</sup> During my fieldwork in Brasília, I was present for the Shared Custody Seminar, which debated Brazilian law on shared custody by parents and, in particular, the pernicious effects of that law when considered in conjunction with the parental alienation law and the domestic violence law (Maria da Penha Law). Briefly stated, in Brazil shared custody has become the mandatory rule; however, women and children who have suffered abuse at the hands of their partners and fathers face the issue of parental alienation, which men have been using to take away the children from their ex-wives. The Maria da Penha Law, on the other hand, offers little to no protection for mothers escaping their abusive partners.

Citizen Carlota Pereira de Queirós (named after the first women elected to the Câmara dos Deputados). One important evaluation is that the Consultoria Legislativa is divided into sectors, roughly matching the committees' in existence (as those tend to change) and the specialists in these areas are assigned to their specific committees. There is one sector, called the "political science sector", which has six specialists (some have over 20, such as the internal rules sector). It is in this one that we can find the man who decided to take it upon himself to be the specialist for the Defence of Women's Rights Committee. He explained to me that he decided to stick with the area after working on the Electoral Reform, which had several amendments proposing different types of quotas for women. It is his plan to stay in the area for the rest of his career, another 15 to 20 years, but having a person dedicated to gender issues in the Consultoria is not mandatory and it is his choice.

My idea would be to make the committee look at the proposals that have, the assessment should take the gender issue into consideration, in the overall analysis of a proposal, because then you can build the gender mainstreaming or transversality here. There are studies like this, you look at the policy with a gender perspective too, there are other aspects, like development, efficiency, I don't know, nationality, but there's also the possible impact that would have, it would have a double processing, because there are bills that affect more than one committee, right? They have double or triple processing, they go through one committee, then there's the rapporteur, then it goes to another... that is, all bills or nearly all would go through the women's committee and look at the importance it would get. *It would get visibility, like the Women's Caucus, and it became a place of dispute.* Exactly (laughs), everything's like that, in the house, it's built like that. Why is the CCJC the most important committee? Because it dies there, the life or death of a bill, if it's stamped as unconstitutional, it dies there, right? (Interview with BRc2).<sup>105</sup>

The Women and Equalities Committee of the House of Commons is quite similar to the Brazilian committee, although its remit includes LGTBQI and ethnic minorities, both women

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<sup>105</sup> Original text: A minha idéia seria obrigar a comissão a olhar as propostas que tem, o parecer deveria levar em consideração a questão de gênero na análise global de uma proposta, porque aí você vai construir o gender mainstreaming aqui ou transversalidade. Tem estudos essa noção, você olha a política com viés de gênero também, você tem outros aspectos desenvolvimentista, eficiência, eficácia, não sei o que nacionalidade, mas também o possível impacto que aquilo teria, teria uma dupla tramitação, porque tem os projetos que afetam mais de uma comissão, né? Eles têm uma dupla ou tripla tramitação, eles passam de uma comissão aí tem o relator aí vai pra outra tem outro, ou seja todos os projetos ou quase todos acabariam por passar na comissão da mulher e, exatamente, olha importância que a comissão da mulher ganha? Ela ganha visibilidade, assim como a bancada feminina ganhou, e virou um lugar de disputa. Exatamente (risos) é tudo assim, na casa se constrói assim. Por que a CCJ é a comissão mais importante? Porque lá morre, vida ou morte do projeto lá né, se ganhar um carimbo de inconstitucionalidade, morreu ali né?

and men. It was created in 2015, with support of the Speaker, after the recommendation of the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Women in Parliament. Since it does not scrutinise bills, the British committee has time and leeway for general investigations and reports. Both these committees are subject to the same rules of membership as any other, which means that while women have a preference, if the majority of the legislature is right-wing so will the committee. Unlike the Brazilian committee, on the other hand, the British Women and Equalities seems to be stable pretty stable for the foreseeable future.

So select committees are established by standing orders. So they're quite hard to create, okay. So for example, the new Women and Equalities (laughs) committee that was set up in 2010 was not permanent, but it's just been made permanent. So I think they're pretty stable once they're established unless they're not permanent. And then then you would have to, so one of the big fears after the snap election, so prior to 2017 General election, we'd been told that the Women and Equalities committee would be made permanent. Informally, we'd been told that and it been also mentioned publicly in the House. (Interview with UKs).

[I]t's difficult to get rid of things that are once there once they're there. And yeah, and the press have picked up quite a lot, I think over the couple of years of their stuff. And Maria Miller was the first chair. She's still chair. I think she's got some more traction in the press and managed to get, get the issues that, that committees interested in sort of a bit more high profile. (Interview with UKc2).

APPGs are parliamentary groups similar to Brazilian parliamentary fronts, although the latter are formally more organised and public. APPG membership is not always official and membership rosters are not always true to who actually attends. They organise around two large types: countries and themes. There are several "women" themed APPGs, but what their work is will only be seen if they publish a report, make recommendations, or make legislative actions that specifically hark back to the APPG.<sup>106</sup>

While all Members are in principle able to vote for the officers of APPGs, and have a say in their running, APPGs normally operate as "coalitions of the willing" with a self-defined remit. They have no official status, no power to compel evidence and their reports, if any, require no government reply. They may have no secretariat, or secretariat services may be provided by Members' staff, or an external body. They are not proceedings in Parliament and so have no protection from legal proceedings or absolute freedom of speech (HC 357, 2013, p. 29).

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<sup>106</sup> One teacher mentioned to me during an informal conversation that their student had a parent who was a MP and let slip out in class that their parent was on the Portugal APPG because the family had a house there.

One thing that is relevant to consider is the importance of women within their parties. In both Brazil and the UK, women in left-wing parties are better organised and have a better rapport with each other. This does not mean that women in the right and centre are not interested in women's substantive representation, but that they might be less inclined to view it as a group effort or might avoid the thorny subjects that come with it. On the other hand, left-wing women tend to ignore or avoid the efforts made by women from other parties, as they see themselves as fighting this fight for a long time (BRd1; BRd2; BRd3). This would explain the tepid response by the women in the Labour Party for instance, to the both the APPG and the committee at first, noticeable in the membership roster.

... I got there, in this council and I started to participate in those discussions, you know? There was a weekend when we went to the Guarujá, to Ruth Escobar's,<sup>107</sup> and in the middle of all these women, I suffered a lot, you know why? Because I was from the other side, for the left, a bourgeois. The left doesn't care who you are, you are either a worker or a bourgeois, there's no in-between, there isn't...<sup>108</sup> (Interview with BRd2).

In the 2005–2010 Parliament members, a new APPG was established, Women in Parliament. This group, whilst officially cross party as the rules require, was in practice much less so. Labour membership came mostly from the Lords, and indeed the then Leader of the Women's Parliamentary Labour Party rejected the overtures of its Chair to become fully involved. Thus, whilst this group had—and has—the potential to become effectively the UK Parliament's women's caucus, at present it remains a much more partial and ultimately contested institution. Indeed, whilst some of its members might have claimed to 'speak for women' in the UK House of Commons, the APPG ultimately lacks the legitimacy of a caucus of all women (CELIS, et al., 2016, p. 7).

Brazil also has the Women's Secretariat, which houses two offices, the Women's Attorneyship and the Women's Caucus, known as *Bancada Feminina*, but officially called the *Coordenadoria dos Direitos da Mulher* or Women's Rights Bureau. The Women's Caucus has a long history, dating back to 1988 and the Constitutional Assembly, but its current form evolved over time. Until 1999, the Women's Caucus was an unofficial group of women deputies; it then became on par with other parliamentary fronts in the Câmara, although all women were, and still are, automatically included in it. In 2009, the Attorneyship

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<sup>107</sup> Former actor turned politician in the 80s.

<sup>108</sup> Original text: ...eu cheguei lá nesse conselho aí eu comecei a participar daquelas discussões, entendeu? Teve um fim de semana que nós fomos pra Guarujá na casa da Ruth Escobar no meio dessa mulherada toda eu sofria muito sabe porque? Eu era do outro lado, pela esquerda como burguesa, a esquerda não quer saber quem você é, ou você é proletariado ou é burguesia, não tem uma coisa entre, não tem...



was created, with its efforts focused on actions outside the Câmara and in 2013, the Secretariat was formed and thus the Women's Caucus in its current form. In fact, the reason for the name change was to discourage other parliamentary fronts to attempt the same path and acquire the same privileges, mainly the Evangelical Caucus, the Agribusiness Caucus, and the Arms Caucus.<sup>109</sup> These privileges are, mainly, presence in the College of Leaders, with voice and vote and leader speaking time in the plenary. There is also the added benefit of office space and dedicated staff, as a party leadership office would have. This means that the Women's Secretariat combines several consensual activities from the deputies, although it is dependent on the leadership style and interests on the Caucus coordinator. For instance, as BRc3 told me, the current coordinator, Soraya Santos (MDB-RJ) insists on it being "feminine, not feminist" and focused on women, family, and children.

On the other hand, these advantages have come with their difficulties and setbacks. Prior to 2013, the Women's Caucus had always been led by a woman from left-wing party, with the exception of Maria Elvira (at the time PMDB-MG) who, despite ideological allegiances, had always been involved with women's rights. However, since the first election post-institutionalisation, the Women's Caucus has only had right-wing women at the helm, due to a re-interpretation of the election rules, done by then Speaker of the Câmara, Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ).

The new congresswomen<sup>110</sup> (...), they were all called to a Women's Caucus meeting so that the functioning of the Secretariat, the process, could be explained. They felt it was a very loose process, that electing one was not a coordinated process, that everything in the house is political force, all the fronts are by political force. The women deputies somehow tried to tell them that they had organised like that since the Lipstick Lobby,<sup>111</sup> that is, that they organised in a crossparty way, nominating those who were closest to the agenda and that's how it worked. They asked for a consultation to the Speaker, the coordinator of the Caucus formalised in a document a consultation to the Speaker, and he answered determining, and that's a Board act, that the organisation would now be done in the same way the party blocs do it for the Board elections. (Interview with BRc3).<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> Also known as the Bible, Bull, and Bullet Caucuses.

<sup>110</sup> Elected in 2014 and seated in 2015.

<sup>111</sup> Pet name for the original group of women elected to the Constitutional Assembly. Although it was initially a pejorative name, the deputies decided to take ownership of it and use it in their favour.

<sup>112</sup> Original text: ...[A]s deputadas que chegaram novas, (...) elas foram chamadas, todas deputadas foram chamadas para uma reunião da Bancada Feminina para que fosse explicado como era que funcionava a secretaria como é que era o processo. Elas entenderam que era um processo muito solto, (...), que você elege

The interpretation of the rules, [Eduardo Cunha]<sup>113</sup> altered it, because there was always elections. And he established a criterion of distribution that excluded the caucus with more women, which was ours. (...) He excluded from the two main positions, the party that had the largest caucus, which was the PT. And it is evident that he got the support of the women from his bloc, so the person nominated, our caucus, the PT and the PCdoB refused to vote in the election, I think it was 17 abstentions and the election was based on the agreement that Eduardo Cunha made within his bloc. So, he had agreed with the deputy's party that he would give them space in the structure of the Chamber and he chose the Women's Secretariat to do it. (...) He got in his interpretation of the rules and his hegemony, of course, the support of the women from the parties that entered into an agreement with him. (...) It affected the collective activity, collegiate, that we had. Evident that from a certain moment we began to participate in events and forums as people who are committed to the cause of women. But the activity, the greater frequency, the collective constructions were harmed in this process and there are themes that we can't discuss because during that time the evangelical caucus became too large even in the [Women's] Caucus.<sup>114</sup> (Interview with BRd1).

Looking at the three countries, it seems that the one with less women MPs has institutionalised their participation more. This evaluation is confirmed by the fact that there are no formal structures in Sweden for women's representation and no structures that (attempt to) unite women from different parties. While women's groups within parties are very strong,

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uma não era um processo coordenado, que na casa tudo era força política, todos os blocos eram por força política. As deputadas em uma medida tentaram dizer para elas que elas se organizavam assim desde do Lobby do Batom, então que elas se organizavam de maneira suprapartidária indicando aquelas aquela que elas achavam mais identificada com a pauta e funcionava assim. Elas pediram uma consulta ao presidente, então a coordenadora da Bancada formalizou num documento uma consulta ao presidente, quando ela formalizou a consulta ao presidente, o presidente respondeu determinando que, é um ato da mesa, que a organização se daria agora pelo mesmo modelo dos blocos da...dos partidos pra eleição da mesa.

<sup>113</sup> Former Speaker of the Câmara, PMDB-RJ, known for his extreme religious positions and for leading the impeachment process that ultimately led to the coup against President Dilma Rousseff.

<sup>114</sup> Original text: [A] interpretação regimental [o Eduardo Cunha] alterou, porque sempre teve [eleições]. E ele estabeleceu um critério de distribuição que excluiu o bloco que tem mais mulheres, que era o nosso bloco. (...) Ele excluiu das duas principais escolhas, o partido que tinha a maior bancada que era o PT. É e evidente que ele conseguiu o apoio das mulheres do seu bloco, então a pessoa indicada, a nossa bancada, o PT e o PCdoB se recusaram de votar na eleição, foram acho que nós somos 17 abstenções e a eleição foi com base no acordo que o Eduardo Cunha fez no interior do seu bloco. Então ele tinha acordado com o partido da deputada, que daria um espaço na estrutura da Câmara, e escolheu a Secretaria da Mulher para o acordo. (...) Ele conseguiu na sua interpretação regimental e na sua hegemonia, claro que adesão das mulheres dos partidos que integraram o acordo com ele. (...) Afetou a atividade coletiva, colegiada que a gente tinha. Evidente que a partir de um certo momento nós passamos a participar de eventos e fóruns enquanto pessoas que tem compromisso com a causa da mulher. Mas a atividade, a frequência maior, as construções coletivas ficaram prejudicadas nesse processo e tem alguns temas que a gente não consegue pautar porque nesse período mais recente a presença da bancada evangélica é muito grande inclusive no interior da bancada feminina.

with the exception of the Sweden Democrats, the Riksdag, as well as other Swedish political institutions use the tool of gender mainstreaming in order to act for women.

I will say, gender streaming is a strategy or tool that is primarily done in state agencies, and it's conducted by staff members, that is, civil servants. So it's a tool which means that gender has to be incorporated and integrated into all processes, into all functionings of state agency, right? Of the government, of the government, of the government office, of all state agencies or public boards that is in Sweden and it's a tool which that is that that's been decided upon and most you know organization stakeholders are part of it too but it's a tool that is implemented by civil servants. It's not implemented by politicians or, but by civil servants. (...) The same goes for state bodies, state agencies in Sweden, they are to implement gender mainstreaming into their works, functionings, and processes like the, the National Board of Education The National Board of Forestry, the National Board of Infrastructure, you name it. So, in one way I think if politicians don't really talk about it it's, it's kind of understandable because this is a tool that you use in state bodies, right, you don't do it in, in, in the parties. The thing is in when it comes to the Parliament, if you think of the Parliament, one could say the gender mainstreaming is applied in this sense that gender has to be integrated into all these areas, in all the standing committees. So if there's a question about gender equality in education, the committee on education with have to deal with this, right? If there's an issue about lack, the lacking of gender equality in enterprises and companies, the committee on enterprises will do these issues, so there's not a specific Standing Committee in the Swedish Parliament that tackles gender equality, it's mainstreamed into all the committees. So I don't think that ordinary MPs reflect on this because it's become, it's kind of a routine and it's becomes natural for them to do it. (Interview with SVs4).

Gender mainstreaming as it is now came about in the 90s, although it has existed in some form since the 70s. The 90s were a particularly troubling time for Swedish feminists as the Social Democrats lost the government, women's presence in the Riksdag decreased for the first time in decades, and the recession loomed and threatened women's jobs and the welfare state (STARK, 1997; SAINSBURY, BERGQVIST, 2009; ÖHBERG, WÄNGNERUD, 2013). Their choice was to organise within their parties and in civil society groups, such as the famous Support Stockings, in order to put pressure on parties, government, and educate society. One of the outcomes of this was the gender mainstreaming system, as described above. Sweden is run by government, the Riksdag, and countless independent state agencies that get their brief from government, but act independently. However, the Swedish way is also goal-oriented, which means that once a project is done, people move on, and this is true for gender specialists as well. Rather than keep people and make use of their accumulated knowledge, people are transferred and there is little evaluation afterwards. Therefore, there

are three issues that affect the model of gender mainstreaming: its speed (or lack there of), its evaluation and sustainability, and its lack of a power-perspective and more of a mechanical problem.

The first is something that affects all Swedish policy-making, but in the case of gender, since there is no specific ministry or agency oversight, although there is a gender equality agency within the executive branch,<sup>115</sup> bills and projects have to go through a process “of the whole society”. This leads to related issue, which is the matter of universalism. The universal view of gender equality and gender mainstreaming keep Swedish policy-makers from creating directed policies that can have an impact on specific groups; policies are either on education, with a gendered perspective, or on health, with a gendered perspective, etc. It is difficult to imagine a policy that made first and foremost considering, for instance, refugee women.

Yeah, I think in a way of decent Swedish politics that has kind of come as a as part of that. So redistribution is also very much in line with the Social Democratic Party. And they have really shaped both the kind of Swedish welfare model, but gender equality has been, has been an integral part of that, thanks to both the party itself, but also thanks to its women’s section as women and and so yeah, I think that the gender equality for many people and parties in Sweden is really about redistribution. And again, recognition becomes difficult in a context where it’s, it’s seen us... It’s not appreciated, to talk about different groups and point to different groups, it’s, it’s much, it’s much easier to say that this is something that’s beneficial for everyone then to say, well, we need to give special attention to this particularly. And that’s, that’s something that I mean, it can see it and all kinds of like, child allowances; everyone gets child allowances, even for high income earners. It’s kind of, in a sense, ridiculous because it’s such a gift to compare it to your salary. But it’s that’s kind of worth of the system. This is this is a benefit that should be good for, for everyone. Everyone should have it that’s not single out of this, you know, only for those who actually need it. It’s it’s something that we, it’s universalistic, we give it to, to everyone. And recognizing, for instance, single mothers as a particularly vulnerable group. This is not something that of course they are and they’re talked about, but they’re not talked about in political terms like that they’re not to create a specific policies (...) for groups like that. (Interview with SVs1).

The second problem is that while there are agencies for everything, without a “gender perspective” agency, knowledge gets lost and evaluation of projects and processes is not done or not done to its full extent. Since there is no “gender point-person”, for instance, while everyone should get gender training, that training for all civil servants, including at the local

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<sup>115</sup> Jämställdhetsmyndigheten - <https://www.jamstalldhetsmyndigheten.se/>

level might not happen or not happen with enough depth (ÖHBERG, WÄNGNERUD, 2009). Even when contacting the Riksdag, I struggled at first, not knowing who to call or where to direct my inquiries. There is the Swedish Gender Equality Agency, which is an institution within the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs of the executive branch. It serves to research and create policy for the executive branch; it is not in charge of any oversight nor is it responsible for work in other areas. It has no ties with the Riksdag.

So in that sense, there are 350 state agencies, Sweden, you know, for each and every policy area, you know, for enterprise, for education, for health services, for universities, for higher education, for lower education, for that 350 agencies for the environment, and so on. But there's no no gender equality. Well, then we hear the argument. The argument against this is we have gender mainstreaming, you know, every state agency is supposed to implement it, integrate it. But in this commission we argued, 'no, there's a need of a state agency since, in our evaluation, a huge government initiative, between 2008 to 2014 millions and millions were pumped into different kinds of activities'. Potential gender equality. A lot of state agency did a lot of good work on gender equality. A lot of civil society organizations received huge amount of money to do different gender equality activities. Lots of municipalities received lots of money, so millions and millions were pumped into the Swedish infrastructure, right, but these activities were never evaluated. Lots of good things were being done but they were done in a kind of a project-oriented way, meaning that when a project ends, what happens with when a project ends? Well, the project leader leaves for another project and the knowledge about, for instance, gender equality also maybe, you know, disappears because it was the project leader that had responsibility for the issues and maybe was the only person that really knew what gender equality is and how to do it you know, in a sense and things like that. And at the same time lots of good things happened, but there was nobody that collected information on the results of these activities and disseminated the best practices to other organizations. Do you get my point? Hundreds of activities were being (...) hundreds of excellent activities but when the project was ended... (Interview with SVs4).

The final problem is gender mainstreaming becoming a "bloodless" bureaucratic tool. That critique encompasses the whole system, since it is focused on developing a "check-mark" way to achieve gender equality, rather than an actual evaluation of the power processes going on that make a gendered policy necessary. In that sense, it creates and deepens all other problems, because policies cannot be developed specifically for women or women in disadvantaged groups and policies cannot be evaluated as such.

A lot of Swedish scholars that criticize the ways in which gender mainstreaming is implemented and when they talk about it, they never talk about the parliament. They're talking about the public agencies, right. And

in their views, the staff members of the state agency, yeah, state agencies, they argue that you know, ‘we don’t know how to do it, we have this policy, but it’s so difficult, we have no idea how to do it, oh it’s, you know, we haven’t started’. And then these scholars say that ‘what the heck? This policy was adopted in 1994 in Sweden! And now 20 years later they’re still complaining, it’s so difficult, we don’t have the knowledge, we don’t know how to do it’. Exactly, right. So they argue that, the scholars argue that gender mainstreaming has become a bureaucratic tool, it’s a tool that bureaucrat civil servants imply, and to have a checklist you know do this and that just you know check all the things that you do and don’t think about... they never consider power orders or distribution of resources, they just, you know have this checklist and they tick the boxes and ‘ok now done’. So this is their main criticism, that is it has become a tool that just bureaucrats, just do, they don’t reflect upon power orders, the distribution of resources and things like that, so they, scholars argue that it has been de-politicized. There’s no conflict, it’s just a tool. These scholars want gender mainstreaming to be about resources and values and power. And that, you know, politicians should be part of it to greater extent than it is today. But also that civil society organizations should be part of gender mainstreaming, it should be more democratic. (Interview with SVs4).

### *Legislative actions and strategies*

Beyond architecture, committee systems, and informal rules and rituals, lie the most basic unit of analysis, with the exception of voting: the actions representatives have at their disposal, such as bills, amendments, information and public hearing requests, motions, questions to ministers.

Brazilian deputies, given the nature of the presidential system, have many more formal options and opportunities of that nature. However, this might be more to do with the Brazilian propensity to be verbose, as each type of action has several “subtypes”, but in the dataset appear each on their own. Ordinary bills (*projetos de lei* – PLs) are the most used by Brazilian deputies, with 35164 of them being proposed between 2000 and 2017. However, other types of bills have been included: legislative decree proposals (*projetos de decreto legislativo* – PDCs, which, among other things, attempt to overturn an executive decree, but most importantly grant TV and radio licencing); complementary bills (*projetos de lei complementar* – PLCs); and conversion bills (*projetos de lei de conversão* – PLVs). In addition, I have also included the most important type of legislation and the hardest to pass: proposals for constitutional amendments (*propostas de emenda à Constituição* – PECs). Between 2000 and 2017 there were 2235 PECs by deputies, with only seven becoming law.

Since the Constitutional Assembly of 1988, 25 PECs written by deputies have been approved, with only two by women, both within the timeframe of the study.

The third type of action included in the research are requests, which can involve a myriad of things, including information from ministries, public hearings, or for events such as seminars.<sup>116</sup> These actions speak to the heart of the daily life in the Câmara. Being so removed from most of the country, both geographically and metaphorically, public hearings and seminars are opportunities for deputies to connect directly to any groups they might claim to represent, and to fulfil a representational role of both informing the public, their colleagues, and themselves.<sup>117</sup>

In this respect, Sweden and the UK do have much more in common. Being parliamentary systems, what seems to be the most valuable aspect of legislative work is access to the executive. However, their access is limited to whatever is set out, in the case of Sweden, by the Instrument of Government, and in the case of the UK, by the executive itself. While at first it seems that the most important thing for an MP is to be able to speak, especially in the UK, that is most often true if one has no other type of power or access and can only work if one has the ability to speak within the confines of the regulations, both formal and informal, which include, but are not limited to, gendered stereotypes on manner of speaking. The House of Commons works within the timeframe set out by the executive, that is, it does not know when it will go on hiatus or if a bill will be presented for pre-legislative scrutiny (UKs; UKc1). Agenda control is at the hands of the government (UKc3) and it is up to MPs to either represent their constituency within that agenda or to attempt to change it.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Other relevant requests are for urgency in processing, creation of a parliamentary inquiry committee, and for the creation of a special committee for an amendment to the Constitution.

<sup>117</sup> Being present at the Câmara and observing its routine, one feels taken by the tides of the committee meetings and the events happening all around. For instance, as I left one committee which was holding a seminar on shared custody, in the main lobby an event was taking place in homage to 20 November, Black Awareness Day. Behind me were sashes that detail Brazil's advances towards ending violence against women, as 25 November is International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women. At one point during the week, I found myself justifying my absences to the mothers who were attending the shared custody seminar, since we had talked over coffee and I had listened to their problems concerning parental alienation. Sometimes it felt like I was back at my university campus, running from class to class and from event to event.

<sup>118</sup> Although the British executive always holds procedural power, whether it is actually powerful, that is, if it can get its agenda approved without distress is a matter of context (UKs).

Swedish MPs have a similar issue, as the executive has more of a hold on the policy-making process. The process of Swedish policy-making is to investigate a matter thoroughly, and that type of action requires resources unavailable to individual MPs. The next steps are to invite all outside opinions, including civil society, and then negotiate, through informal channels and party leaders before submitting it to the Riksdag (BERG, 2016; PETERSSON, 2016).

And yes, it's, it's so much that happens behind closed doors, you know, that there is a bill coming from the government. And as you say in these times, with minority governments, this bill has already been processed through the, you know, I don't know those terms. But at least with, of course, the Social Democrats and the, and the Green Party, they are together again, and so they, they coordinate themselves, but they also negotiate with the Left Party. So that has to take place before they can post a bill. (...) And the majority parties, in this case, the Social Democrats and the Left and the Green Party, they are aware of this bill, and they already know what to do, right? But they have to negotiate with the Left Party in the parliament as well. And they also have to kind of try to (laughs) see where the other stems, and the other parties the four non-socialist parties, they have their, they call it committee meetings or something, they meet before the committee in an informal meeting, which is also closed, to coordinate their position and this issue. So they have these committee meetings before, in this informal committee meetings also, before the actual committee meeting, because the actual meeting that can be two minutes that is very, very quick, they don't discuss, discuss issues at the meeting. They just kind of present 'Okay, this is the bill, who supports this, who are against, who wants to reject' or, what is it called... discussions are they take place, informally. (Interview with SVs3).

This means that once a bill is submitted, while MPs may try to get their changes in through motions (MATTSON, 2016), the likelihood is that those changes will not be accepted by their committee and by the chamber because negotiations have already been done.

All of that being said, the types of action that British and Swedish MPs may take are few and split along the lines of speech-making and written actions; although another division could be for public view and for internal use. The latter represents the most used type of action, which are written questions. MPs submit their questions in writing and receive written responses by whatever cabinet member they appealed to and because these lack the "posturing" aspect of rhetoric and speech-making, they can be quite telling of an MPs work (MARTIN, 2011; SAAFELD, 2011). For instance, Bird (2005) found that there is a gendered



pattern to written and oral questions, as men in the House of Commons prefer to use the former in order to discuss gendered topics, while women used both equally.

Oral questions are a different story completely. Particularly in the House of Commons, question time (QT)<sup>119</sup> or prime-minister questions (PMQs) can be heated affairs, with shouting, members standing and sitting constantly, arms flailing, fingers pointing, and the Speaker telling everyone to quiet down.<sup>120</sup> In comparison, while interpellations in the Riksdag might involve some lively repartee, that means that debaters (an MP and a minister) are each standing at their podium and waiting for their turn to speak.<sup>121</sup> For the Riksdag, a gendered pattern was found by Bäck et al. (2014) for speech-making: women speak less, regardless of party, rank, or expertise, and a significant gender gap on which topics are discussed. Bates and Sealey (2019) found that PMQs about women increase proportionally with the number of women elected and that conservative male MPs also began to use PMQs to ask questions about women-related questions after the 1997 increase in Labour women.

In Sweden, private members actions towards changing legislation are called motions, and they can be made freely during the “private members’ motion period” (when the Riksdag opens and until 15 days after the budget bill is sent to it) and in relation to a bill or communication sent by the government (*Regeringen*), within a 15-day window. Although the committee system is strong, they do not have terminative powers, which means that all motions must be voted in the chamber, giving MPs a good opportunity to show their efforts to their constituents (MATTSON, 2016), especially considering the closed nature of committees. The Swedish Riksdag ends up in a more of a “supervisor” role the government’s actions, making amendments and representations, and asking for new initiatives to government. Consequently, the importance of being able to change or amend a government

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<sup>119</sup> Recently, Speaker John Bercow has modified the use of Urgent Questions, allowing them to be used more freely by backbenchers to address ministers on matters that cannot wait for other forms of address. There is no data available for these yet, only absolute numbers showing their increase since Bercow made the change.

<sup>120</sup> An interesting rule for the House of Commons is that MPs are not allowed to address each other directly in formal speech. They speak only to the Speaker and refer to others in the third person, using their formal titles (Erskine May, Part 3, Chapter 21, paragraph 21.1).

<sup>121</sup> Importantly, there is a difference between question time and interpellation debates, the latter being the focus here, since question time data is not available. Interpellations are written questions that are answered orally by ministers in the chamber with a debate taking place afterwards.

bill is more demonstrative than questions or interpellations, which would explain the fact there are 65.216 motions and 35.296 questions and interpellations.

In the United Kingdom, beyond questions, MPs use Early Day Motions (EDMs), short written motions that are available for support from other members, to state their positions on any given topic, although whips and PPSs are less likely to be a part of those (UKs). EDMs are an interesting aspect to British politics as they serve no other purpose than to demonstrate an MP's interest in a given topic. While they may be part of a multi-pronged strategy or instigate a media debate, that is not always the case; they stand alone as position statements and claims-making, often away from the public's eye.

Another action available to British MPs is a private member's bill. PMBs are quite rare and it is rarer still that they receive Royal Assent, but they are great tools for MPs to make their representative claims and to call attention to a topic that is very important to them (BRAZIER, FOX, 2009; BOWLER, 2010). As the House of Commons depends on the government's timetable, there only a few windows of opportunity in which an MP is able to present a bill. They are golden chances to stand out, even if one is presenting a bill given to them by their party (UKc1). Bills can be presented in three ways: by ballot, presentation, or ten-minute-rule. For the first, MPs sign up and hope to have their number come up in the lottery and often they do not even have an idea of what to propose, deciding only after being drawn up and with the help of a clerk.<sup>122</sup> The second usually does not even get to a reading<sup>123</sup> and can be done any time after the second reading of ballot bills; ten-minute-rule bills can also be proposed regularly, and the member has ten minutes to defend it in plenary. There is of course, always the chance that either government will pick up on the topic or, more importantly, that the bill will pass. There have been 341 successful PMBs between 1983 and 2017, 30 of which were by women, 15 by a ten-minute-rule, and 46 via presentation (HC Briefing Paper 04568). The Abortion Act of 1967, for example, came about via a PMB. The House of Commons also offers the options of Statutory Instruments (SIs), which are also known as secondary legislation, and usually serve to regulate Acts. Laid papers are the

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<sup>122</sup> The documentary *Inside the Commons* (BBC, 2015) has a very good demonstration of this process.

<sup>123</sup> A formal discussion in the plenary.

database general code for SIs and for other types of longer informational documents tabled by MPs and others, such as the Clerk of the House or the Speaker.

All these types of actions in each country demand different use of resources, including time, staff, research, and sometimes funds.<sup>124</sup> MPs need to balance their activities between the legislature and their constituencies and find how to best connect to that constituency and do their jobs. Written questions and information requests, for instance, exist mainly for the MPs own edification and use. However, oral questions get attention, if you can make them count. EDMs, motions, and ordinary bills can be valuable in showing your constituency that you did set their concerns on the agenda. Public hearings and oral evidence will bring civil society into the legislature and demonstrate to them the deputies' actions within that debate, with the latter giving select committee members some media attention. It is common that MPs will combine these strategies and use them all in different ways and occasions (UKs; BRd1; BRd 2; BRd3). Some are more prone to use some of these tools and not others. If one is analysing how one law came to be, this becomes incredibly significant. While laws have a general rule-based process within the institution, not all laws are created the same; they do not all get the same attention, they are not discussed in similar forums, they do not all have the same impact.

MPs have informal strategies, such as speaking to run out the clock, reframing their discourse (FREIDENVALL, KROOK, 2011; AMERY, 2015) or, as it has been happening steadily in Brazil, voting women-themed actions on International Women's Day or the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women (BRd1; BRd3; BRd5).

Since you're following up on several things at the same time, sometimes you go fulfil that role, that is, 'oh, there's an important bill, we're gonna try to strengthen here (...). Or, a quorum is needed because they need to approve the requests, so you go over there to sign in, and that's the quorum. If no one questions the quorum, then the meeting goes on like that, that is, with the president and the other person who's there. (...) Then you go do something you think is more important. If here, in this committee, my main task is, you evaluate that every day, all the time, it's fulfilling the quorum, because if the quorum is met then it's all good because we have a majority to present and approve something. Then I gave quorum and now I move on to somewhere I need to speak, fight, you know, or defend a project of mine that's at this moment, in that committee. It's just a lot of tasks, really. (...)

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<sup>124</sup> During my time in Brasilia, I witnessed the deputies in the Women's Rights Defence Committee argue about a seminar that they were planning and could not afford to bring the guests. The seminar was scheduled to happen in two days and it did, with a videoconference.

And of course the more heated debates that move public opinion or, for example, to approve Law Dandara<sup>125</sup> in the Human Rights Committee (...) there was a task-force by some of the military<sup>126</sup> [deputies], chief police officer Whatever, Bolsonaro's son, Eduardo Bolsonaro, they were all calling each other to be in there, to stay. Because when it was time to defend the project, I was there until the end, there was a quorum, we're the majority, the people from the party stayed to approve [it]. But what did they do? What was the strategy, the parliamentary maneuver that they did? When discussion time begins on a bill, every committee member has 15 minutes to speak. So they kept repeating over and over the same thing, each one, to use up the 15 minutes and for what? So that the Order of the Day<sup>127</sup> would start. (Interview with BRd4).<sup>128</sup>

Below are the graphs analysing gender patterns in the use of these tools, over the 2000-2017, before the categorisation of women's representation. That is, these numbers represent the full amount of what was done by women and men in the legislatures, in order to see if there are any differences in how often these tools are used; the percentages refer to in-group use. In Brazil, it is clear that women privilege the use of information and public hearing requests much more than men and in all interviews with deputies they mentioned using public hearings as either a way to "shore up" their bills, to bring society into the process, to inform their colleagues, or a combination of the three. Given that type of effort, it makes sense that women have relatively fewer bills than men. However, it is interesting to see that their

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<sup>125</sup> Lei Dandara is the unofficial name of PL 7292/2017, which would further penalise homicide committed against an LGTB person. It is named after Dandara dos Santos, a crossdresser who was murdered in February 2017. Presently, it is still in the Human Rights Committee.


<sup>126</sup> Military, in Brazil, often is a reference to the Military Police, which works concurrently with the Civil Police. The Military Police is not, in fact, connected to the Armed Forces; it is a remnant of state armies that existed before during the Brazilian monarchical period.

<sup>127</sup> Order of the Day opens the plenary and all deputies must sign in.

<sup>128</sup> Original text: Como você está acompanhando várias coisas ao mesmo tempo então às vezes você vai lá cumprir aquele papel, ou seja, 'ah tem um projeto importante, nós vamos tentar fortalecer aqui' (...). Ou então, precisou dar quórum porque precisa aprovar os requerimentos, então você vai lá dar sua presença, então já tá dado o quórum. Se ninguém questionar o quórum, vai tocar a reunião daquele jeito, ou seja, com a presidente e com outra pessoa que teja lá. (...) Então tu vai fazer aquilo que tu acha mais importante. Se aqui, nessa comissão, a minha principal tarefa, isso você avalia todo dia, toda hora, é dá o quórum, porque se der o quórum tá tudo ok porque nós temos maioria pra apresentar e aprovar determinada coisa. Então eu dei o quórum e vou numa que eu tenho que falar, brigar, entendeu, ou defender um projeto meu que está naquele momento naquela comissão. É porque são muitas tarefas mesmo. (...) É claro que debates mais calorosos que movimentam a opinião pública ou então por exemplo, foi pra aprovar a Lei Dandara na comissão de direitos humanos (...) houve uma força tarefa de alguns militares, delegado fulano de tal, o filho do Bolsonaro, o Eduardo Bolsonaro, uns ficaram ligando para outros para estarem naquele momento pra poder ficar. Porque na hora de defender o projeto, eu fiquei até o final tinha dado o quórum e a gente é maioria e (...) ficaram pra aprovar. Só que o que que eles fizeram? Qual foi a estratégia, que são as manobras parlamentares? Na hora que abre a discussão de um projeto de lei, necessariamente cada membro da comissão tem 15 minutos pra se manifestar. Então ele ficavam repetindo milhares de vezes a mesma coisa cada um pra ocupar os 15 minutos pra poder o quê? Começar a ordem do dia no plenário.

relative use of constitutional amendment proposals is not that different, especially when considering the gender gap in the Câmara and the long and tough process of getting a PEC through. A possibility is that women invest in enshrining their legislative efforts in the Constitution.


Graph 31: Legislative actions, total, by gender, Câmara dos Deputados Brazil, 2000-2017



Source: the author.

In Sweden, given their similar numbers and the small number of possible actions, it is to be expected that men and women show the same results, as the graph below demonstrates. One addendum is that committee motions are submitted under the name of the committee chair and party motions are submitted under the name of the party leader in the Riksdag. However, it is unclear if that has had any impact in the data, since although men are more likely to be leaders, it is possible that they do not take many individual actions.


Graph 32: Legislative actions, total, by gender, Riksdagen, Sweden, 2000-2017



Source: the author.

The House of Commons also shows little difference among members, although women are slightly more likely to pose oral questions, and table less EDMs than men. That is an interesting pattern to find, as this means that women prioritise more the actions that give them more exposure and require of them a pattern of action that is opposed to their gender stereotype and use less the virtually risk-free EDMs. The overwhelming presence of written questions, which are the largest section of the database although they are only available from 2013, is also relevant to point out. Written questions are actions that, while useful to MPs, do not pose any risk and are clearly used profusely. These questions are short and often only ask for general or statistical information of actions taken by the government. In light of this, rather than split the data based on the years in which full information is available, it seems more more effective to split it based on whether the cases are written questions or not.

Graph 33: Legislative actions, total, by gender, House of Commons, UK, 2000-2017



Source: the author. British data includes data from the second semester of 1999, does not have written or oral questions before 2013 or prime-minister questions before 2010.

These being “normal” circumstances, I analysed which types of actions legislators, regardless of gender, used the most in the search of the goal of representing women. For Brazil, public hearing requests are the highest percentage of SWRs within the group. When looking at the subsequent graph there are clear cut gender differences, with women’s public hearing requests coming to 19.12%, while men’s is only 7.40%, also a marked difference from the total of actions. Men’s actions are mostly bills, over 70%, but what is interesting is that women, who have roughly 20% of their actions being bills, jump to more than 40%.

Sweden shows no marked difference in which types of action are privileged for SRW. When looking at women’s actions only, there is almost no difference at all; they use all types of actions in the same proportion. Men, however, ask less written questions and propose more motions.

The United Kingdom data shows that EDMs and PMBs are the most used for SRW. Although both are less risky actions given the level of exposure of oral questions, PMBs do have a small chance of receiving Royal Assent. If a PMB does get its reading, both its submission and its reading are good ways of making claims unencumbered. However, if they get a second reading or are approved then it is a big win for the MP. It does take a lot of effort and dedication to reach that goal, which might not pay off in the end considering all the other possible avenues for action. Indeed, when looking at the corresponding graph it is noticeable that women table more EDMs for women's substantive representation, corroborating Childs and Withey (2004) and ask less oral questions, although there is an increase in PMQs. Prime-minister questions are interesting affairs, as MPs will often stand up and ask if the PM "doesn't agree with them about..." or ask about some specific public action that they know is being carried out (especially in their constituency). Therefore, there could be a number of reasons as to why PMQs are used more than oral questions, but it is highly likely the theatrical and media-focused nature of the process has something to do with it. Oral questions are directed to specific ministers, which means that they would be more directed to the MP's interests; in addition, there is a minister for Women and Equalities.



**Table 4: Comparison of total legislative actions vs. actions of women’s substantive representation**

<b>Brazil</b>	<b>Bills</b>	<b>Public hearing request</b>	<b>PEC</b>	<b>Information requests</b>	<b>Other requests</b>	<b>Other /Unspecified</b>	<b>Budget amendments</b>
Total	50514	7187	2234	20740	69154	43	428
Substantive representation	1847	360	50	188	621	0	0
Substantive representation %	3.66	5.01	2.24	0.91	0.90	0	0


<b>Sweden</b>	<b>Written question</b>	<b>Interpellation</b>	<b>Motion</b>
Total	26590	10400	65216
Substantive representation	1420	650	4086
Substantive representation %	5.34	6.25	6.26

<b>UK</b>	<b>EDMs</b>	<b>Oral question</b>	<b>Laid papers</b>	<b>PMBs</b>	<b>PMQs</b>	<b>Written Question</b>
Total	28562	17759	3226	2039	9829	173750
Substantive representation	1627	520	15	85	365	6053
Substantive representation %	5.70	2.93	0.46	4.17	3.71	3.48


Source: the author. British data includes data from the second semester of 1999, does not have written or oral questions before 2013 or prime-minister questions before 2010. Despite that gap, the difference between the relative amount of data is not high.

Graph 34: Women's substantive representation by gender and type of action, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2000-2017



Source: the author.

Graph 35: Women’s substantive representation by gender and type of action, Riksdagen, Sweden, 2000-2017



Source: the author.


One aspect to highlight is the skewness in the British data, which has no questions at all from 2000 until 2009, with PMQs beginning in 2010 and oral and written questions in 2013. The table below shows the gender breakdown in uses of the types of action, demonstrating that despite that difference, there is no relevant change. Although written questions are the majority of the dataset, it should not affect the overall analysis, with the exception of the analysis by year, in which the data has the skewness has been taken into consideration for analysis.

**Table 5: British men and women’s use of different action types, %, House of Commons, UK, 2000-2017**

	Men	%Men	Women	%Women	Total
EDM	1015	62.38	612	37.62	1627
Oral question	275	52.88	245	47.12	520
Laid papers	10	66.67	5	33.33	15
PMB	58	68.24	27	31.76	85
PMQ	191	52.33	174	47.67	365
Written Question	3152	52.07	2901	47.93	6053
Total	4701	54.25	3964	45.75	8665

Source: the author.

**Graph 36: Women’s substantive representation by gender and type of action, House of Commons, UK , 2000-2017**



Source: the author. British data includes data from the second semester of 1999, does not have written or oral questions before 2013 or prime-minister questions before 2010.

Hopefully, this chapter has succeeded in its goal of painting a picture of legislative work as a whole and demonstrating under which circumstances legislators find themselves in, particularly when working on women's substantive representation. It was not meant to be a detailed image, but one that combined the overall aspects with detailed characteristics of each parliament and how they go about their work.

I would like to highlight the importance of the informal aspects of policy-making, especially the ones which include legislators communicating with each other. The hypotheses on the politics of presence and social perspective bring this action to the forefront, when legislators are able to exchange ideas and, less idealistically, negotiate. It is also relevant to note that legislatures offer modes and routines that frame the acts of legislators, which means that their actions are not only based on context but which actions they take might also be.

Aside from their daily routine of informal talking, one cannot underplay the role of the theatre. While its actual effect on legislation might be argued, its effect on representation and on public opinion is incredibly relevant as MPs shape the national agenda and discussion. This means that issues that were not controversial one day might become so the next, and where parties and MPs fall on that will dictate how people act and vice-versa.

The countries chosen for this study are, in many ways, similar and different. I would like to highlight that often they exchange places in extremes and middles, as their political cultures and institutions evolved separately but within a global context of democracy and capitalism. For instance, the country is known for its lack of corruption scandals, but also its watchful eye of individual-on-individual has completely closed committee sessions, while the country that has gone through several dictatorships and corruption issues has all its representatives exposed to the public. In between their extremes, each country finds pragmatic ways to work, represent, and maybe produce legislation.

I've been in some horrific situations where women have been raped repeatedly in Darfur, I've been with child soldiers who have been given Kalashnikov and kill members of their own family in Uganda. In Afghanistan I was talking to Afghan elders who were world-weary of a lack of sustained attention from their own Government and from the international community to stop problems early. That's the thing that all of that experience gave me - if you ignore a problem it gets worse.

*Jo Cox (British member of Parliament, murdered in 2016)<sup>129</sup>*

## CHAPTER FOUR

### The many facets of women's substantive representation

#### *Who is doing it?*

During 2000 and 2017, there were 114 women in the Brazilian legislature, 371 in Sweden; and 285 in the UK. Respectively, there were 638, 329, and 616 individual men. The difference in the Brazilian and British parliaments is quite telling.<sup>130</sup> The expectation is that over time, there is an increase in women's substantive legislation, not only from the increase in women in parliament, but because of the likelihood that they are keenly aware of gender differences in society. Moreover, two other possibilities must be considered: the rise in women's issues globally and the rise of a conservative new-right (CORREDOR, 2019) and with it a backlash against gender equality and women's rights. The table below shows the number of men and women, their percentages and the amount of SRW actions taken by each group for each country. *Contrary to the expectation that men would participate equally in women's substantive representation, not only is the group of Swedish women larger, it is significantly more active than Swedish men.* Brazilian and British women, on the other hand, despite their much smaller numbers, take on much of the work of SRW. Brazil has an average of ten actions per woman and three per man; Sweden and the UK shows women responsible, on average, for double the amount of actions than men. Without the Swedish data, this would seem to reinforce the hypothesis of tokenism, but with the stable numbers of Swedish women in the Riksdag, the notion of substantive representation of women *by* women is sustained and indicates that the principal hypothesis of if women are mainly responsible for SRW is confirmed. It would also confirm that in countries with less women, they carry a heavier

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<sup>129</sup> Jo Cox was in her first term when shot and stabbed by a man connected to far-right extremist groups.

<sup>130</sup> The Câmara dos Deputados has 513 seats; the Riksdag, 349; the House of Commons, 650.

burden in fulfilling that task, but that countries with more women do not see a large decrease in that responsibility.

**Table 6: Men and women, by country, with number of actions taken, 2000-2017**

	Brazil		Sweden		United Kingdom	
	Individuals	SRW	Individuals	SRW	Individuals	SRW
Men	638	1931	329	1987	616	4701
%Men	84.84	62.98	47.00	32.28	68.37	54.53
Women	114	1135	371	4168	285	3964
<b>%Women</b>	<b>15.16</b>	<b>37.02</b>	<b>53.00</b>	<b>67.72</b>	<b>31.63</b>	<b>45.47</b>
Total	752	3066	700	6155	901	8665

Source: the author.

**Table 7: Average of actions per individual per gender per country – 2000-2017**

Brazil	Total actions	Average of actions per individual per gender
Men	1931	3.03
Women	1135	<b>9.96</b>
<b>Sweden</b>		
Men	1987	6.04
Women	4168	<b>11.23</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>		
Men	4701	7.63
Women	3964	<b>13.91</b>

Source: the author. The British data was checked against data type and by year; while written and oral questions do raise women's numbers, the difference is not significant.

This effect of women and men as a group does not come solely from their collective adherence to gender equality and feminist values. When analysing the cases, it is relatively clear the impact of *individual* women in the numbers of actions taken. In Brazil, 36 individual women had ten or more actions, adding up to nearly a third of all actions (28%, 859 actions), the highest being Erika Kokay (PT-DF), with 100. Brazilian men with ten or more actions totalled 29, with 527 actions (17.18% of the Brazilian total), the highest contributor being Carlos Nader (PFL-RJ), with 45 actions.

Women who had ten or more actions (120) in Sweden, are responsible for 3213 actions, 52.21% of the total. Swedish men with ten or more actions totalled 55, with 1152 actions (18.72% of the total). The highest contributor for women is Carina Hägg (Social Democrats), with 254 actions and the highest contributor for men is Tasso Stafilidis (Left Party), with 84 actions.

For the House of Commons, there are 89 women with ten or more actions, totalling 3228 actions among them, which means 37.13% of the overall total. The highest contribution is made by Sharon Hodgson (Labour Party), with 279 legislative actions. British men with ten or more contributions totalled 127, with 3323 actions. That is a 38.35% of the overall total. The highest number of individual actions came from Phillip Davies (Conservative Party), with 193 contributions. However, when disconsidering written questions, the highest number of contributions for women are made by Valerie Vaz (Labour Party, 47 actions) and for men, Jeremy Corbyn (Labour Party, 35 actions).


We can also look at these figures in another way. First, the percentage of SRW actions relative to the total of actions by MPs' genders. Out of all of their actions for the whole timeframe, women used 6.84%, 9.96%, and 6.05%, respectively in Brazil, Sweden, and the UK, for women's substantive representation. In comparison, men used 1.62%, 4.18%, and 2.77%. In addition, the average number of actions proposed by women and men differs greatly, with women proposing three times more actions than men in Brazil, and twice more in Sweden and the UK. Sweden subverted expectation by having such a high number of actions proposed by women and so few proposed by men, although the number of representatives is relatively close.

Below are graphs showing the percentages of women's substantive representation, using the yearly total of actions, compared with the percentage of women elected at each general election. I applied a logarithmic function in order to normalise the lines and added a trend line. The Brazilian graph shows a small increase in women's representation, but the increase in women in the House of Commons is accompanied by a decreased number of actions. Sweden has a relatively stable trend line, with a small decrease. Despite the trend in decreases, years with an increase in women show a decrease in the first year but increase in



years after that. This can be observed particularly in the British graph, since that country has had a higher fluctuation in women’s presence.


Graph 37: Women’s substantive representation and women’s presence over time, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil – 2000-2017



Source: the author. Logarithmic scale.

The trend line showing a decrease in women’s representation, however, could be connected with the overall increase in actions over time in both parliaments (even when considering the issues with written and oral questions in the British data). When parliaments (further) professionalise, an increase in actions is common; in addition, since elections have become more connected with singling yourself out, even in party-focused systems, MPs have become more engrossed in demonstrating their legislating abilities. Therefore, the decrease in actions despite the increase in women needs to be taken with a grain of salt.

Graph 38: Women’s substantive representation and women’s presence over time, Riksdagen, Sweden – 2000-2017




Source: the author. Logarithmic scale.

These details indicate that there is more than just men and women happening when it comes to women's substantive representation. Not only is there a pattern of more women than men in charge of these actions, but there seems to be particular groups of men and women in all three countries who dedicate more time and resources to these concerns. When comparing the top contributors, the need to check for a pattern in party ideology and a cross with gender is clear, as women from historically and well-known centre-left parties top the list and men from historically and well-known right<sup>131</sup> and centre-right parties top their side of the list for two countries. The following tables respectively show the aggregate values of men and women by party and the numbers for each countries' group of top contributors (ten or more legislative actions) by party ideology. The first clearly demonstrates the importance of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, as it contributes to more than 60% of all legislative action in women's substantive representation in that country.

<sup>131</sup> The Liberal Front Party (PFL) changed its name in 2007 to Democrats (DEM), but Carlos Nader was only a member of the Câmara while it was still called PFL. Regardless, the change in name did not mean a change in party programme or values and the DEM is known for its ties to the civil-military dictatorship of 1964-1985 and its support of the neoliberal policies of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB-SP).

Graph 39: Women’s substantive representation and women’s presence over time, House of Commons, UK – 2000-2017



Source: the author.

In Sweden, it is noticeable how the two largest parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Moderate Party, overpower the others. It is also clear that gender issues go beyond party lines. In fact, SVs4 had been hired by the Social Democratic government and stayed on during the coalition government headed by the Moderate Party in continuation of her work on gender equality. One aspect that is important to highlight and was discussed in the interview with SVd1, is that MPs who belong to the governing party are less likely to perform any of these actions, either because of party loyalty or because they have direct access to party leaders and government ministers. With the Social Democrats dominating the executive for most of Swedish history, that is something to take into account.

Brazil’s picture is less clear; while the largest number of women are in centre-left parties, it seems that substantive women’s representation is still a contested issue, with men from all over the spectrum participating, and the majority being in the right-wing.

In checking the top contributors, we find that in all three countries the overwhelming majority of actions come from women from centre-left parties. The United Kingdom is the most clear

case of SRW and party ideology in tandem, as the men *and* women in the centre-left contribute to 61.27% of all cases. There are 76 women and 80 men in that group, with 13 women and 38 men completing the centre to right of centre spectrum. The second largest contributor from the men’s group is Jim Shannon from the right-wing, Democratic Unionist Party, with 190 legislative actions, although they are all written questions. This would indicate that the British men who are in the right-wing and propose SWRs are quite committed, rather than it being something from the leadership (although it does not seem to disturb the leadership). On the other hand, there are quite a few men in the left who share the number of actions proposed. This would indicate that the social perspective hypothesis is confirmed but with two caveats. The first is that women’s actions within their parties seems to matter more than within the legislature; it is not enough to become elected and work for women if there are no overarching discussions that include men and make them aware of the issues.

**Table 8: Gender and party ideology of legislators - 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>							
	Left	Centre-Left	Centre	Centre-Right	Right	Unknown or independent	Total
Men	68	461	55	591	753	3	1931
%Men	2.22	15.04	1.79	19.28	<b>24.56</b>	0.10	62.99
Women	147	458	7	309	212	2	1135
%Women	4.79	<b>14.94</b>	0.23	10.08	6.91	0.07	37.01
Total	215	919	62	900	965	5	3066
%Party	7.01	<b>30.01</b>	2.02	<b>29.35</b>	<b>31.47</b>	0.16	100.00
<b>Sweden</b>							
	Left	Centre-Left	Centre	Centre-Right	Right	Unknown or independent	Total
Men	240	590	729	283	143	2	1987
%Men	3.90	9.59	11.84	4.60	2.32	0.03	32.28
Women	497	1695	1424	446	59	47	4168

%Women	<b>27.54</b>	<b>23.14</b>	7.25	0.96	0.76	67.72	27.54
Total	737	2285	2153	729	202	49	6155
%Party	37.12	34.98	11.84	3.28	0.80	100.00	37.12

#### United Kingdom

	Left	Centre-Left	Centre	Centre-Right	Right	Unknown or independent	Total
Men	246	2380	383	1389	300	3	4701
%Men	2.84	<b>27.47</b>	4.42	16.03	3.46	0.03	54.25
Women	350	2929	150	517	9	9	3964
%Women	4.04	<b>33.80</b>	1.73	5.97	0.10	0.10	<b>45.75</b>
Total	596	5309	533	1906	309	12	8665
%Party	6.88	<b>61.27</b>	6.15	22.00	3.57	0.14	100.00

Source: the author.

This could mean that parliaments with a large presence of women will not, even gradually, increase in SRW by men and that parliaments might not be a deliberative “haven”, as it were, as the Swedish case demonstrates. While Swedish women are strong internally within their parties and that has some impact, one wonders how “gender equal” the consideration for social issues really is. Another important aspect to this is the connection between SRW and left-wing ideology, as the majority of actions from women come from that side of the spectrum and only in Brazil do right-wing men contribute more than left-wing men, making the matter of content of these actions something incredibly important. In addition, when considering top contributors, left-wing women also come out as more dedicated, but all countries have a small group of right-wing men making a large number of actions. The second caveat is that this analysis does not discuss the content or quality of legislation proposed.

**Table 9: Top contributors in legislative actions by gender and party ideology, per country – 2000-2017**

	Left	Centre-left	Centre	Centre-right	Right	Unknown or independent	Total for top contributors	Total contribution over overall
<b>Brazilian men</b>	23	74	20	201	209	-	527	17.18
<b>%</b>	4.36	14.04	3.80	38.14	<b>39.66</b>	-		

<b>Brazilian women</b>	123	373	0	213	150	-	859	28.01
%	14.32	<b>43.42</b>	0	24.80	<b>17.46</b>	-		
<b>Total</b>	146	447	20	414	359	-	1386	<b>45.19</b>
<b>Swedish men</b>	185	283	428	185	71	0	1152	18.72
%	16.06	24.57	37.15	16.06	6.16	0.00		
<b>Swedish women</b>	446	1245	1054	373	49	46	3213	52.21
%	13.88	38.75	32.80	11.61	1.53	1.43		
<b>Total</b>	631	1528	1482	558	120	46	4365	<b>70.93</b>
<b>British men</b>	150	1843	232	794	278	0	3297	38.05
%	4.55	<b>55.90</b>	7.04	24.08	<b>8.43</b>	0		
<b>British women</b>	294	2522	117	299	0	9	3241	37.40
%	9.07	<b>77.81</b>	3.61	9.22	<b>0</b>	0.28		
<b>Total</b>	444	4365	349	1093	278	9	6538	<b>75.45</b>

Source: the author.

### A note on Brazilian federalism

Being the only federalist country out of the three, it is important to quickly describe how Brazilian federalism works and how it might affect the analysis. There are 26 states and the federal district (Brasília), which are entitled to their own government (a governor and a legislative assembly) and representation at the national level. The Federal Senate is supposed to represent the states' interests and is elected by majoritarian representation, with three representatives for each state and the federal district.

The states are also the proportional districts for electing deputies to the Câmara dos Deputados. Although representation is proportional, there are minimum and maximum caps, in order to minimise the effect of small and largely populated states. The minimum representation a state receives is eight deputies and the maximum, only reached by São Paulo, is 70. Other largely populated states are Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, respectively, with 53 and 46 deputies. These three states are in the Southeast region of Brazil, and home to three of the six largest cities in the country: São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo Horizonte. Brazil is a country of a few very large cities and many smaller cities, which is how, São and Rio de

Janeiro have such large caucuses, despite their states being much smaller in size than, for instance, Bahia or Pará.

There are also specific differences and divisions in the country when it comes to economic interests and sociocultural aspects. These variations can be within region or within state; Minas Gerais, for example, has areas that are very progressive and areas that are very conservative. São Paulo differs regarding the capitol city and the rest of the state. Being able to at least acknowledge these possibilities when studying Brazil is important, because it will affect how many women are elected, which women those are, and which policies are put forth by which state given, their particular problems. One issue that arose, for instance, was the situation with women being scalped by unregulated boats in the North region of Brazil, an issue that most of the country is unaware of. The table below shows the actions by gender and state; notably the federal district (DF) has the third highest number for women’s actions due to Erika Kokay being a deputy from that area and the woman with most actions in total.

The debate on who works on behalf of women has been going on for centuries, even before enfranchisement. Politics, much like science, is seen as a field for the whole, the general, the complete picture, the tool for the betterment of society. Representing men is unheard of and as one male party leader said to me once “it is very telling that there is a women’s department in the party, but not one for men” (GOMES, 2012). There is no need for a men’s department as men are not underrepresented; not only that, but any act of representation is perceived as representing *society*, while negating that society means “men”. Men represent the country, while women represent women – or rather, women’s issues are for women to deal with.

**Table 10: Frequency and percentage of actions by Brazilian state and gender of MPs, Brazil – 2000-2017**

State	Frequency in men	%in men	State	Frequency in women	%in women	State	Total frequency	%total in state
SP	356	18.43	RJ	255	22.47	RJ	543	17.70
RJ	288	14.91	SP	127	11.19	SP	483	15.75
MG	158	8.18	DF	108	9.52	MG	187	6.10
RS	103	5.33	AM	61	5.37	DF	167	5.45
PB	95	4.92	AC	59	5.20	RS	160	5.22

CE	85	4.40	ES	57	5.02	GO	129	4.21
GO	85	4.40	RS	57	5.02	BA	125	4.08
BA	83	4.30	RN	47	4.14	CE	121	3.95
PR	75	3.88	SC	45	3.96	ES	110	3.59
MT	68	3.52	GO	44	3.88	PB	107	3.49
PE	66	3.42	BA	42	3.70	AM	87	2.84
DF	59	3.05	CE	36	3.17	AC	84	2.74
PA	55	2.85	AP	32	2.82	PA	84	2.74
ES	53	2.74	MG	29	2.56	PR	83	2.71
MA	45	2.33	PA	29	2.56	SC	82	2.67
MS	38	1.97	RO	22	1.94	MT	77	2.51
SC	37	1.92	TO	14	1.23	PE	74	2.41
TO	30	1.55	PI	13	1.15	RN	55	1.79
AM	26	1.35	PB	12	1.06	MA	48	1.57
AC	25	1.29	AL	9	0.79	AP	45	1.47
RO	21	1.09	MT	9	0.79	TO	44	1.43
SE	19	0.98	PE	8	0.70	RO	43	1.40
RR	18	0.93	PR	8	0.70	MS	39	1.27
PI	14	0.72	RR	8	0.70	PI	27	0.88
AP	13	0.67	MA	3	0.26	RR	26	0.85
AL	9	0.47	MS	1	0.09	SE	19	0.62
RN	8	0.41	SE	0	0.00	AL	18	0.59
	1931	100		1135	100		3066	100

Source: the author.

Consequently, how have men been representing women since before enfranchisement, if that representation was done from a completely male perspective? Representation without the presence of women in the representative institution or without a gendered perspective will be done not for women, but for whatever perspective of gender roles the representative ascribes to. In that sense, what motivates a man to write, speak, or propose something on “behalf” of women? Do the representatives proposing negative actions – men and women – that would curtail women’s freedoms and autonomy truly believe that those would improve women’s lives and society as a whole or are they serving a different purpose?



The results show that in Sweden and the UK, the gender-party divide is much clearer than in Brazil. Both men and women from all over the ideological spectrum propose actions, although the scale does tip towards the left side of the spectrum, with the caveat that women do so at a much higher rate than men. One thing to consider in the ideological bias of the actions is what rhetoric they present and why do certain parties associate more with gender legislation. The image showed here of contested ground, with left-wing women on one side and right-wing men on the other. The increase in women in Brazilian politics and the rise of women's issues both in the country and worldwide does seem to have been accompanied by a similar effort from the conservative side. It is important to highlight that I deviate from the mainstream categorisations of party ideology in Brazil, which has an effect, in particular, the place of the MDB, the party with the largest caucus in the Câmara and which I argue should be placed in the centre-right, rather than the centre. Categorising parties in Brazil based on roll-call votes gives an incomplete picture at best, and creates categories based on aggregate number of votes. Given the unprogrammatic nature of most Brazilian parties, that needs to be coupled with a qualitative analysis of contextual factors.

#### *ANOVA and negative binomial regressions*

In order to verify the effects of these descriptive patterns, two types of statistical analyses were conducted. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test allows us to see if group differences are statistically significant; a negative binomial regression allows us to see the likelihood that one factor will impact the overall result.<sup>132</sup> For the case at hand, we want to see if men and women from different party ideologies are connected to women's substantive representation at different rates and how much does gender and ideology increase or decrease the amount of SRW actions.

In all three countries, women are the highest proponents of actions on women's substantive representation: in Brazil and Sweden, there is no difference of party ideology, only gender;

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<sup>132</sup> The datasets used for the statistical analyses are slightly different. Due to an issue with collection, the Brazilian dataset had to be reformulated, which is why it goes all the way to November 2019. All datasets were clustered by MP and year (or session, in the case of Sweden, which is one legislative year, beginning in August/September). This means that MPs are not unique, but the composite MP-Year is. In addition, these analyses were done before content analysis was conducted and false positives and negatives were corrected; however, these differences are not statistically significant.

but in the UK, gender and party ideology act in tandem, with left-wing women being markedly different from other groups. The ANOVA test comes with several analyses in order to demonstrate the group differences. The detailed numbers are all in the Appendix – here, I will only show the graphs and multiple comparisons. I have highlighted the groups that are different, with a significance higher than 0.005. The tests show that women left-wing and right-wing women both in Brazil and in Sweden are indistinguishable and that left-wing women in the UK are different from all other groups. The graphs for each country compare the means for each group and allow for the visualisation of why and by how much these groups differ. When markers are on similar levels, that means their means are also similar and no statistically significant difference was found, which is confirmed by the tables. Importantly, these only evaluate the number of legislative actions and not their substance.


With these results, I conducted a negative binomial regression for each country, evaluating the impact of each factor in the likely outcome of more SRW legislative action. Given the results for the UK ANOVA analysis, the NBR was conducted with the variable that includes both gender and ideology. For Brazil and Sweden, these were analysed separately.

**Table 11: ANOVA Multiple Comparisons - Brazil**

Dependent Variable: Women’s substantive representation						
Tukey HSD						
(I) Gender & Party Ideology	(J) Gender & Party Ideology	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
<b>Left-wing men</b>	<b>Right-wing men</b>	<b>-,030</b>	<b>,020</b>	<b>,444</b>	-,08	,02
	Right-wing women	-,823*	,044	,000	-,94	-,71
	Left-wing women	-,819*	,041	,000	-,92	-,71
<b>Left-wing women</b>	Right-wing men	,789*	,039	,000	,69	,89
	<b>Right-wing women</b>	<b>-,004</b>	<b>,055</b>	<b>1,000</b>	-,15	,14
	Left-wing men	,819*	,041	,000	,71	,92

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Graph 40: Group comparison – Brazil (2000-2019)



Source: the author.

**Table 12: ANOVA Multiple Comparisons - Sweden**


Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Tukey HSD

(I) Gender & Party Ideology	(J) Gender & Party Ideology	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
<b>Left-wing men</b>	<b>Right-wing men</b>	<b>-,076</b>	<b>,123</b>	<b>,927</b>	-,39	,24
	Right-wing women	-1,468	,134	,000	-1,81	-1,12
	Left-wing women	-1,480	,129	,000	-1,81	-1,15
<b>Left-wing women</b>	Right-wing men	1,404	,123	,000	1,09	1,72
	<b>Right-wing women</b>	<b>,012</b>	<b>,134</b>	<b>1,000</b>	-,33	,36
	Left-wing men	1,480	,129	,000	1,15	1,81

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Graph 41: Group comparison – Sweden (2000-2017)



Source: the author.

**Table 13: ANOVA Multiple Comparisons - UK**


Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Tukey HSD

(I) Gender & Party Ideology	(J) Gender & Party Ideology	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
<b>Left-wing men</b>	Right-wing men	,326	,072	,000	,14	,51
	<b>Right-wing women</b>	<b>-,174</b>	<b>,130</b>	<b>,536</b>	-,51	,16
	Left-wing women	-1,017	,095	,000	-1,26	-,77
<b>Left-wing women</b>	Right-wing men	1,343	,095	<b>,000</b>	1,10	1,59
	Right-wing women	,843	,144	<b>,000</b>	,47	1,21
	Left-wing men	1,017	,095	<b>,000</b>	,77	1,26

\*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Graph 42: Group comparison – UK (2000-2017)



Source: the author.

The model below displays the most relevant tables for the NBR results for Brazil. Other tables can be found in the Appendix. Here, we find that the model and all its factors are significant (Tables 14 and 15). Table 16 shows the direction of the relationships ( $\beta$ ) and the exponentiated  $\beta$ , or incidence rate ratios (or risk ratios). These coefficients indicate the likelihood that the outcome will be present in the presence of the factor analysed; in other words, having a woman as MP increases the likelihood of women's substantive representation action by 5.58 times, in Brazil. When a factor is close to 1, that means its impact is nearly null, while values lower than 1 indicate a negative relationship. Given the results from the ANOVA the fact that being left-wing in fact lowers the likelihood of SRW is directly linked to right-wing women's high number of actions, which diminishes the impact of being left-wing at all.

**Table 14: NBR – Brazil – Omnibus Test<sup>a</sup>**

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
2505,685	4	,000

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender, Co-authorship, Left

a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.

**Table 15: NBR – Brazil – Tests of Model Effects**

Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	54,651	1	<b>,000</b>
Year	52,956	1	<b>,000</b>
Gender	502,187	1	<b>,000</b>
Co-authorship	35,170	1	<b>,000</b>
Left	10,643	1	<b>,001</b>

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender, Co-authorship, Left

**Table 16: NBR – Brazil – Parameter Estimates**

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-	14,8881	-	-	54,651	1	,000	1,587E-48	3,371E-61	7,472E-36
Year	<b>,054</b>	,0074	,039	,068	52,956	1	<b>,000</b>	<b>1,055</b>	1,040	1,071
Gender	<b>1,720</b>	,0767	1,569	1,870	502,187	1	<b>,000</b>	<b>5,582</b>	4,803	6,488
Co-authorship	<b>,061</b>	,0103	,041	,082	35,170	1	<b>,000</b>	<b>1,063</b>	1,042	1,085
Left	<b>-,229</b>	,0702	-,366	-,091	10,643	1	<b>,001</b>	<b>,795</b>	,693	,913
(Scale binomial)	1 <sup>a</sup>									
(Negative binomial)	4,829	,2473	4,368	5,339						

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender, Co-authorship, Left

a. Fixed at the displayed value.

The Swedish model follows. Unlike the Brazilian model, the year /session variable was not significant, even if considering that despite that variable having significance for Brazil, its effect is nearly null. Given the importance of gender in both cases, and that Brazil has an increase in women MPs over time while Sweden does not, that makes sense. The variable distinguishing left-wing parties also has a smaller impact in Sweden, with even smaller

significance values. The direction and rate of the relationship is also similar to Brazil. This further confirms that gender is the most relevant factor in the number of women’s substantive representation actions. In Sweden, the risk ratio (exponentiated  $\beta$ ) for gender is 2.53, meaning SRW actions are more than two times more likely to come from women. In addition, the cosponsorship variable was also significant and with a risk ratio of 3.10, which is compatible with that country’s ethos of teamwork. This does not mean that these are committee or party motions; most seem to be individual motions with cosponsors.

**Table 17: NBR – Sweden – Omnibus Test<sup>a</sup>**

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
581,420	4	,000

Dependent Variable: Women’s substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Session\_CAT, Gender, Left, Cosponsor

a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.

**Table 18: NBR – Sweden – Tests of Model Effects**

Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	72,878	1	,000
Session_CAT	1,974	1	,160
Gender	265,409	1	,000
Co-sponsor	126,587	1	,000
Left	3,365	1	,067

Dependent Variable: Women’s substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Session\_CAT, Gender, Left, Cosponsor

**Table 19: NBR – Sweden – Parameter Estimates**

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	<b>-.944</b>	,1105	-1,160	-,727	72,878	1	,000	<b>,389</b>	,313	,483
Session_CAT	<b>-.007</b>	,0051	-,017	,003	1,974	1	,160	<b>,993</b>	,983	1,003
Gender	<b>,930</b>	,0571	,818	1,042	265,409	1	,000	<b>2,534</b>	2,266	2,834
Cosponsor	<b>1,129</b>	,1003	,932	1,325	126,587	1	,000	<b>3,092</b>	2,540	3,764
Left (Scale)	<b>-.106</b>	,0579	-,220	,007	3,365	1	,067	<b>,899</b>	,803	1,007
(Negative binomial)	3,021	,0903	2,849	3,203						

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Model: (Intercept), Session\_CAT, Gender, Left, Cosponsor

a. Fixed at the displayed value.

The British model has only three variables, year, co-authorship, and a composite of gender and party ideology. This was done given the results of the ANOVA, showing the importance of left-wing women. Therefore, the goal here is to see the coefficient for gender with ideology. All variables were significant in the model.

**Table 20: NBR – UK – Omnibus Test<sup>a</sup>**

Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square	df	Sig.
1331,052	5	<b>,000</b>

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender & Party Ideology, Co-authorship

a. Compares the fitted model against the intercept-only model.



**Table 21: NBR – UK – Tests of Model Effects**

Source	Type III		
	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.
(Intercept)	792,679	1	<b>,000</b>
Year	792,737	1	<b>,000</b>
Gender & Ideology	171,562	3	<b>,000</b>
Co-authorship	144,762	1	<b>,000</b>

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender & Party Ideology, Co-authorship

In order to conduct this test with the composite variable, it was added as a factor, rather than covariate, which permits us to analyse each category individually. Categories 2 and 4 refer to right-wing and left-wing women, respectively, and have the highest risk ratios. This means that a left-wing woman in the UK is 2.46 times more likely to produce women's substantive representation action, while right-wing women have a risk ratio of 1.57. As mentioned, the closer to 1, the less of an impact a coefficient has, as this means a multiplication with 1. The co-authorship variable has a risk ratio of 2.06, but that is likely the impact of the larger presence of Early Day Motions in the dataset, while other type of actions in the UK do not have the possibility for co-authorship or sponsorship.

**Table 22: NBR – UK – Parameter Estimates**

Parameter	B	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval		Hypothesis Test			Exp(B)	95% Wald Confidence Interval for Exp(B)	
			Lower	Upper	Wald Chi-Square	df	Sig.		Lower	Upper
(Intercept)	-	11,1911	-	-	794,930	1	,000	9,280E-138	2,765E-147	3,115E-128
	<b>315,529</b>		337,463	293,595						
Year	<b>,157</b>	,0056	,146	,167	792,737	1	,000	<b>1,169</b>	1,157	1,182
G & PId=4	<b>,902</b>	,0697	,765	1,038	167,631	1	,000	<b>2,464</b>	2,150	2,825
G & PId=3	<b>,339</b>	,0579	,225	,452	34,155	1	,000	<b>1,403</b>	1,252	1,572
G & PId=2	<b>,450</b>	,0889	,276	,624	25,653	1	,000	<b>1,569</b>	1,318	1,867
G & PId=1	<b>0</b>	.	.	.	.	.	.	<b>1</b>	.	.
Co-authorship	<b>,725</b>	,0603	,607	,843	144,762	1	,000	<b>2,065</b>	1,835	2,324
(Scale)	1 <sup>a</sup>									
(Negative binomial)	2,232	,0668	2,105	2,367						

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender & Party Ideology, Co-authorship

a. Fixed at the displayed value.

A relevant aspect in all of this is party ideology. When looking specifically as women's substantive representation, women are more likely to be similar, despite their ideologies. In addition, in Brazil, women tend to follow consensual topics rather than dive into controversial ones, as I will show in the following sections. Sweden, on the other hand, falls back into a gender equality culture as well as an approximation between left and right parties, with the exception of the rise of the extreme right-wing. Both Brazil and the UK have experienced a stretching of party distances, as polarisation increases over topics such as the coup against Dilma Rousseff and Brexit. Therefore, I caution the reader that the conclusions reached here refer to women's substantive representation only and the debate on party ideology inserted here is inscribed within these boundaries.

Other crucial aspects that must inform the analysis and interpretation are the presence of salient themes and critical actors. While these statistical tests demonstrate the link between

descriptive and substantive representation, they do not speak to the quality of that representation, what it considers women's lives to be and what it hopes they would be, and it is not sensitive to the work of critical actors. Yes, women are more likely to be the proponents of SRW, but there are men, from all parties, who also take an interest in the topic. However, their actions must be looked at qualitatively, which is what the following sections propose.

*When are they doing it?*

Checks over time can be tricky, as many contextual factors not only play significant roles, but their interaction may also impact their outcome. However, as there are indications that women's substantive representation has changed qualitatively recently, and since the basic idea that the increase in women would lead to an increase in SRW is predicated on increase over time, it is relevant to attempt to find patterns regarding time.


Beginning with Brazil, the first graph compares men and women's actions during the timeframe of analysis. One indication is that the increase in women and increase in SRW is likely, but only slightly connected. During the first year of President Lula's government, 2003, women's actions begin to increase and men's begins to decrease. During President Rousseff's first term, there is an uptick in both women and men's actions, but in 2014, year of her reelection, all fall to almost zero. There also seems to be a different pattern to when men and women increase their SRW: men seem to mostly decrease their participation in election years, while women increase theirs. Political ambition in Brazil runs, overall, in a zig-zag, with politicians jumping from legislative to executive offices (SAMUELS, 2000; LEONI et al., 2003); women, however, are more likely to stay in local politics as councillors and mayors of small towns<sup>133</sup> (MIGUEL, QUEIROZ, 2006; GOULART, GOMES, 2018). Consequently, the political ambition of women could be different, although there are no studies on this as of yet.

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<sup>133</sup> Cities with less than 200 thousand inhabitants do not have run-off elections. Cities larger than that are rare and tend to be regional centres or state capitals, meaning that the competition is always high. It is always relevant to remember that Brazil is a continentally-sized country, with travel taking place mostly by air or road. Within states, travel by plane is still rare, which would make the weekly trip for a woman who is, for instance, a state deputy, from the capital to her hometown, possibly prohibitive. In Gomes (2012) I show that for 2010, almost all candidates for legislative assembly of Minas Gerais were residents either of the capital or its surrounding cities.

I suggest that, since large cities and gubernatorial races tend to be off-limits to women, those who are federal deputies would most likely not seek to move on from their seats. While they still have to campaign, they are less imposed on by their parties to campaign for others. This, overall, means that women might find themselves with a Câmara that is low on scheduling and see this an opportunity to set and achieve some goals. In 2015, there is a spike in men’s actions, but a higher increase in women’s, possibly connected to a backlash against gender equality and, more specifically, the President herself and legislation she undertook on behalf of trans people during that time. The following graphs show men and women’s actions separately, dividing them by party ideology, which I narrowed to only three fields by combining left and centre-left; right and centre-right. The percentage references each group’s yearly total against their total within the timeframe of analysis.


Graph 43: Actions of Brazilian deputies over time, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2000-2017



Source: the author.

The men’s graph shows that right-wing men have increased their actions slightly since 2015, but that they are usually stable over time. This includes considering the decrease in all actions in 2014. Left-wing men have a less stable line, with peaks over specific pre-election years: 2007, 2009, and 2013. Men in centre parties have a completely unstable line, with sharp downs and lows. The actions of women, on the other hand, indicate that left-wing women have acted on women’s substantive representation quite constantly over time; the same is true for right-wing women, although with fewer actions. For the latter, however, there is a sharp increase starting in 2016. That is a year with increases for all, but the left tended to maintain their usual pattern. Centre women follow the pattern of men, or lack of pattern, that is. This is partly a result of the increase in polarisation in Brazilian politics, which is reflected in the categorisation of parties.

Graph 44: Actions of Brazilian men over time, by ideology, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2000-2017




Source: the author.

Noticeably, women in the right have overpowered women in the left since before the coup, showing a steady pace of increase. The election of a centre-left president, and following him,

a centre-left woman, certainly changed the discourse around women and women’s rights in Brazil. President Rousseff, during her first campaign, had to pander to neopentecostals and denounce abortion. When I visited the Câmara, I observed the reception for the new women of the Women’s Caucus, the ones elected in 2018. Most who attended were from right-wing parties, Bolsonaro’s party in particular, the Social Liberal Party (PSL) and were claiming their femininity and motherhood, while at the same time stating their nature as fighters and their connections to male politicians such as husbands or brothers.

Graph 45: Actions of Brazilian women over time, by ideology, Câmara dos Deputados, Brazil, 2000-2017



Source: the author.

The issue of left and right in Brazil definitely has a different level of complexity than it does in other countries. Brazilian left and centre-left parties would like to play by different rules, but find themselves either having to choose between the *de facto* rules of the game and compromising their identity or sticking to their beliefs and losing seats and power. In fact, the rules that Brazilian leftist parties would like to play by are European; they would like programmatic parties, centralised leaderships, close relationships with unions and civil

society. However, Brazilian electoral rules do not lend themselves to the electing candidates in these conditions (NICOLAU, 2006; SANTOS, 2006; ALMEIDA, GOMES, 2018). Brazil has a long history of combining formal and informal electoral rules that prioritise local leaders and individual financing and a longer history of combining politics and private interests (HOLANDA, [1933] 1999; FREYRE, [1936] 1968; FAORO, [1958] (1975); LEAL, 1975; SAFFIOTI, 1976; ALENCASTRO, 1987). This means that not only are leftist using a different rule-book, women in general face harsher obstacles on the path to election. As BRd4 points out, it is not a matter of ideology; it is a matter of who is there for political work and who is there for private, undisclosed, possibly illegal reasons.

... it's one thing the guy being right-wing, it's another if the guy's a crook, when it comes to character, personality, corruption, that's something else, you know? So, I think that this also matters at the end of the day, it matters to personal relationships, you know, there's people you like to approach even if they're right-wing, they're nice, they keep agreements if it's important. And there's people that you have zero interest in... (Interview with BRd4).<sup>134</sup>

That, undoubtedly, has its effects on what leftists, and particularly, left-wing women are able to accomplish when elected. As Araújo (2010) points out, men and women run for office for different reasons; men see it as an end in itself and women as the means to an end. That is, women are usually connected to some cause or another that leads them to run for office. However, that assertion needs more research and definitely more detail when it comes to party ideology, especially with the rise of right-wing women in the legislature. What are their connections and goals? On the other hand, how does this affect the strategy of left-wing women? Have their actions decreased in number, but their efforts increased in getting them through? Or are they more concerned with stopping unfavourable legislation, whether it concerns women or the whole country?

Yeah, the caucus that's there after the coup it's much, much more backwards, so much so that the more progressive, left-wing, activist congresswomen, or who were in the past, they're not involved anymore

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<sup>134</sup> Original text: ...uma coisa é o cara ser da direita, outra coisa o cara se vagabundo, no sentido do caráter, da personalidade, da corrupção aí já é outra coisa, entendeu? Então, eu acho que isso também pesa no final das contas, pesa nas relações pessoais entendeu, tem gente que você gosta de aproximar mesmo sendo da direita, é gente boa, que cumpre acordo se é uma coisa importante. E tem gente que você não tem o menor interesse...

because of wasting time, most, even, follow the men's agenda, right, many of them. (Interview with BRd3).<sup>135</sup>

During that time it was hard to do anything, even the mixed committee on combatting violence against women was hurt in the sense that it was really tense because, for example, when the coup was happening and they unseated Dilma, when you called on authorities to be in public hearings (...) came people who had been placed by force, in the left's perception, by the coup. So the relationship got, it was like we avoided, even I had that feeling, it was like the women avoided meeting, even seeing each other, being in the same space because it wasn't easy for the women themselves, some from the same party, even if they voted, they voted against Dilma forcibly, against their will. Because they are women too, especially, I would say, the more conservative ones and in right-wing parties. (Interview with BRd4).<sup>136</sup>

Turning to the European countries in the study, a different picture appears. Sweden definitely takes the opposite side of Brazil here, as quite possibly the goal for most left-wing Brazilian parties. In fact, even for a researcher, albeit Brazilian, there is a strangeness in seeing party members refer to themselves and each other as “socialist” and “bourgeois”, without a hint of irony.<sup>137</sup> As discussed previously, despite moves towards the centre by the Moderate Party, Swedish parties are still highly programmatic and disciplined. When looking at a Swedish legislative action in the area of women's representation, one can usually tell by the wording

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<sup>135</sup> Original text: Sim, a bancada que tá aí depois do golpe ela é muito mais, muito mais atrasada, tanto é que as deputadas mais progressistas, de esquerda, mais ativistas ou foram no passado, já não estão mais tão envolvidas por perda de tempo, a maioria, inclusive segue a pauta dos homens né, muitas delas. – Notably, the deputy who gave this quote was highlighted by the Women's Caucus consultant as someone who has “lost their hope” and sees the future in activism, rather than trying to work with their colleagues.

<sup>136</sup> Original text: Nessa época era difícil fazer tudo era difícil acontecer, até a comissão mista de combate violência contra a mulher foi prejudicada no sentido de que era tudo muito tenso o clima era muito tenso porque por exemplo, quando estava tendo o golpe e que destituíram o governo Dilma, quando você chamava as autoridades pra compor a audiências públicas (...) vinha exatamente as pessoas que tinham sido empossadas na marra, na nossa avaliação da esquerda, pelo golpe. Então a relação ficou, era como se a gente evitasse até, eu tive essa sensação, era como se as mulheres evitassem se encontrar mais, até se ver mais, até estar no mesmo espaço porque não foi uma coisa fácil, até para as próprias mulheres, algumas mesmo partido, mesmo elas votando, elas votaram contra a Dilma constrangidas, a contra gosto. Até pelo fato de ser mulher também principalmente digamos assim, as que são mais conservadoras mesmo e que estão em partidos de direita entendeu.

<sup>137</sup> Through observations, interviews, and literature review, Sweden forms an odd image of equality of opportunity through the welfare state with the use of high taxes, but with essentially every service being provided by the state, including parental leave, sick leave, daycare, and any other needs that would prevent a citizen from working. Work is the bedrock of Swedish society; however it must not stand in the way of the reproduction of Swedish society, the family. The state, on the other hand, is everywhere, ensuring that status quo, and nowhere, as the picture I was presented with was of people living their lives without much concern for politics, despite the high voting turnouts. For me, Sweden in an image is the walk to the Riksdag through the a pedestrian road, full of high-street and souvenir shops and malls. The height of capitalism in the path to one of the largest welfare states.




of the first phrase to which party the member belongs to (although that may differ in other issues). Being a parliamentary country, Swedish heads of government come from the Riksdag, but unlike other countries with the same system, often the party that has the better chance of forming a government, rather than the party with the largest caucus, is the one that is able to do so (BÄCK, BERGMAN, 2016; PERSSON, 2016). With the Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*) always giving support to the Social Democrats (*Socialdemokraterna*), the left has usually managed to be more organised than the centre and the right, meaning many years of a minority Social Democratic government. During the timeframe selected, the Moderate Party (*Moderaterna*) held the prime-minister's office in a centre-right coalition (named Alliance), between 2006 and 2014, with the Centre Party (*Centerpartiet*), the Christian Democrats (*Kristdemokraterna*) and the Liberal Party (*Liberalerna*).<sup>138</sup> Between 2000 and 2005, the Social Democrats had a single-party government and after 2014 they returned to power with the Green Party (*Miljöpartiet*) and the support of the Left Party. This is relevant because it explains the ups-and-downs of actions in parliament, at least along party lines. Given the importance of access to the government, but also of party loyalty, this must be kept in mind. MPs are less likely to put the parties in difficult situations as well as are able to discuss matters with party leaders or even members of cabinet in more informal ways. In addition, because of the strong programmatic nature of Swedish parties, the likelihood that MPs actually disagree with a government measure or that an action by an MP will be rebellious is also small.

The graph below shows an increase in the actions of women during the period of the Alliance government and a decrease in men's actions. In 2014, year when the Social Democrats got back in government, women's actions decreased, while men's increased, and that has been the pattern since then. Another relevant aspect is the election of the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*), an extreme right party, in 2010, with sharp increases in the following elections, becoming Sweden's third largest party (JUNGAR, 2016; DAL BÓ, et al. 2018).

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<sup>138</sup> Until 2015, the People's Liberal Party (*Folkpartiet liberalern*).

Graph 46: Actions of Swedish MPs over time, Riksdagen, Sweden, 2000-2017




Source: the author.

Looking at the graph below, of men's actions by ideology, it is important to remember that the actions of left-wing men are skewed by few individuals taking many actions, which means that years in which they peak might be years in which those individuals were in office. After 2014, the actions of centre men increase, which is reasonable to expect with the election of a "socialist" government. However, there is an unexpected decrease in the actions of right-wing men, albeit slight.

The women's graph a peak in actions for right-wing women in the beginning of the timeframe, but that decreases and somewhat stabilised over time. The centre and left-wing women behave as expected, with a decrease during their time in office and an increase when in the opposition. Centre women have the steadiest line, but in 2014 they begin an upward trend that in 2017 sees them with their highest percentage of actions for the whole timeframe. Left-wing women quite consistently maintain a low percentage of actions during leftist governments.

Graph 47: Actions of Swedish men over time, by ideology, Riksdagen, Sweden, 2000-2017




Source: the author.

Beyond the switch between “socialist” and “bourgeois”, there are other patterns to consider. The sharp decrease in left-wing actions could indicate either a successful fulfilment of the party’s agenda or a tighter hold from party leadership. The actions of centre and right-wing women are not kept as low during the Alliance government. The increase in actions among MPs in the centre, both men and women, as well as men in the right-wing could indicate an increase in polarisation over the representation of women, but since the left’s action is likely focused in the executive, that cannot be certain from the quantitative data. Which leads me to the Sweden Democrats and their entering the Riksdag. That is a significant change for women’s representation and gender issues in general, given their nationalist and social conservative takes (ERLINGSSON et al., 2014; HARTEVELD, IVARSFLATEN, 2016). Indeed, until their entry, none of the parties present in the Riksdag could have been considered right-wing, and it is only in 2010 that the data shows actions from the right.

However, since for this section the data has been unified into three ideological camps, the Christian Democrats and the Swedish Democrats are placed together.<sup>139</sup>

Graph 48: Actions of Swedish women over time, by ideology, Riksdagen, Sweden, 2000-2017



Source: the author.

On the other hand, many of the positions taken by the Christian Democrats when it comes to women’s representation cannot be differentiated from the SD. Since 2015, there is a slight decrease in the rights actions which could mean that they are excluded from the committees which deal with most women-related issues; or their attentions by be focused elsewhere, immigration and asylum, specifically. It is also the case that the SD has been trying to moderate its stance, being linked to neonazi movements from the ’80s and having that image remain until today, despite those efforts (ERLINGSSON et al., 2014; JUNGAR, 2016; HARTEVELD, IVARSFLATEN, 2016). However, the trend is too small to say. It is also possible that they have diminished their efforts in the area of women’s issues given the widespread belief in gender equality in Sweden, although that did not stop interviewee SVd2

<sup>139</sup> I have found that Sweden has their own “School without party” movement, *Partipolitiskt neutrala lärare*, advocated by the Sweden Democrats, although without the gendered aspects that can be found in Brazil. Source: <https://riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/motion/partipolitiskt-neutrala-larare- H4025>

from only referring to them as “the nazi party”. It is clear that when discussing Sweden, it is impossible to not be swayed by the movements of its parties and their moods and cultures. While other countries permit a discussion without too much detail on party life and election cycles, that is not the case when dealing with Sweden.


And also if we talk about the the group that aligns, the parties in the middle, the right and the center parties, you know, they're quite big together, quite big. Now there's a big conflict going on, right now, not in terms there's a conflict going on in Parliament, where the right-wing the Moderate Party have said they might work with the Sweden Democratic Party, right. So now that party it is very much criticised and it remains to be seen if she will survive the summer, right. On the other hand, we have other political parties, the Liberal Party would say that it will never work with the Sweden Democratic Party. Meaning that this quite big group of opposition parties in the middle, there's a tension, you know, within this group. So with an upcoming election next year it will be extremely interesting to see if this strong political divide between the left and right would survive. We might see a new constellation of parties which will break this left-right political dimension. I'm not sure, but it could happen. (Interview with SVs4).

[I]t's still seen as a very provocative for authority leaders to say that men are partly to blame for the environmental crisis, because they eat more meat and drive cars more, and things like that (laughs), you know, a big uproar. And it's a thing seems that the same, I think, mechanism that makes it difficult to talk about legislation against violence, violence against women. But that makes it very easy to talk about parental leave, because parental leave, we just say, 'oh, everyone has the right to choose, everyone has the right to be with the children and to work' that, you know, that choice should be the same for men, women, regardless of how they choose, but you can't talk about domestic violence legislation in those terms. (Interview with SVs1).

Analysing British actions demands some care, given the lack of data for written and oral questions before 2013 and PMQs before 2010. Since the data presented no difference in the aggregate by type and I am using percentages rather than absolute numbers, after many checks, a simple time series graph was still the best way to display the data and analyse the findings. One difference is that the number for each year was calculated against the total between 2000-2012 and 2013-2017.

The graph below shows that British men and women table a relative similar amount of actions in SRW. Although women have slightly more accentuated peaks, it seems that both groups are swayed by the “tides” of issues. Importantly, the peak in 2014 refers to the increase in data with the addition of oral and written questions.

Graph 49: Actions of British MPs over time, House of Commons, 2000-2017




Source: the author.

Given the marked pattern of action in the House of Commons by party ideology, rather than by gender, the graph below divides all MPs by party allegiance. The increase in women's actions in 2006 seems to come from the centre, a likely possibility since there was an increase in women from the Liberal Democrats during this time. In 2014, there was some activity from the centre-right surrounding reproductive rights; it is the only year in which right-wing men surpassed left-wing men, however, left-wing women were never outdone. It is important to highlight that these lines refer to in-group trends; that is, for all countries, an increase, for instance, in right-wing actions does not mean that there was less left-wing actions, only that in 2014 more right-wing MPs tabled actions than they had before.

The shift in party numbers in the House of Commons comes as no surprise, especially since the coalition government. It is no longer a house of two parties only, and although the Labour Party is the one most associated with women's representation, this change is felt in the increased participation of right-wing men and the oscillation in the presence of women from other parties.

Graph 50: Actions of British MPs over time, by ideology, House of Commons, UK, 2000-2017



Source: the author.

Out of all three countries, Brazil is the only with right-wing men having the highest number of participation for the whole timeframe, reinforcing the notion of contested ground. The actions of women in Sweden have decreased, a likely reflection of the decreased in actions by left-wing women. All countries show some increase in the actions of the right-wing, but Brazil has the added aspect of right-women being large contributors to this.

#### *What are they doing?*

The process for categorisation used each country's own language, relying on basic key words and developing from there. In conjunction with interviews and literature review, issues specific to each country arose and more so than issues, the discursive structure around them. That is, while certain issues exist in all three, they are not discussed using the same words, even when accounting for translation gaps or the same rhetoric. Categories are not mutually exclusive.

## Women, girls, men, boys

The first two words categorised in all datasets was “women”, allowing for its singular and root words in Portuguese and Swedish.<sup>140</sup> In the case of Sweden, this then includes “female”, but more important, since the construction of words in Swedish often connects two words to make a new one, anything related to women came up. For instance, one of the main words when discussing gender violence in Sweden is “kvinnofrid” and often, specifically given that the database was so succinct, there was no other reference to women. The same applies for “girl”, the second categorisation. The goal was to allow for the maximum amount of information to be included, as well as to follow in the footsteps of previous studies. The table below shows that women’s substantive representation in Brazil and the UK is very much tied to the use of the word “women”, although these databases had more text to categorise (that is, if the word was not in the title, it might have been detected in the summary or the full text of an EDM). Even so, the percentages below, in bold, demonstrate that a study on SRW should not focus on this key word alone. In the care to not essentialise womanhood and the life experiences that go with it, it has become commonplace to reject using certain categories which are known to either affect women only or more often. For instance, a few cases in the Swedish database are simply titled “Osteoporosis”; however, the content of the text mostly refers to women as that illness affects them more often (also an issue that appeared in the British data). More specifically, any reference to “endometriosis” or “breast cancer” will undoubtedly be about women, whether or not it should be so. In Brazil, the word most often used without “woman” was “pregnant”<sup>141</sup>. All possibilities identified were coded separately in order to include them in the databases, but not in the key word category, in order to evaluate the utility of just searching for “women”.

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<sup>140</sup> The word *sex* was also used as a basic key word and served as root for instances of *sexualised* or *sexual* (as in violence or health). The word *gender* and its variations in all three languages was also used as a basic key word.

<sup>141</sup> Grávida, gestante, lactente.




**Table 23: Use of word *women* by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

		Frequency	% in key word	Total frequency	% in Total by gender
<b>Brazil (Mulher)</b>	Men	649	52.00	1931	<b>33.59</b>
	Women	599	48.00	1135	<b>52.78</b>
		1248	<b>40.69</b>	3066	100.00
<b>Sweden (Kvinn-)</b>	Men	272	18.71	1987	<b>13.68</b>
	Women	1190	81.29	4168	<b>28.58</b>
		1464	<b>23.77</b>	6155	100.00
<b>UK (Women)</b>	Men	1869	52.50	4701	<b>39.76</b>
	Women	1691	47.50	3964	<b>42.66</b>
		3560	<b>41.08</b>	8665	100.00


Source: the author.

**Graph 51: Means plot (ANOVA) - use of “mulher”, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)**



Source: the author.  $F = 25.037$  Sig. = ,000

Graph 52: Means plot (ANOVA) - use of “kvinn-”, by gender and party, Sweden (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 39.313$  Sig. = ,000


The category of “girl”, albeit useful in including all cases, did not make a quantitative impact in any of the datasets. Moreover, although the goal of this study is to investigate women’s substantive representation, the databases were also coded to include “men” and “boys”. In the case of Brazil, the root word for “girls” and “boys” is the same, and in most cases referred to both.<sup>142</sup> In Sweden, there were three topics associated with boys only: the HPV vaccine, actions against non-medical circumcision, and boys’ performance in school. The issue of HPV vaccination for boys appeared in all countries. Again, as with women, there are issues that affect girls and boys distinctly and that will appear without referring to either group. In the case of girls, for the UK and Sweden, the issues of female genital mutilation and child marriage arose, although they were not clearly coded with the word “girl” or “female”.<sup>143</sup> Other than “boys” and “girls”, the word “child” was also categorised, and that had more of a quantitative impact. There were very few references to “men” that did not also referenced women, for instance, “equal pay between women and men” or “violent men”. A few discussed prostate cancer and an ordinary bill, in Brazil, proposed that men would not be allowed to ride motorcycles together, as that is a common form of mugging (PL 5998/2001).

<sup>142</sup> *Menina*, *menino*, and the gender-neutral *criança*, respectively meaning *girl-child*, *boy-child*, and *child*.

<sup>143</sup> They were included within the violence category.

In all countries, singled-out references to men were rare, often referring to some form of illness that is specific to men. Although there are cases of actions speaking against toxic masculinity, that is usually in reference to the harm it does to women.

Graph 53: Means plot (ANOVA) - use of “woman/women”, by gender and party, UK (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 5.258$  Sig. = ,000

### Family and children

One highly controversial aspect of categorising words that are not specific references to women is deciding what are women’s experiences and how they differ from men’s experiences in a relevant way. It is important to realise that even Sweden struggles with gender roles and its status as one of the most “gender equal” countries in the world stands in a relational perspective and often through the action of the state in ensuring that at least certain aspects gendered roles in society are less reinforced, with the particular success of parental leave. Rather than consider what I or anyone else believe women’s lives *should* be, this categorisation needed to be about what women’s lives *are*.

With this in mind, several categories that describe women’s lives were created. A few of them lent themselves to the development of a thematic variable for *family*. These variables were not identical for all three countries, as cultural and linguistic variations made that

impossible. Nevertheless, these were words such as: family, daughter, son, child and childcare, motherhood, fatherhood, maternity, paternity, infant, pregnancy, parent, custody, adoption, etc. All three datasets include specific categories for “child”, but they are only included in the *family* variable when they were connected to other family-related categories, such as “mother”.

The use of *family* is qualitatively different in each country. In Brazil, referring to family usually means discussing children’s rights, divorce, custody issues. The largest cash-transfer programme is called “Bolsa Família” and there are many references to it. It is directly transferred to the woman head of the household, dependent on the children of the house going to school and being vaccinated. Many cases, therefore, use this programme as a basis to propose actions towards women from low-income backgrounds. Although there are several cases that use the *family* in order to defend traditional conceptions of family, including attempts to ban adoption by same-sex couples, from the perspective of Brazilian policy-making, there is no fundamental basis on family and policies are usually being defined as conflict resolution, such as protecting children from their parents.

This difference becomes noticeable when analysing the content from Sweden and the United Kingdom. In the Swedish dataset, there are ten cases of party motions, from six parties, about family policy, which detail that party’s perspective on how policies should impact families. There are 44 cases in total that are specifically called *familjepolitik* (family policy), from all parties, which are motions in which MPs detail their parties’ views on policy-making and their impact of families’ lives. While Brazil would like to think of its policy making as for the familial unit, however defined, their perspective is individualistic and contradictory, and developed within the conflicts of family life, such as divorce; and while Sweden would like to think of its policy making as universal and individually equal, it is actually in consideration of the family unit.

The United Kingdom has, since 2014, the *Family Test*, which are five questions that policy-makers at the government level should take into consideration in order to adequately account for possible consequences on the family (ABREU, BELLIS, HC 07714, 2019). Their legislative actions take the middle-ground, in between a Brazilian and a Swedish perspective, so to speak. Many MPs begin their questions with “as a mother”, “as a father”, “as a parent”,


which both reinforces the family perspective but also their individual outlook, rather than a concern for a *family* issue. The graph and F test demonstrate that there is not statistical significance between gender and party and using the word *family*.

**Table 24: Use of *family* category by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

Brazil		Frequency	% in category	Total frequency	% in Total by gender
Brazil	Men	572	77.33	1931	<b>29.66</b>
	Women	168	22.67	1135	<b>14.80</b>
		741	<b>24.16</b>	3066	100,00
Sweden	Men	687	38.81	1987	<b>34.54</b>
	Women	1083	61.19	4168	<b>25.97</b>
		1770	<b>28.74</b>	6155	100.00
UK	Men	966	53.76	4701	<b>20.55</b>
	Women	831	<b>46.24</b>	3964	<b>20.96</b>
		1797	<b>29.74</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.


**Graph 54: Means plot (ANOVA) - *family* category, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)**



Source: the author. F = 20.998 Sig. = ,000


Another way to look at this would be to evaluate the presence of actions for children and family that make no reference to women at all. The next two tables demonstrate that: the first has the numbers for cases categorised with the *family* set of words, but that did not use the word “women”; the second shows the uses of “child” without referring to women. The percentage of cases drops dramatically for Sweden, and some for the UK. In the Brazilian case, it seems that men discuss family issues without referring to women, but there is a decrease in cases for women deputies. This is likely an effect of references to the Bolsa Família programme and its impact on women’s lives as many actions refer to both.

Graph 55: Means plot (ANOVA) - *family* category, by gender and party, Sweden (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 25.342$  Sig. = ,000

Graph 56: Means plot (ANOVA) - *family* category, by gender and party, UK (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 2.855$  Sig. = ,013

**Table 25: Use of *family* without *women* by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

		Frequency	% in issue	Total frequency	% in Total by gender
<b>Brazil</b>	Men	488	78.33	1931	<b>25.26</b>
	Women	135	21.67	1135	<b>11.89</b>
		623	<b>20.31</b>	3066	100.00
<b>Sweden</b>	Men	92	23.53	1987	<b>4.63</b>
	Women	299	76.47	4168	<b>7.17</b>
		391	<b>6.35</b>	6155	100.00
<b>UK</b>	Men	696	53.33	4701	14.81
	Women	609	<b>46.67</b>	3964	15.36
		1305	<b>15.06</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.

When analysing the table that identifies children without referring to women, we see that numbers decrease strongly for all countries and for both men and women MPs. However, the

Swedish case is interesting, as there are more references for children/care without women than there are of family without women, which did not happen for the other two countries. This would mean that Sweden connects family and women more than it does women and children, while Brazil and the UK do the opposite<sup>144</sup>. Nevertheless, the risk of essentialising women’s experience from a researcher’s perspective does not exist; at least 20% of actions are about family and caring responsibilities and they are connected to women.

**Table 26: Use of *child without women* by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil (filh-, criança)</b>		<b>Frequency</b>	<b>% in issue</b>	<b>Total frequency</b>	<b>% in Total by gender</b>
	Men	184	75.10	1931	<b>9.52</b>
	Women	61	24.90	1135	<b>5.37</b>
		245	<b>7.99</b>	3066	100.00
<b>Sweden (vård-, barn)</b>	Men	243	33.61	1987	<b>12.22</b>
	Women	480	66.39	4168	<b>11.51</b>
		723	<b>11.74</b>	6155	100.00
<b>UK (child)</b>	Men	290	52.73	4701	<b>6.17</b>
	Women	260	<b>47.27</b>	3964	6.56
		550	<b>6.35</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.

### Parental leave

The Swedish system of parental leave has become famous around the world, not only for providing an allotted time for fathers, but for making that time mandatory or, at least, highly rewarded (BERQVIST et al., 2015). The law exists since 1995 and uses the gender-neutral word *parent*, rather than *mother* or *father* in defining who is covered by the law. A biological mother has the added time for leave before the birth. Sharing leave days is incentivised by

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<sup>144</sup> For the UK, an additional variable was created to separate references to *women and children*, as they cluttered up the analysis, particularly for the *child* category. There were 95 cases, 34 of which mentioned *domestic violence*; many were particularly paternalistic and singled out women and children in ways that were unnecessary, and specified situations in which women and children were victims of conflict; others were more blatant such as “That this House recognises the unique health benefits of cranberries and their role in preventing the incidence of urinary tract infections (UTIs) in women and children...” (Gavin Robinson, DUP, EDM 8, 2016).



paying out the full sickness benefit level a parent would receive, for a limited amount of time. That is, if parents “switch” who stays home, they receive their full benefit. There is also a number of days that cannot be transferred and will be lost if the parent does not take them out. Between 2008 and 2017, there was also a specific financial incentive for parents to share leave days, an increase in the daily amount received if the parent who had taken out less days decided to stay home (Lag 1995:584, Lag 2008:313).

It is important to go into this bit of detail in order to explain the country differences that occur here. While the model for Swedish policy-making has been described, its content is slowly revealing itself. Having the “family” as its unit for policy-making, the Swedish goal is to ensure that work life is compatible with that. However, this goes against the breaking of traditional gender roles, as even in Sweden, women are the ones more burdened with care responsibilities and lower wages. Consequently, the legislation put in place has the goal to lessen that effect, and it does so without making gendered references unless absolutely necessary. This is the case even when considering that Sweden allows, in its conceptualisations, for different types of family, such as single-parents, adoptive parents, and same-sex couples.

There were 71 references to *Föräldraledighet* or parental leave, 108 to *Föräldrapenning* which refers to any kind of leave taken by parents to look after their children for any reason, and 18 references to the *Jämställdhetsbonus*, the no-longer existent “bonus days” for shared leave. Almost all cases discuss views on how to make these better, more gender equal, more accessible to fathers.

On the other hand, the discussion is quite different in the UK and in Brazil. In the former, there were 17 cases mentioning paternity-leave; 65 mentioning maternity-leave; and 30 referencing parental leave. In Portuguese, the gender-neutral word “parent”<sup>145</sup> does not exist, however, the Anglicism “parental” has recently appeared in feminist debates for parental leave. There were 19 references to paternity-leave, 34 for maternity-leave, and two for parental leave. In this context, the Swedish case does stand out as prioritising the

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<sup>145</sup> “Parente” is a Portuguese word meaning “relative”.

discussion and enactment of policies that make family life more gender equal, despite having its own specific issues.

For instance, despite the overall support from most parties of the policies for parental leave and the gender equality bonus, a debate on *Vårdnadsbidraget*, or the childcare allowance, shows the differences in perspective between left and right and the persistence of gender roles. The childcare allowance enables a parent to stay home for the first few years of the child's life rather than send them to public pre-school. Arguments range from child socialisation, integration, and language skills, to the closing of pre-schools for lack of pupils, to the fact that mothers are the ones who stay home, and the importance of the parents' being able to choose their child's schooling (Motion 2016/17:245, Jan Ericson, M). The argument for integration is often focused on immigrant children and women, with children not learning the language (Interpellation 2006/07: 348, Jasenko Omanovic, S) and immigrant women being segregated (Interpellation 2012/13:384, Monica Green, S).

There are two conceptions at work here, from all areas of the ideological spectrum. The first is the notion of "choice" and the role the state is allowed to play in people's lives. The second is Swedish values. These are always relevant when analysing Swedish representative-claims because their enforcement shifts dependent on the issue area. While for the gender equality bonus or the furthering individualisation of parental leave, there were several arguments that it did not give the parents a "choice", the childcare allowance had the same argument from both sides, claiming that its existence removed choice from women and its non-existence removed choice from parents. The addition of the immigration aspect further adds to the issue; for instance, with one motion entitled *Svenska värderingar* or "Swedish values" (Motion 2017/18: 2964, Jesper Skalberg Karlsson, M), discussing how to integrate immigrants from religious backgrounds into liberal, secular Sweden. However, this is the same that party defends the childcare allowance, although it might affect immigrant women of religious backgrounds in a way that they deem negative.

There is a political desire that the differences between men and women's withdrawal of parental days should continue to decrease. In this perspective, the gender equality bonus is an important tool, which encourages a more even withdrawal of parental days.

But the political wish of reduced differences in the withdrawal of parental days should not be allowed to take power from the parents about how they want to allocate unemployment between them.

An opinion poll conducted this spring shows that the Swedes, both women and men, themselves want to decide how the parental days should be distributed. Political oversight is rejected.

With the above as a background, the government should review the possibility of removing the 60 parental days reserved for each parent. (Motion 2012/13:Sf286, Eliza Roszkowska Öberg, M. Translation by the author).<sup>146</sup>

Instead of proposing concrete measures to eliminate obstacles and thereby increase the parents' choice, the Social Democratic Government has appointed a single investigator to propose measures that limit the parents' choice in the parental insurance. The investigator will, among other things, 'analyse what effects it may have to reserve additional months' for the mother and the father respectively. (...) Such a system does not take into account that family circumstances differ and that a single solution does not suit everyone. Nor does it take into account that parents themselves want and should decide on the distribution of parental leave. (Interpellation 2004/05:287, Lindström, Torsten, KD. Translation by the author).<sup>147</sup>

And in terms of details of legislation, I think that the parental leave legislation that I have studied a bit more in detail, as I said, it has been easy to, to move ahead, when you just say that everyone should have equal rights, but when it comes to actually forcing people to do something to have more forceful legislation that's based on an analysis of, of inequalities, that has been difficult. So the example is individualizing parental leave for instance, because that, the idea of doing that is not in itself radical, because it just ties the insurance to, to the person, to the parent, instead of to the family. And that's how we do with taxation and everything. But the interesting thing there is that it's built on an analysis of 'it's fathers are not making the right choices'. And others aren't either, because mothers are staying home more, and fathers are not taking care of the children. So if you force people to do that, that also becomes you know, pointing fingers and saying that "you're not doing the right thing". And again, it becomes

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<sup>146</sup> Original text: Det finns en politisk ambition och önskan om att skillnaderna mellan mäns och kvinnors uttag av föräldradagar ska fortsätta att minska. I det perspektivet är jämställdhetsbonus ett viktigt verktyg, som uppmuntrar till ett jämnare uttag av föräldradagarna.

Men den politiska ambitionen om minskade skillnader i uttaget av föräldradagarna ska inte få ta makten från föräldrarna om hur de vill fördela ledigheten dem emellan.

En opinionsundersökning som genomfördes i våras visar att svenskarna, både kvinnor och män, själva vill bestämma hur föräldradagarna ska fördelas. Politisk styrning avvisas.

Med ovanstående som bakgrund bör regeringen se över möjligheten att ta bort de 60 föräldradagar som är reserverade för varje förälder.

<sup>147</sup> Original text: I stället för att föreslå konkreta åtgärder för att undanröja hinder och därmed öka föräldrarnas valmöjligheter har den socialdemokratiska regeringen tillsatt en ensamutredare som ska föreslå åtgärder som inskränker föräldrarnas valmöjligheter i föräldraförsäkringen. Utredaren ska bland annat "analysera vilka effekter det kan få att reservera ytterligare månader" för mamman respektive pappan. (...) Ett sådant system tar inte i beaktande att familjers omständigheter ser olika ut och att en enda lösning inte passar alla. Det tar heller inte i beaktande att föräldrar själva vill och ska bestämma över fördelningen av föräldradagarna.

pushing women's and mothers' behaviours against fathers' and men's behaviour, and that has become a very infected debate that's been ongoing, and over and over again. And then the question keeps popping up and coming back, but it's never really resolved. (SVs1)

Returning to Brazil and the United Kingdom, the development and application of maternity-leave still seems like a priority in those countries.<sup>148</sup> Gender roles in Brazil are still quite rigid and men get five days of parental leave, 30 days if they are civil servants of the federal government. Mothers get four months of paid maternity leave if they have held a job registered with social security for at least 10 months.<sup>149</sup> In the UK, while mothers get 90% of their pay for six weeks, the next 33 weeks are based on a fixed amount of £148.68/week. The mother is allowed to stay on unpaid maternity leave for another 13 weeks. Fathers are able to take two weeks or shared parental leave, receiving £148.68/week.<sup>150</sup>

There is little consideration for how the state can support new parents in childcare; and in Brazil, federalism mandates certain prerogatives, which makes the municipalities in charge of children's education before the age of 14. The construction of Swedish parental leave comes on the heels of its perspective on the inclusion of women in the labour market. Since such a path did not take place in Brazil or the UK, the trajectory has been different. This is not to say that there is a unique path to be taken or that the Swedish model is the best; there is no evolutionary assertion being made here. However, the discussion of gender equality and its consequences in the other two countries is more scattered, lending itself to progress in some areas and the reinforcement of traditional gender roles in others. In Sweden, gender equality has taken firmer root, with the exception of the matter of choice and the so-called Swedish values. While this is beneficial for policies such as parental leave and even the debated childcare allowance, it has negative effects on other aspects of women's lives, as the other subsections demonstrate.

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<sup>148</sup> In Brazil, a study has shown that nearly half of the women who take maternity-leave tend to lose their jobs after the four-months period of job security (MACHADO, PINHO NETO, 2016)

<sup>149</sup> <https://www.inss.gov.br/beneficios/salario-maternidade>

<sup>150</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/maternity-pay-leave/>


## Violence

Gender violence is a catch-all term to refer to violence occurring on the basis of gender. As such, it refers to different types of situations, including based on gender identity. There are two main variations on the violence suffered by women *because* they are women: the first is being victimised by someone they know, and the second by a stranger. That violence is based on the feelings of power and possession over the woman, her actions and her body. Therefore, this violence does occur with men as the victims, but under different circumstances and in much smaller numbers. Within the first type, there are domestic and workplace types of violence and it is the most common type of violence suffered by cisgender women. The Brazilian executive developed, and passed through the National Congress in 2006, the Maria da Penha Law (Lei 11.340/2006)<sup>151</sup>. The purpose of the law is to codify domestic violence and protect women from repeated victimisation. It specifies that domestic violence can take the form of: physical violence, psychological violence, sexual violence, patrimonial violence, and moral violence. In addition, in 2015, the Femicide Law, by the Mixed Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPMI) on violence against women was passed. Originally, the bill included trans women, by defining femicide as “the homicide of women by reason of their gender”, but was altered a few minutes before the vote in the Câmara to state “by reason of being of the feminine sex”.

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<sup>151</sup> Named after pharmacist and now activist Maria da Penha, who survived repeated homicide attempts by her husband, and despite constant pleas to the police, only received assistance when he shot her in the back, while she slept, making her a paraplegic. The actual effects of the law are still under debate as much is still in the hands of the police, mostly male and under-prepared to work with these issues, and the judiciary, leaving the situation of victimised women to the chances of them getting well-prepared and sympathetic officers and judges. The law leaves a lot of room for discretionary decisions and does not tell anyone, police, lawyers, judges, what to do; it is a good sociological tool, but not necessarily an effective legal tool.


Graph 57: Means plot (ANOVA) - *violence* category, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 15.564$  Sig. = ,000

The creation of this institutional structure regarding domestic violence created a shift in the legislative production of the Brazilian deputies. The graph below shows the percentages of references to domestic violence/Maria da Penha Law, forms of sexual violence (such as rape, but also exploitation and abuse), and references to child prostitution, sexual tourism, and human trafficking. Each percentage is calculated by the year's total number of proposals and the categories are not mutually exclusive. With the exception of one action in 2000, *domestic violence* is only mentioned again in 2004, within the context of the national debate on the Maria da Penha Law. Although the at-the-time bill by the executive is not mentioned yet, the expression *domestic violence* becomes much more common in the national vocabulary. Discussing violence against women and children, in Brazil, can be considered a “safe” subject. Women deputies are in consensus in these matters (BRc2; BRc3; BRd1; BRd2) and are perceived as doing work to help women but that is not immediately connected to feminism; men are perceived as protectors and often have actions that suggested increased jail time for offenders.

Graph 58: Percentage of actions related to violence against women, by main expression used and year – Brazil – 2000-2017




Source: the author.

The UK has a similar situation, with *domestic violence* being referred to in 618 cases (7.13% of the total). One aspect of dealing with gendered violence in the United Kingdom is the care of women victimised, whether she is a victim of domestic violence or other types of gendered violence. In Brazil, the focus is in penal law; in the UK, the focus is on prevention and women’s refuges and assistance. One caveat is that *domestic violence*, in the UK, might mean crimes committed within a domestic environment; the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act (2004) refers to people who are co-habitants, and the amendment passed in 2012 specifically refers to children and vulnerable adults. Although the database excludes these instances, it is important to understand the context around which the issue is discussed in the UK. In 2015, a question was tabled to the Home Office: “To ask the Secretary of State for the Home Department, what her policy is on making domestic violence a specific criminal

offence” (Justin Tomlinson, Conservative).<sup>152</sup> Several more similar questions and other actions are proposed in an attempt to codify domestic violence against women, including the additional understanding of “emotional” or psychological violence. MPs are acting on the existence of domestic violence even without the specific legislation for it.<sup>153</sup>

Graph 59: Means plot (ANOVA) - *violence* category, by gender and party, UK (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 18.434$  Sig. = ,000

The Swedish way, however, comes in contrast with this. Being based on the idea of gender equality and universalism, while it is easy to say that parental leave is good for everyone, domestic violence means clearly stating that one gender is the regular offender of another. There is no specific legislation in Sweden regarding domestic violence in the terms laid out above. In addition, the term *våld i hemmet*, or “violence in the home”, is only used seven times in the whole dataset, and only once by a man. As SVs4 also let me know, *gender*


<sup>152</sup> The answer he received was: “The Government is committed to ensuring that the police and other frontline agencies have the tools they need to respond effectively to domestic violence and abuse. We launched an eight week consultation last August to ask whether the law around domestic abuse needs to be strengthened and subsequently announced we would create a specific offence of domestic abuse which captures coercive and controlling behaviour.”The offence will be introduced as a Government amendment to the Serious Crime Bill and will impose a maximum five years imprisonment, a fine, or both. Answered by: Lynne Featherstone, on 13 January 2015.

<sup>153</sup> One interesting aspect of British politics is devolution; the Welsh parliament introduced the Violence against Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Act 2015, specifically focused on “gender-based violence, domestic abuse and sexual violence”.



*violence* is also a term that is not used, with preference for “men’s violence against women” (*mäns våld mot kvinnor*). The distinction is clear: gender issues are not to be associated with this type of violence. Another common expression is “violence in close relationships” (*våld i nära relationer*). Lastly, *kvinnofrid*, or loosely translated, “women’s peace”, but might appear as “women’s rights”, entitled an attempt in 1997, by the government, to legislate cases of “violence against women, prostitution and sexual harassment in working life” (Proposition 1997/98:55).

Graph 60: Means plot (ANOVA) - *violence* category, by gender and party, Sweden (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 1.596$  Sig. = ,158

But I think that in issues when it is obvious that there is some conflict, for example, sexual violence against women we have much fewer tools to how to deal with it and how to handle it and how to even discuss it because we were not very keen to... To destroy our idea of gender equality as something complimentary, because if you start to discuss it in terms of ‘no, wait, men take advantage of women’ then you kind of – I think that many are afraid that if they discuss gender equality in such terms you will not get support from men, it will be they will say ‘okay so, now we don’t want gender equality’. (Interview with SVs3).

And it’s a thing seems that the same, I think, mechanism that makes it difficult to talk about legislation against violence, violence against women.

But that makes it very easy to talk about parental leave, because parental leave, we just say, ‘oh, everyone has the right to choose, everyone has the right to be with the children and to work’ that, you know, that choice should be the same for men, women, regardless of how they choose, but you can’t talk about domestic violence legislation in those terms. [So when you’re talking about blame, it’s harder when you’re talking about rights it makes it easier.] Exactly. Yeah. (Interview with SVs1).

**Table 27: All possible references to violence against women by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>		<b>Frequency in violence</b>	<b>% in concept</b>	<b>Total frequency</b>	<b>% in Total by gender</b>
	Men	433	51.92	1931	<b>22.41</b>
	Women	401	48.08	1135	<b>35.33</b>
		834	<b>27.19</b>	3066	100.00
<b>Sweden</b>	Men	215	31.52	1987	<b>10.81</b>
	Women	467	68.48	4168	<b>11.21</b>
		682	<b>11.08</b>	6155	100.00
<b>UK</b>	Men	972	50.13	4701	<b>20.68</b>
	Women	967	49.87	3964	<b>24.39</b>
		1939	<b>22.38</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.

Sweden is the country with the least references to domestic violence (and references to all possible expressions of violence against women), although other types of violence are mentioned more often and the country recently passed a consent law. When domestic violence is mentioned, often it is cushioned with mentions of other types of violence, whether it is domestic violence in same-sex relationships or honour-related violence, which is associated with the immigrant population (Motion 2008/09: So366, Stefan Tornberg and Anders Åkesson, C). The goal is seemingly to neutralise the gendered aspect of domestic violence, and while violence against women is recognised, these men are exceptions, outliers, outside of Swedish norm. Once case specifically mentions women’s violence against men and the dangers of under-notification (Interpellation 2007/08: 233, Lars-Ivar Ericson, C).

**Table 28: All possible references to *domestic violence* by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>		<b>Frequency in domestic violence</b>	<b>% in concept</b>	<b>Total frequency</b>	<b>% in Total by gender</b>
	Men	104	56.83	1931	<b>5.38</b>
	Women	79	43.17	1135	<b>6.96</b>
		183	<b>5.97</b>	3066	100.00
<b>Sweden</b>	Men	35	23.81	1987	<b>1.76</b>
	Women	112	76.19	4168	<b>2.69</b>
		147	<b>2.39</b>	6155	100.00
<b>UK</b>	Men	326	52.84	4701	<b>6.93</b>
	Women	291	47.16	3964	<b>7.34</b>
		617	<b>7.12</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.

### Intersectionality

It is not the goal of this dissertation to go in to each issue or to describe the history of each country but to find and analyse what is being brought to the fore in relation to women. That being said, all three countries have very different perspectives and issues when it comes to the many facets of women's lives. Broadly speaking, Brazil still faces issues that date back to colonisation and the enslavement of indigenous and African populations; Sweden is the country that proportionally has taken more refugees than any other country and has an indigenous population; the UK, with its colonial and imperialistic past has issues with immigration and integration that come with imposing a second-class citizen on several areas of the world.

The same is true for matters regarding the LGBTQI community, particularly with Brazil being the country with the highest number of victims of homicide within that population, often in quite gruesome situations. Sweden, a country who has allowed trans people to legally change their gender since 1972, until 2009 mandated that people who underwent gender affirming surgery be unwed and until 2013 that they be sterilised in order to go through with the procedure.

### Ethnic, racial, and religious minorities

Beginning with Brazil, the coding included references to indigenous populations, words such as race, skin colour, and racial discrimination,<sup>154</sup> and *quilombo* or *quilombola*. A *quilombo* was a community of enslaved people who had runaway from their captors; many of these communities remain with their descendants and others; a person living in such a community is a *quilombola*. Although most indigenous and quilombola populations are in the North, Northeast, and Midwest of Brazil, most actions come from the states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. However, in proportion to the total of actions from each state, Amapá and Bahia (respectively, North and Northeast) have the highest percentages, with 11.11% and 8.00%.


As it often is with Brazilian legislative actions, most focus on criminalising behaviour and regulating acceptable practices. Often the actions include racial minorities with women and people of the LGBTQI community, in general anti-discriminatory claims. There are 36 cases that mention words such as violence, discrimination, crime, or intolerance. There are one that, claiming to protect indigenous children, looks to “stop harmful traditional practices” (PL 1057/2007, Henrique Afonso, PT-AC). There are three requests associated with that bill, for it to be included in the agenda for the day (*ordem do dia*). One bill proposes that no tourism ads depict women naked or in bikinis, specifically adding the key word *indigenous* (PL 6090-2002, Orlando Fantazzini, PT-SP). There is little qualitative difference between men and women in this variable and the presence of only 93 cases (3.03%) is further indication of the invisibility of non-white women in Brazil. For instance, only one action regarding racism in police action was found, a request for a public hearing, despite it being a

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<sup>154</sup> “Race” is a far more used concept than ethnicity in Brazilian institutional politics. Brazil has dealt with centuries of miscegenation, either through rape or institutional policies for “whitening” the population, and assimilation, which decoupled many of the traditions that came with certain ethnicities from their genetic heritage. There is a long-standing debate on colourism in Brazil and how race and class combine in “whitening” elite members of the Brazilian population. Notably, Brazil’s seventh president, Nilo Peçanha, is now being debated as the first black president and Brazil’s most acclaimed author, Machado de Assis, has been the central figure of several movements regarding the whitening of Brazilian historical figures. There are, on the other hand, key statistics that demonstrate the chasm between the white and black populations and how that also correlates with socioeconomic class, the most important of which, for this dissertation, the decrease in the femicide rates of non-black women by 8.0%, the increase in the femicide rate of black women by 15.4% and that the chance that a young black men is killed in a homicide is 2,7 times higher than a young black men (IPEA, 2018). One aspect that is relevant in considering this is within state and region, as different states have different populations of indigenous and black people.

serious and evident problem (REQ 23/2004, Dr. Hélio, PDT-SP).<sup>155</sup> The focus on criminal practices, although important, also disregards the basic needs of these populations such as healthcare provision, education that respects their traditions, land demarcation and protection against intruders. Rape and gang rape are structural issues and constant threats against indigenous women (MIOTTO, 2017), but it is not mentioned at all in the actions of legislators. In fact, one issue in this area is lack of data.

Graph 61: Means plot (ANOVA) - *ethnicity/race* category, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)




Source: the author.  $F = 5.471$  Sig. = ,000

For Sweden and the UK, words to include immigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, and Muslim individuals were used. In Sweden, an important expression to include is *foreign born* (*utrikes födda* and *utlandsfödda*). Sweden also has an indigenous population, the Sámi, who reside in the northern region of the country (as well as Norway, Finland, and Russia). The policy regarding the Sámi has usually been assimilation, particularly with Sámi who are not involved with reindeer husbandry (JOSEFSON, 2010). The Sámi in Sweden have their own parliament (*Sameting*), with limited prerogatives, although it is an elected body. There are

<sup>155</sup> Searching for the key work “indigenous”, between 2000 and 2017 produces 601 results; for “quilombo”, it is 34.

no studies on the representativeness of this body or the political representation of the Sámi in Sweden. However, they were not mentioned by during any of the interviews and are present in only three cases out of the 143 that focus on ethnic minorities and women. Similarly to Brazil, this is a community that is often invisible, particularly when it comes to its women members and their issues (BURMAN, 2017).


Graph 62: Means plot (ANOVA) - *ethnicity/race/religion* category, by gender and party, Sweden (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 1.642$  Sig. = ,145

In both countries, rather than burqa or hijab, MPs tend to use the word “veil” (*slöja*, in Swedish). In the UK, there are specific expressions that are used in discussing ethnic minorities such as *BME*, *BAME*, *BAMER*, respectively Black and Ethnic Minority, Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic, and Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic and Refugee.

Graph 63: Means plot (ANOVA) - *ethnicity/race/religion* category, by gender and party, UK (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 13.222$  Sig. = ,000

**Table 29: All references to ethnic/racial minority women by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>		<b>Frequency in racial or ethnic minority</b>	<b>% in issue</b>	<b>Total frequency</b>	<b>% in Total by gender</b>
	Men	59	63.44	1931	<b>3.05</b>
	Women	37	39.78	1135	<b>3.26</b>
		93	<b>3.03</b>	3066	100.00
<b>Sweden</b>	Men	56	39.16	1989	<b>2.82</b>
	Women	87	60.84	4165	<b>2.09</b>
		143	<b>2.32</b>	6154	100.00
<b>UK</b>	Men	360	63.16	4701	<b>7.66</b>
	Women	210	36.84	3964	<b>5.30</b>
		570	<b>6.58</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.

Thirty-two cases focus on people searching for asylum due to their sexual orientation or gender identity (22.38%); another 32 discuss immigrant women and girls, their vulnerability,

their rights to school, work, and divorce; a few mention the specific countries or regions from which women asylum-seekers come from, such as Iran or Kurdistan. There is a clear sense of protecting the most vulnerable, but also of a paternalistic view. The concept of Swedish values comes back, as the notion of integration is often dispersed within these documents. In addition, a feminist rhetoric is used by the Swedish Democrats in order to place their prejudiced views within an acceptable frame. For instance, one interpellation that had escaped the initial categorisation given its title of *Världens första feministiska regering* (or “The world’s first feminist government”), berates minister Ann Linde (S) for wearing a “veil” in her visit to Iran (Interpellation 2016/17: 319, Richard Jomshof, SD). However, it is not only the extreme-right that uses this recourse. Patrick Reslow, a member for the Moderate Party, presented a written question and a motion against a dedicated time set aside for women at public pools; he understands this to be a step back in gender equality (Written question 2016/17: 556; Motion 2016/17: 1288). While Reslow never mentions Muslim women specifically, a simple Google search finds that these instances are all connected with making pool facilities available to them.

However, the entry of immigrants and their possible disconnect with Swedish “liberal” values does not only resonate with the parties in the centre and right-wing in Sweden. With the focus of gender equality on working women, the debate on the childcare allowance often brings the issue of immigrant women being the ones who were making use of the benefit and staying at home with the children.

The Norwegian experience shows that, to a large extent, immigrant women and young women with low education and a weak position in the labour market make use of the allowance. The childcare allowance further complicates the establishment in the labour market of already marginalised groups of women, complicates the integration of immigrant women in Sweden, and reinforces the oppressive gender roles that women, not men, are suited to be responsible for children and homes.

In addition, the contribution is too small. It is so small that it can in no way be a real choice for the person who is well established in the labour market today. The result is a contribution to those with the weakest establishment in order to further strengthen the lock-in in exclusion of young, immigrant and low-skilled women - or a housewife to happened to marry a rich man



(Interpellation 2007/08: 334, Veronica Palm, S. Translation by the author).<sup>156</sup>

One issue that is specifically striking is the two-year rule (*tvåårsregeln*), which dictates that women who have been granted visas because of marriage need to be married for at least two years before applying for a divorce. This means several women trapped in possibly violent relationships, but unable to leave. There were three cases in the dataset with this debate, and one more that discusses the right to divorce for immigrant women and how to protect them in their home countries (Written question 2004/05: 61, Birgitta Ohlsson, FP). All of these actions have been notably by women, while the debate on the childcare allowance was almost gender equal (22 actions by women, 16 by men), which is unusual for this database.

During the interviews, one of the MPs mentioned the issue of “beggars” and the association the right-wing made of that with immigration and asylum. The actions in the dataset that have that key word (*tiggeri*) were collected because of their association with the word “prostitution”; however, upon review, the content of actions demanded deportation for people caught begging or engaging in prostitution (Motions 354, 365, 3122, 2547, 3879, respectively in 2011, 2012, 2015, 2016, 2017; the first three by David Lång and the last by Mikael Jansson, both from SD).

In the United Kingdom, one particular expression that was important was “Yarl’s Wood”, which is often referred to without mention that it is where refugee women and girls are held. Some form of violence is discussed in 26.22% of actions, including denouncing the state of affairs in other countries, child marriage, honour-based violence, female genital mutilation, and trafficking. Apart from that, actions range from political inclusion to access to healthcare and job assistance for women of ethnic minorities. The discussion of situation in other countries is 18.18% of the actions regarding ethnic minorities. There are 70 references to Asian women (12.24%), and only three references to South Asian women. Considering that

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<sup>156</sup> Original text: Vårdnadsbidraget i sig försvårar alltså etablering på arbetsmarknaden för redan svaga kvinnogrupper, försvårar integrationen av just kvinnor bland de invandrade svenskarna och förstärker de förtryckande könsroller som säger att kvinnor, inte män, är lämpade att ansvara för barn och hem. Dessutom är bidraget för litet. Det är så litet att det på intet sätt kan vara en reell valmöjlighet för den som i dag finns väl etablerad på arbetsmarknaden. Resultatet blir ett bidrag till dem med svagast etablering för att ytterligare förstärka inlåsningen i utanförskap av unga, invandrade och lågutbildade kvinnor – eller ett hemmafrubidrag till de kvinnor som gift sig rikt.

the largest minority in the UK is made up of Asian ethnic groups, the invisibility of Asian and particularly South Asian women is striking.<sup>157</sup>

On the other hand, the UK is the country with the highest percentage of actions in this area; many of them seem concerned with structural issues affecting ethnic minority women. This is a qualitative difference, but the Brazilian cases are vague and concerned with criminal behaviour (with little specific definition) and the Swedish cases often make it seem as if the existence of ethnic minorities began recently and suddenly. These differences rise from the cultural and institutional background of each country. In Brazil, interviewee BRd5 describes her experience as one of the few (at times, the only) black woman politician as incredibly difficult to get issues on the agenda, not only because who she was and what the issues were but because of the plethora of problems to solve. She describes the racial issue as something that is on the agenda constantly, as black people are the majority of the population, but that these were included in social and redistributive actions.

I feel a difference from when I was the only one, I was the only black woman and this single black woman participated in the Constituent [Assembly] and in the Constituent we could introduce things like that, important things like the rights of domestic workers, that was extremely important, making racial discrimination a crime, I regulated that law, which was by Caó [Law 7.716/1989], I regulated that law... (...)

I, in the beginning, I focused on the black issue, because at that moment it was all or nothing. And I introduced what *they* call macro policies, right? Then it would start and because I'm a woman, and I'm a social worker, we don't talk about, we don't defend just the racial issue, but because the black population is the majority in Brazil, there was no way to not talk about the racial issue. If you talked about unemployment, then you'd see it, if you talked about the penitentiary system, it's there too, if you talked about unequal pay, who has it? It was the woman, and more so if it was the black woman. Then you talked about the housing issue, housing conditions, who is under the worst conditions? See? So the black [person] is present in these policies, present I mean to fight, because people don't even realise, sometimes you're in an auditorium, 99.9% of the people are white and they go "why do you think black people should have a quota?". Then I give them a look and say, 'what do you think, how many black people are in here other than me?'. Then they look and maybe there's one or two more and then I say 'yeah, I'm the exception that confirms the rule'. Then we discuss the economy, we discuss agribusiness. Because we have a vision of the land, right, what was the land to us? So rural workers, we work on that issue

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<sup>157</sup><https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/national-and-regional-populations/population-of-england-and-wales/1.4#by-ethnicity>

because it matters to us, and the quilombos, right? The quilombos and the indigenous, they are the true workers of the land, right, and what inspires us a lot in their economy, solidary economy, a domestic economy, we call it, which is, they plant it and they sell it, right, I mean, entrepreneurs. And I think that, one of the signs of prejudice and of discrimination is when a black person speaks in a debate on general issues and some people go ‘well, look how they speak well!’. I don’t speak well, I just simply speak, right? So there’s also that, you realise people don’t have any idea, they just don’t. (Interview with BRd5).<sup>158</sup>

Sweden, on the other hand, has the cultural and political custom of designing universal policies and using the rhetoric of making policies and services equal to *everyone*. However, as many of the Swedish specialists commented, this becomes an issue when people do not need the same policy or service identically. If the argument cannot be made that a policy should be targeted, particularly a policy that seeks to improve the lives of a particular group without, necessarily, changing their values system, how is Sweden to go about it?

[Do you feel like it’s maybe the slow pace of Swedish politics that still catching up?] Could be, could be, could be. I think these are inherently difficult problems. Maybe it’s, you know, how do you how do you solve them? Yeah, you have to implement lots of different kinds of activities and maybe the sector I think, you know, maybe we need to be better at making tailored activities, activities that are tailored towards certain groups. Maybe in Sweden, there has been a willingness to have activities, activities that are that address all groups you know. (Interview with SVs4).

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<sup>158</sup> Original text: Eu sinto uma diferença quando eu era única, eu era a única mulher negra e essa única mulher negra participou da constituinte e na constituinte pudemos introduzir coisas assim, coisas seculares como foi o direito da trabalhadora doméstica isso foi extremamente importante, tornar crime a discriminação racial, regulamentei essa lei, que era do Caó [Lei 7.716/1989], regulamentei essa lei... (...) (...) Eu, a princípio, eu foquei nesta questão negra, porque ou era aquele momento ou nada. E fui introduzindo o que eles chamam de políticas macro, né? Aí ia começar e por ser mulher, e eu sou assistente social de formação, então não conversamos, não defendemos apenas questão racial mas por conta de ser a população negra majoritária no Brasil, você não tinha como não falar desta questão racial. Se você for falava de desemprego aí você ia ver, se você falava de sistema penitenciário também está lá, se falava de salário diferenciado quem tem? Era mulher e se for mulher negra mais ainda. Então você falava da questão de habitação, das condições habitacionais, quem é que tem as piores condições habitacionais? Entende? Então o negro tá presente nessas políticas, presente que eu digo pra lutar porque as pessoas sequer percebem, você as vezes tá num auditório, 99,9% das pessoas são brancas e elas ficam falando, ‘por que que você acha que tem que ter cota?’ Aí eu olho assim e digo, ‘o que que vocês acham, quantas negras tem aqui além de mim?’ Aí elas olham, às vezes tem uma ou duas pessoas e aí eu digo, pois é ‘eu sou uma exceção que confirma uma regra’. Então a gente discute a economia, a gente discute agronegócio. Porque a gente tem uma visão da terra né, o que foi a terra pra gente? Então trabalhadoras rurais, trabalhadores rurais, nós trabalhamos esta questão porque nos interessa e os quilombos, né? Os quilombos e indígenas eles são os verdadeiros agricultores né, e que nos inspira bastante na sua economia, economia solidária e uma economia doméstica que a gente chama, que é ele planta lá e vende né, quer dizer, empreendedores. E eu penso que uma das, dos sinais do preconceito e da discriminação é quando o negro ou a negra se manifesta para debater assuntos gerais e aí chegam algumas pessoas ‘fala bem, olha como fala bem!’. Eu não falo bem, eu falo pura e simplesmente isso, eu falo, né? Então tem essas coisa também, você percebe que as pessoas não têm noção, não têm.

And again, recognition becomes difficult in a context where it's, it's seen us... It's not appreciated, to talk about different groups and point to different groups, it's, it's much, it's much easier to say that this is something that's beneficial for everyone then to say, well, we need to give special attention to this particularly. And that's, that's something that I mean, it can see it and all kinds of like, child allowances; everyone gets child allowances, even for high income earners. It's kind of, in a sense, ridiculous because it's such a gift to compare it to your salary. But it's that's kind of worth of the system. This is this is a benefit that should be good for, for everyone. Everyone should have it that's not single out of this, you know, only for those who actually need it. It's it's something that we, it's universalistic, we give it to, to everyone. And recognizing, for instance, single mothers as a particularly vulnerable group. This is not something that of course they are and they're talked about, but they're not talked about in political terms like that they're not to create specific policies for groups like that. (Interview with SVs1).

This is not to say that the British do not hold similar views or that there all actions in that dataset are specific, targeted, structured, well-researched, and considering measures that will include non-white populations rather than only focus on criminalising racist behaviour. There are vague actions and absurd PMQs, but there are also PMBs and written questions that indicate a different focus, and that opens the possibility for well-structured policies. For instance:

If she will take steps to (a) ensure that survivors of sexual and other gender-based violence are only held in immigration detention as a last resort and (b) monitor the effective implementation of the adults at risk policy (PMQ, 29/11/2016, Jess Phillips, Labour).

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to require the Secretary of State to take steps to eradicate slavery; and for connected purposes (10-minute-rule PMB, 10/07/2013, Peter Bone, Conservative).

That this House notes that the new family immigration rules impose a minimum earnings requirement of £18,600, with an additional £3,800 for the first child and £2,400 for each additional child, in respect of partners and children from outside the EU seeking to join their partners and parents resident in the UK; further notes that the sponsoring partner is subject to enforced separation in that she or he is required to work in the UK for at least six months before the application can be made; further notes that the new immigration rules are to be challenged in the Administrative Court in Birmingham from 5 to 8 February 2013; believes that the new immigration rules are irrational and discriminate against British citizens, those settled in the UK and those with refugee or humanitarian protection leave on grounds including gender and race-ethnicity; further believes that the new rules are preventing British and settled families on lower incomes from being reunited and enjoying family life with their non-EEA family members contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and other international instruments; and calls on the Government immediately to withdraw that aspect of the new family immigration rules which impose the

minimum earnings requirement reverting back to the predecessor rule which adequately ensured that there was no recourse to public funds (EDM 13/2013, “New family immigration rules”, George Galloway, Independent Party).

That this House celebrates the 20th anniversary of the current hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington becoming the first ethnic minority woman to be elected to Parliament; notes that the Fawcett Society’s research shows that two decades later, ethnic minority women are still severely under-represented in Parliament, Government and public life; regrets that only three black women have ever been elected and there has never been an Asian woman MP; expresses concern that at the current pace of change it will take more than three centuries for Parliament to reflect the UK’s population of ethnic minority women; and calls on the Government to renew its commitment to positive measures by extending the time limit on all-women shortlists and prioritising the needs of ethnic minority women (EDM 42, 23/05/2007, “Black and minority women in public life”, Dawn Butler, Labour).

Another interesting aspect is the fact that the majority of Swedish actions in this area was taken by men, particularly from centre-left and left-wing parties. Although a majority of actions from men is not surprising for Brazil or the UK, it is for Sweden, and what is most striking is the number of actions dedicated to the issue considering the overall total of contributions for each gender and party ideology. There are several possibilities for this, but I would suggest that a risk-free protectionist view of vulnerable women and children facilitate these results. Putting it crudely: it is white men saving brown women from brown men (SPIVAK, 1999). I would point out that many of these actions are extremely relevant, whether their rhetoric is paternalistic or not. However, given that the majority of them focus on vague depictions of discrimination; descriptions of situations in other countries; gender equality through cultural assimilation, it is important to contextualise and give shape to them. It is worth noting that only one was found to specifically reference men only, Written question 2003/04: 1249 by Mariam Osman Sherifay (S), which reports on the situation of prejudice faced by Muslim men post 9/11.

**Table 30: Actions about ethnic minority women, by gender and party ideology of MPs, Brazil – 2000-2107**

Brazil			Frequency in ethnic minority women	% ethnic minority women	Total actions	% by ideology in total actions	party and total
	Men	Party ideology	Left	6	<b>8.82</b>	68	3.52
	Men		Centre-left	24	<b>5.21</b>	461	23.87
	Men		Centre	4	<b>7.27</b>	55	2.85
	Men		Centre-right	7	1.18	591	30.61
	Men		Right	16	2.12	753	39.00
	Men		NA	1	33.33	3	0.16
	Men		<b>Total</b>	58	3.00	1931	100.00
	Women		Left	0	<b>0.00</b>	147	12.95
	Women		Centre-left	25	<b>5.46</b>	458	40.35
	Women		Centre	0	0.00	7	0.62
	Women		Centre-right	6	1.94	309	27.22
	Women		Right	6	2.83	212	18.68
	Women		NA	0	0.00	2	0.18
	Women		<b>Total</b>	37	3.26	1135	100.00

Source: the author.

**Table 31: Actions about ethnic minority women, by gender and party ideology of MPs, Sweden – 2000-2107**

Sweden			Frequency in ethnic minority women	% ethnic minority women	Total actions	% by ideology and gender in total actions		
Men	Party ideology	Left	13	<b>5.42</b>	240	12.09		
		Centre-left	8	<b>1.36</b>	590	29.67		
		Centre	27	<b>3.71</b>	729	36.62		
		Centre-right	4	1.41	283	14.26		
		Right	4	2.78	143	7.25		
		NA	0	0.00	2	0.10		
		<b>Total</b>	56	2.82	1987	100.00		
		Women	Party ideology	Left	18	<b>3.62</b>	497	11.94
				Centre-left	26	<b>1.54</b>	1695	40.62
				Centre	31	2.18	1424	34.18
				Centre-right	12	2.69	446	10.71
				Right	0	0.00	59	1.42
				NA	0	0.00	47	1.13
				<b>Total</b>	87	2.09	4168	100.00

Source: the author.

**Table 32: Actions about ethnic minority women, by gender and party ideology of MPs, UK – 2000-2107**

UK			Frequency in ethnic minority women	% ethnic minority women	Total actions	% by party ideology and gender in total actions
	<b>Men</b>	<b>Party ideology</b>	Left	20	<b>8.13</b>	246
	Centre-left		229	<b>9.62</b>	2380	50.63
	Centre		31	<b>8.09</b>	383	8.15
	Centre-right		72	5.18	1389	29.55
	Right		8	2.67	300	6.38
	NA		0	0.00	3	0.06
	<b>Total</b>		360	7.66	4701	100.00
<b>Women</b>	Left		30	<b>8.57</b>	350	8.83
	Centre-left		156	<b>5.33</b>	2929	73.89
	Centre		11	7.33	150	3.78
	Centre-right		13	2.51	517	13.04
	Right		0	0.00	9	0.23
	NA		0	0.00	9	0.23
	<b>Total</b>		210	5.30	3964	100.00

Source: the author.

## LGBTQI

The table below shows that actions about the LGBTQI community are also more authored by Swedish men. The actions in this variable do not exclude gay men, but very few single them out. There is a palpable difference between the rhetoric and structure of actions when it comes to ethnic minorities and the LGBTQI community in Brazil. The actions are slightly more focused and directed, with some concerning the organisation of the national LGBTQI seminar, others making sure that homophobic and transphobic crimes are adequately reported by police, and a few on the use of chosen name for trans people. On the other hand, the actions within this group are also very polarising, with some demanding referendums regarding equal marriage and adoption by same-sex couples and others outright defending that same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry and/or adopt. The use of referendums in Brazil or, at least, the suggestion of referendums for “social” issues, is extremely common as it gives politicians ways of washing their hands of the matter and leaving it up to churches, NGOs, parties, and lobbyists to do the campaigning. This strategy was particularly used




during Marina Silva's (PV, then REDE) presidential runs. It is also significant to see the presence of 22 Legislative Decree Proposals (PDCs) which attempt to subvert the following norms and resolutions taken by other branches of government:

- In 1999, the Federal Psychology Council determined that psychologists were not allowed to perform “conversion therapy”.
- Since 2008, the Trans Procedure (*Processo Transsexualizador*), has been in place within the Unified Healthcare System (SUS) (*Portaria 1707, 2008; Portaria 2803, 2013*).
- Equal marriage in Brazil came about a ruling from the Supreme Court in 2011 (*Ação Direta de Inconstitucionalidade 4277; Arguição de Descumprimento de Preceito Fundamental 132*), which established civil unions (stable partnerships) as comparable to marriage and by a norm set out by the National Justice Council in 2013 (*Resolução 175/2013*) which mandated that registrars' offices could not deny marriage licences to same-sex couples.
- Consequently, since 2011, denying adoption rights to same-sex couples has become harder, but there has never been legislation that directly denied (or allowed) them such a right. Since 2009, birth certificates no longer have gendered headings such as “father” or “mother”, but the gender-neutral heading of *filiação*, which loosely translates to “child of”.
- In 2014, under President Rousseff, the Special Secretariat for Human Rights published a resolution (11, 2014) that established parameters for the use of expressions such as “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in police reports.
- In 2015, President Rousseff, through the Special Secretariat for Human Rights set out norms enforcing the use of the chosen name (*nome social*) and access to services and facilities with respect for a person's gender identity (*Resolução 12, 2015*). President Rousseff also made an executive decree that mandated the use of the chosen name and respect of gender identity in all executive branch offices and state-owned companies (*Decreto 8727, 2016*).

Two of these PDCs have a record number of co-authorships, with over 20 signatures. There are only 210 cases of co-authorship and only 43 PDCs in total. A total of ten PDCs propose referendums.

Graph 64: Means plot (ANOVA) - *LGBTQI* category, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 3.141$  Sig. = ,008

**Table 33: Actions about LGBTQI, by gender and party ideology of MPs, Brazil, Sweden, and the UK – 2000-2107**


<b>Brazil</b>		<b>Frequency in LGBTQI issues</b>	<b>% in issue</b>	<b>Total frequency</b>	<b>% in Total by gender</b>
	Men	82	69.49	1931	<b>4.24</b>
	Women	36	30.51	1135	<b>3.17</b>
		118	<b>3.85</b>	3066	100.00
<b>Sweden</b>	Men	143	51.62	1987	<b>7.19</b>
	Women	134	48.38	4168	<b>3.22</b>
		277	<b>4.50</b>	6155	100.00
<b>UK</b>	Men	307	56.23	4701	<b>6.53</b>
	Women	239	43.77	3964	<b>6.03</b>
		546	<b>6.30</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.

The Swedish and British datasets have several instances of denouncing the persecution of LGBTQI persons in other countries. In Sweden, same-sex couples have been able to marry on the same basis as heterosexual couples since 2009, after the *Könsneutrala äktenskap lagen* (Gender neutral marriage Act), and to seek medically assisted insemination since 2005. Actions after these dates tend to be about discriminatory practices despite the law and how to improve access to single women to assisted insemination. Before 2005 and 2009, there are many actions by the Christian Democrats (KD) defending traditional notions of marriage and gender roles, but afterwards, they stop. Same-sex marriage in the UK has been legal since 2013, by a government bill initiated by Conservative MP Maria Miller when she was a member of cabinet. Prior to that, same-sex couples were able to register as civil partnerships and were allowed to adopt since 2002. Mrs. Maria Miller, as an MP, is also responsible for the Gender Identity (Protected Characteristic) Bill (2016).

The difference among countries is how rooted these rights are and how safe do LGBTQI people feel for instance, that a change in government will not mean a change in rights and access to services for them. With Brazil being one of the most homophobic and transphobic countries in the world, the coup of 2016 has definitely increased hate-speech and created an overall fear that the rights guaranteed by executive decrees and judicial resolutions would be overturned by legislative action. Although it has been the case of an increase in action, these have not been approved. In the case of the UK, SVs did point out during the interview how the Conservative party was ahead of left-wing parties on several key issues, but it is important to point out the critical actor in the figure of Maria Miller, who was Minister for Women and Equalities and is now chair of the Women and Equalities Select Committee and has been the one to move forward key pieces of legislation.


Graph 65: Means plot (ANOVA) - *LGBTQI* category, by gender and party, UK (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 8.964$  Sig. = ,000


Graph 56 shows that there is a time trend to consider, with a steady decrease in actions in Sweden as rights are ensured; a small increase starting from 2015 shows no apparent connection to a backlash on those rights. In the case of the United Kingdom, the sharp increase in 2014 is connected with the 49 written questions tabled by MP Simon Kirby (Conservative) to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on how the British government was promoting LGBT [sic] rights in other countries. Although a similar increase is present in 2017, there is no connection to a single individual. In Brazil, there are very few cases, increases are volatile, and only in 2015 can be connected to a specific situation – the executive actions taken by President Rousseff. Although there are critical actors in the sense that the same people are main authors of actions, there is no overwhelming number of actions by a single deputy. Lastly, only in Sweden were actions specifically targeted at lesbians found; overall, actions targeting LGBTQI groups see them as single whole, rather than a community of people with similar, but at the end of it, differing needs.

Graph 66: Means plot (ANOVA) - *LGBTQI* category, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 22.717$  Sig. = ,000

Graph 67: Actions on LGBTQI issues, over time, by country – Brazil, Sweden, UK – 2000-2017



Source: the author.

## Labour and work

Another particularly salient issue was labour and related matters. In Brazil, an issue that was interconnected often was maternity/paternity/parental leave; in Sweden, integration, equal pay, and corporate quotas; and in the UK, equal pay and the pension system's new rules affecting women. However, before focusing on the overall picture of this issue, there is a qualitatively significant aspect to it that must be addressed. In all countries, the issue cleaning and domestic work surfaced, an issue that disproportionately affects women.

In Brazil, still a remainder from the time when slavery created a divide between women, that created stereotypes of the white, elite woman, the black woman who was her servant, and the over-sexualised brown woman, all property of men in their own way, the service of housekeepers is still prevalent. As being black and of low-income are correlated,<sup>159</sup> most women attached to that service are black and until 2013, domestic workers did not share in workers' rights by constitutional design. With a connection between the house and care work, one in six women are domestic workers, 93% of domestic workers are women, with 60% being black (GUERRA, 2017). Constitutional amendment proposal 478/2010 by Carlos Bezerra (PMDB-MT) revoked Article 7 and established domestic workers' rights. There are 83 cases within the dataset, including the PEC by Bezerra, 62 by men, 21 by women; only one mentions racial issues, in connection with inviting the president of the National Association for Domestic Workers for a public hearing on racial university quotas. Despite the Constitutional Amendment, the nature of domestic work is still informal, undervalued, underpaid, and often connected with sexual assault, moral abuse, incarceration, and slavery.

In Sweden, a connection that often appeared was of RUT (*Rengöring, underhåll och tvätt* or Cleaning, Maintenance and Laundry) tax cuts. There were 39 cases, 20 of which between 2014 and 2016. Although the RUT-coded cases do not intersect with the ethnic minority category, a connection does appear in the full text of some actions; moreover, as the Brazilian and many other examples demonstrate, work that is less-valued and care work tend to go to non-white women. Although the number of immigrant women in cleaning services has

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<sup>159</sup> *Síntese de Indicadores Sociais – SIS* (Synthesis of Social Indicators), Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics), 2018 data. (<https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais.html>)

increased, although the majority are still Swedish (NYBERG, 2015). Motion 2015/16:1678 by Margareta B Kjellin (M), praises the RUT tax deduction for making lives easier for people and legalising previously illegal posts;<sup>160</sup> Motion 2015/16: 1452 by Johan Nissinen (SD) proposes extending the RUT-deduction as it gives immigrant women job opportunities; on the other side of it, Raimo Pärssinen (S) proposed Motion 2013/14: Sk349 requesting the abolishment of the RUT-deduction, as it is being used inappropriately to hire private tutors.

In the UK, there were 50 cases that intersected between ethnic minority women and labour. Often, these are questions posed in the manner of “how many are a) women, b) ethnic minorities”, such as “To ask the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, how many people for whom Youth Contract wage incentives have been paid since April 2012 have been (a) male, (b) female, (c) disabled and (d) Black and minority ethnic” (Written question, 16/07/2014, Stephen Timms, Labour). This means that they are not always considering the issue of ethnic minority women, as Creshaw (1989) sets out. The EDM “Black and minority women at work” was the only that stood out as making a representative claim on behalf on ethnic minority women in the workplace.

That this House welcomes the Equal Opportunities Commission’s investigation into the pay and progression of black and ethnic minority women in employment; notes with alarm the findings that Pakistani women face a pay gap of at least 10 per cent. higher than that of white British women, further notes the waste of talent represented by the fact that young Pakistani women with a degree are at least four times more likely to be unemployed than white British women with a degree, while Bangladeshi and black Caribbean women with degrees are two to three times more likely to be unemployed than white British women despite having similar ambitions and aspirations to white women; is very concerned by this huge loss of potential; notes the Department for Work and Pensions’ Public Service Agreement target to narrow the gap between the ethnic minority employment rate and the overall employment rate; also notes the overall Government target that by 2013 no one should be disadvantaged in their employment prospects because of their ethnicity; recognises that addressing the specific needs of black and ethnic minority women would help to close the employment gap and achieve this aim; and urges the

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<sup>160</sup> One argument found in a Swedish news website was made by a Swedish woman who owns a company that employs cleaners and sends them on contracts (in Portuguese, companies of *terceirização*). According to her, arguments against the tax-reduction hurt women-owned businesses, which is an aspect to consider given that what we are discussing here is how things *are*, not how they should be. Women being the majority of cleaners, they are also the majority of their employers, in a clear class, and often ethnic, divide (<https://www.thelocal.se/20100916/29046>).

Government to seize the opportunity in the Comprehensive Spending Review 2007 to tackle the specific barriers different ethnic minority women face (EDM 59, 2006, Julie Morgan, Labour).

One interesting aspect is the difference in words used, as *labour* is more prevalent in Sweden and *work* more common in the UK. In Portuguese, there is a difference in the economic issues vocabulary and issues used by the left and the right (GOMES, et al., forthcoming), but labour and work can be used as synonyms, translated as *trabalho*.<sup>161</sup> The table below shows the results for the variable that groups all work/labour related key words. The gaps in how many actions were made by women and men are quite different in this issue: in Brazil, the difference is much larger than usual, with men contributing with over 70% of actions; in Sweden, the same occurs, however, with women contributing much more; in the UK, the change is more substantial as it is the only case thus far where women contribute more than men. In addition, women MPs in the House of Commons used many more of their actions than the women in Brazil and Sweden, with almost 20% of their actions pertaining to work-related issues.

**Table 34: Labour-related actions by country and gender of MP - Brazil, Sweden, UK, 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>		<b>Frequency in labour/work issues</b>	<b>% in issue</b>	<b>Total frequency</b>	<b>% in Total by gender</b>
	Men	356	70.08	1931	<b>18.43</b>
	Women	152	29.92	1135	<b>13.39</b>
		508	<b>16.56</b>	3066	100.00
<hr/>					
<b>Sweden</b>	Men	169	26.61	1987	<b>8.50</b>
	Women	466	73.39	4168	<b>11.19</b>
		635	<b>10.32</b>	6155	100.00
<hr/>					
<b>UK</b>	Men	700	46.98	4701	<b>14.89</b>
	Women	790	53.02	3964	<b>19.93</b>
		1490	<b>17.20</b>	8665	100.00

Source: the author.

<sup>161</sup> *Work* and *job* are also synonyms, translated as *emprego*. However, in expressions such as “employment rates”, the translation for *employment* is also *emprego*. These differences matter both in understanding cultural and linguistic contexts, but also for replication, since one needs to be able to know which words to look for.



Out of the 55 cases that mention some sort of parental leave in Brazil, 36 are explicitly connected with the labour category. Within the labour category, 57 cases intersect with the variable for pregnancy-related words and 22 cases mention discrimination, including prohibiting employers to ask for pregnancy or sterilisation records; 16.34% of cases concern domestic labour; seven mention equal pay; and two mention gender quotas. There are 145 cases, or 28.54%, that specifically reference the *Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho* (Consolidation of Labour Laws – CLT), first established in 1943, and the basis for most changes in labour laws in Brazil and 282 in total mention other laws (55.51%). These numbers demonstrate further demonstrate the use of other laws in structuring the Brazilian legislative process. As with the law on domestic violence, once a subject is entered into formal existence by virtue of some previous codification into law, it becomes easier to discuss it by amending the original. For instance:

Alters the Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), approved by the Decree-Law 5.452 from 1 May 1943, Law 8.036, from 11 May 1990, and Law 7.998, from 11 January 1990, in order to apply its norms to domestic workers, and revokes Law 5.859, from 11 December 1972. (PL 5238/2013, Benedita da Silva, PT-RJ).<sup>162</sup>

Alters the writing of art. 392-A from the Consolidation of Labour Laws – CLT, and art. 71-A from Law 8.213, from 24 July 1991, in order to ensure maternity leave and pay to the worker who adopts a teenager. (PL 7826/2017, Laura Carneiro, PMDB-RJ).<sup>163</sup>

On the other hand, they also show how previous laws are lacking in their inclusivity of women in the workplace and do little to consider how women must balance work and private lives given the expectations put on them by traditional roles, but also the basic fact that women are the ones who get pregnant and breastfeed.<sup>164</sup> The difference is clear in the Swedish case where, as mentioned, the focus on gender equality came about a law concerning women in the labour market, passed in 1979. The use of the expressions *arbetsmarknad* and *arbetslivet* (labour market and working life) demonstrate the importance of seeing work and

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<sup>162</sup> Original text: Altera a Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho (CLT), aprovada pelo Decreto-lei nº 5.452, de 1º de maio de 1943, a Lei nº 8.036, de 11 de maio de 1990, e a Lei nº 7.998, de 11 de janeiro de 1990, para aplicar seus preceitos aos empregados domésticos, e revoga a Lei nº 5.859, de 11 de dezembro de 1972 (PL 5238/2013, Benedita da Silva, PT-RJ).

<sup>163</sup> Original text: Altera a redação do art. 392-A da Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho - CLT, e do art. 71-A da Lei nº 8.213, de 24 de julho de 1991, a fim de assegurar a licença-maternidade e o salário-maternidade à empregada que adote adolescente. (PL 7826/2017, Laura Carneiro, PMDB-RJ).

<sup>164</sup> And, in a few cases, trans men.

private lives as complementary for Swedish policy-making as well as a perception that if men and women are equal in the workplace they will be equal in other areas of life. For instance, setting aside paternity-leave that could not be transferred to mothers was a way to ensure that fathers shared in the care burden and that businesses would value men and women equally as they it would be likely that they would take as much time off due to responsibilities with children. The policy is devised in consideration of the outcome desired, not based on the current circumstances.

Although the political motivation exists, Interpellation 2006/07:513 by Luciano Astudillo (S) claims that women have less freedom to define their own work-hours and tasks, which is also connected to class and rank within the company; there are 43 cases discussing equal pay or unequal pension distribution and even MPs from centre-right parties support legislation to rectify problems in that area. Motion 2005/06: A335 by Karin Pilsäter (FP) discusses issues with implementation of the Gender Equality Act when it comes to equal pay, particularly given that the underlying causes of women's under-employment are not addressed.

In order to change the fact that typical women's jobs, especially in the public sector, are low-paid and that women work part-time to a greater extent, the provision in the action plan is useless. The action plan does not address the greatest problem of gender equality, namely that women earn less, i.e. have lower incomes than men (Motion 2005/06: A335, Karin Pilsäter, FP).<sup>165</sup>

The same MP, on the other hand, strongly opposes the use of gender quotas for corporations, stating her claim as a liberal feminist (Interpellation 2005/06: 444, Karin Pilsäter, FP), although quotas would be one way to fix the issues mentioned by her in the motion above. The issue of quotas is discussed in 75 cases, with 50 actions by the Left, Green, and Social Democratic parties and 25 by the Liberal, Moderate, and Swedish Democracy parties. The latter are particularly concerned with quotas for women in fire and police departments and their physical inability to do the job. Once again, the issue of choice and state imposition

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<sup>165</sup> Original text: För att förändra det faktum att ty-piska kvinnojobb, särskilt inom offentliga sektorn, är lågbetalda och att kvinnor i högre grad jobbar deltid är bestämmelsen om handlingsplan värdelös. Med en handlingsplan kommer man inte åt det allra största jämställdhetsproblemet, nämligen att kvinnor tjänar mindre, d.v.s. har lägre inkomster än män.

comes up in Sweden, whereupon the suggestion of what is “right” should be sufficient and people should make that choice for themselves, reinforcing ideological party divisions.

There were 458 (30.74%) cases in the UK mentioning the word “pension”, many of which following a change in the pension system that would affect the retirement age of women born in the 1950s. The general group labelled *work* was subdivided into two categories: one that used the key words for pension and employment (658 exclusive cases, 44.16%) and another for affirmative action, equal pay, and discrimination against mothers/pregnant women and women in general (698 exclusive cases, 46.85%). Another 134 cases (8.99%) intersected both subdivisions, such as

That this House recalls that two thirds of pensioners are women yet their income in retirement is just 57 per cent of men’s; further notes with alarm that just 16 per cent. of women receive the full state pension in their own right; believes that the first step to a sustainable long-term solution is to improve women’s entitlement to a state pension; welcomes the findings of a recent EOC/ICM poll, showing that nearly four out of five people agree that those who have not been in paid work for caring reasons should have the same state pension rights as those who have been in paid work; welcomes the Secretary of State’s plan to give an early indication of the Government’s thinking on pensions reform; and urges the Government to address women’s pension provision as a matter of priority to ensure that women and those taking caring breaks from the workforce are not penalised in retirement (EDM 129/2005, “Women’s pensions” Vera Baird, Labour and Sandra Gidley, Liberal Democrat).

The funding for the United Kingdom Resource Centre for women in science, engineering and technology has been cut. Given that 1 million women are unemployed and that women make up only 12.3% of people in science, engineering and technology, will the Prime Minister look again at funding for the UKRC, and at thereby restoring Britain’s leading role in science, which nurtured the talents of Dorothy Hodgkin and Rosalind Franklin? (PMQ, 11/01/2012, Valerie Vaz, Labour).

The connection between *work* and *labour*, that is, a perspective that is mostly following from workers’ rights and unemployment rather than a discussion on business regulation or incentivising women in business (an aspect that is very common in the Swedish case) is noticeable. The *equality at work* category has 94 cases that specifically discuss discrimination (11.30%) and even then the *equality of opportunity* aspect seems to be emphasised, with only three cases mentioning affirmative action or quotas. In addition, only ten cases come from right-leaning parties, with mentions of equal pay much more prevalent among them. With this in mind, the table below shows the distribution along party ideology, excluding cases of

unknown or independent, demonstrating that, overall, work issues are mostly discussed by the left-leaning parties.

**Table 35: Labour/work issues by type and party ideology – UK – 2000-2017**

UK	Frequency in equal pay and discrimination	% in issue	Total frequency	% in Total by ideology
Left	627	<b>75.36</b>	5905	<b>10.62</b>
Centre	19	2.28	533	3.56
Right	186	22.36	2215	8.40
Total	832	100.00	8653	9.62
UK	Frequency in employment, pension, poverty	% in issue	Total frequency	% in Total by ideology
Left	633	<b>80.43</b>	5905	<b>10.72</b>
Centre	29	3.68	533	5.44
Right	125	15.88	2215	5.64
Total	787	100.00	8653	9.10

Source: the author.

## Gender

The use of *gender* throughout this dissertation is complex as it represents a theoretical concept, a political issue, and a methodological key word. Using *gender* represents a specific perspective on the part of MPs, a sociological understanding of the underpinnings of sex and social relations. “Gender” has become a polarising topic, as the rise in a new division between left and right, in part, means the acceptance or not of the idea of gender as a social construct and the possibility of a person’s gender identity not being in line with the gender they were assigned at birth. In addition, it challenges the idea of binary genders as natural, with the traditional gender roles of men and women being considered just as constructed as anything else. The notion that a so-called “gender ideology” has been devised by feminists whose ultimate goal is to destroy the natural way of the heterosexual family has grown since the mid-90’s, out of the Catholic Church, as a movement against positions taken at the Cairo and

Beijing Conferences, and made its way into other Christian religions (VATICAN, 2000<sup>166</sup>; LACERDA, 2016; MISKOLCI, CAMPANHA, 2017; CORREDOR, 2019).<sup>167</sup>

The 2010 Brazilian Census shows 89.32% of the population declaring themselves to be religious, with 64.63% Catholics and 22.16% evangelicals.<sup>168</sup> Some political parties in Brazil associate with religion quite strongly, even adding it to their names. Presently, 195 deputies are members of the National Congress's Evangelical Parliamentary Front, also known as the Bible Caucus.

While the association with religion is important in Brazil, the rise in *gender ideology* rhetoric is not necessarily religious. There is a connection made by “old-right” parties, as they unite with the new right and combine their agendas (NORRIS, 2018; GOMES et al., forthcoming). Another indication is the increase in this rhetoric in less religious countries, such as Sweden and the UK. Sweden does not have official statistics on religion, as the census does not ask the question, but the country's official website states that only 19% of the population claims to be religious at all.<sup>169</sup> In the United Kingdom, the census focuses on England and Wales and reports 59.30% of the population as Christians and 4.8% as Muslim (2011).<sup>170</sup>

The charts below show the use of *gender*, *sex*, and the *concept of gender* over time, in each country. The percentages denote the increase within each variable, that is, it calculated over the overall number of the variable, per year. In Brazil, *gênero* was the single word searched for<sup>171</sup>; *sex-* was a root word which can include *sexo* or *sexualização*, for instance, and *gender as a concept* included uses such as “men and women”, and *feminin-* and *masculin-*, as previously explained, as well as the word itself. The graph shows that while there are peaks in previous years, the three categories tend to follow the same trend, until 2015, when the

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<sup>166</sup>[http://www.vatican.va/roman\\_curia/pontifical\\_councils/family/documents/rc\\_pc\\_family\\_doc\\_20001115\\_familly-human-rights\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family_doc_20001115_familly-human-rights_en.html)

<sup>167</sup> The Google NGram tool shows a distinct peak in the late 90s in the use of the expression “gender ideology”. <https://tinyurl.com/ngram-genderideology>

<sup>168</sup> <https://www.ibge.gov.br/estatisticas/sociais/populacao/9662-censo-demografico-2010.html?edicao=9749&t=destaques>


<sup>169</sup> <https://sweden.se/society/10-fundamentals-of-religion-in-sweden/>

<sup>170</sup> <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religioninenglandandwales2011/2012-12-11>

<sup>171</sup> An important warning is that *gênero* can also mean *type/kind*, often referencing food products (*gênero alimentício*).

single use of the word *gênero* supersedes the other two by a large margin. This is at least partially due to the PDCs against the LGBTQI measures taken by the executive branch during that time.

Graph 68: Uses of *gender*, *sex*, and gender as a concept – Brazil – 2000-2017



Source: the author.


For Sweden, the words change as *kön* and *sex*<sup>172</sup> can be found and translated as “sex” and *kön* and *genus* can be translated as “gender”. Words such as *könsperspektiv* and *genusperspektiv*<sup>173</sup> can be found and both translated to “gender perspective”. In addition, there is also the matter of *jämställdhet*, which has been explained throughout this dissertation. The categories were thus defined as: *kön*, *sex*- (root), *jämställ*- (root), *genus*, and a category that combined *jämställ*- (root word), *genus*, *feminis*- (root), and expressions to include uses such as “men and women”. However, there was very little statistical relevance found in separating this latter category from *jämställ*- (root) and *genus*.

<sup>172</sup> An important warning is that the number six is translated into Swedish as “sex”, which can generate some mistakes.

<sup>173</sup> As words are often combined to make other words in Swedish, single words are often root words for others.

No specific reason was found for the 2008 peak in use of *sex*, although the majority of cases do come from the Social Democrats and the Left. However, there is no particular topic that dominates the agenda or a single MP. On the other hand, during the return of the Social Democrats to government, there does seem to be a drop-off, with an increase in 2015 and 2016 for *kön* and gender as a concept. Although there is an increase in actions by the Sweden Democrats, it is not enough to explain this rise; it is possible that it is a reaction to the increase in the right-wing in the Riksdag by the left-wing parties.


Graph 69: Uses of *gender*, *sex*, and gender as a concept – Sweden – 2000-2017



Source: the author.

The graph for the British data was made by dividing the cases before and after 2013, as done with other time series analysis. Therefore, the percentages refer to the total of cases between 2000-2012 and then 2013-2017. For the “gender as concept” category, in addition to the word *gender*, *male* and *female* were also used, as well as expressions such as “men and women”. The trend lines all have similar shapes, with *gender* being the smallest one. Male/female have a particular importance as many written questions regard the gender breakdown of statistical information. The peak in 2014 is due to a high number of questions by Philip Davies (Conservative) and Sharon Hodgson (Labour), with no particular topic being detected.

Graph 70: Uses of *gender*, *sex*, *male/female*, and gender as a concept – UK – 2000-2017



Source: the author.

Other variables could also matter in who uses *gender* and what for. First, an analysis by gender of MP was conducted. This showed no difference among men and women MPs of all countries for all categories, that is, they were all used with a somewhat similar frequency. A party ideology analysis, however, showed some differences. The table below shows the percentages of use of “gender as a concept” in each country; in one column considering the total within the category and in the other considering the total within party ideology. In bold are the most revealing numbers: in Brazil, over 50% of actions within the category come from the right-wing; in Sweden, the left-wing is by far the one who most uses the words associated with gender as a concept; and although the UK shares that assertion, gender is present in over 40% of the right’s actions.




**Table 36: Gender as a concept by country and party ideology – 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>		
	% category	% by ideology
Left	44.74	<b>34.24</b>
Centre	3.59	24.19
Right	<b>51.44</b>	23.02
<b>Sweden</b>		
Left	<b>62.77</b>	<b>39.78</b>
Centre	27.84	11.84
Right	7.64	16.76
<b>United Kingdom</b>		
Left	<b>72.36</b>	<b>50.49</b>
Centre	4.76	19.89
Right	22.88	41.94


Source: the author. Excluding MPs who were independent or had missing information.

**Graph 71: Means plot (ANOVA) - gender category, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)**




Source: the author.  $F = 5.331$  Sig. = ,000

Graph 72: Means plot (ANOVA) - *gender* category, by gender and party, Sweden (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 19.057$  Sig. = ,000

Graph 73: Means plot (ANOVA) - *gender* category, by gender and party, UK (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 11.832$  Sig. = ,000

Below are three excerpts from the interview with the consultant from the Women's Caucus in Brazil. They<sup>174</sup> detail how difficult it is to bring the women together because of this difference in vocabulary and understanding and, from the subtext, we find they have taken upon themselves to be this 'cultural translator', although they report that the people who work in the Women's Caucus are not all self-declared feminists.

They have a lot of difficulty with certain words, 'empowerment', 'feminism'... No, 'gender' is not even, 'gender' is hors-concour, but simpler words, like, feminism or empowerment. Empowerment. The word that they have difficulty with, let's talk about equality between men and women, yes, but that's not empowerment. Their understanding is that it's contradictory to be feminine and feminist, that it's not the same thing. I'm gonna be really honest, I feel bad for them. They're gonna suffer a lot in the plenary. (...) On Tuesday, we're gonna release a report that the World Forum made. It talks about the impact of education and the laws themselves on child marriage in Brazil. The recommendation I gave them was 'don't add gender, just don't add gender, just say that girls marrying before 18 and having a family before 18 and kids before 18 hurts their lives and it has an impact on the economy, say the economy and it's great.

Yeah, she created the so-called gender ideology. When congresswoman Jô, in 2013,<sup>175</sup> said 'what the hell is gender ideology?', I said 'congresswoman, that's a creation, there's no ideology'. She told me 'gimme the texts on it'. So I did, sent her the books, the texts. She said 'and we're gonna waste our time with this?' I said 'I don't know how we're gonna do it'. Bené<sup>176</sup> even, she said, 'if you want, I'll debate it with the evangelical caucus', she's in the evangelical caucus, 'I'll go, debate, explain what gender is'.<sup>177</sup>

The women's office of the PSC<sup>178</sup>, I gave them some data that shows that women who say they are evangelical suffer more domestic violence. And talking with her how much of that was 'the pastor said the guy is possessed by the devil, she has to take, it's a matter for God and she has to go through those trials and take all of that and she ends up subjecting herself to that violence'. (...) ... we need to do something about this, even if it's just a flyer so that these women understand that they don't need to subject themselves to this violence. And she made two flyers that actually turned out pretty cool. So I said that, 'that's it, we have to, how to we reach these women?' who at the same time have a huge aversion to the word 'gender', that's it...

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<sup>174</sup> In order to keep their anonymity, I have chosen the gender-neutral 'they', but to avoid confusion, I mean here only one person.

<sup>175</sup> Jô Moraes (PCdoB-MG), at the time, coordinator of the Women's Caucus.

<sup>176</sup> Benedita da Silva (PT-RJ), is often referred to as Bené by those closest to her; I also observed this with her staff. This, however, is uncommon.

<sup>177</sup> Original text: Sim, eles criaram a tal da ideologia de gênero. Quando a deputada Jô em 2013 disse assim 'que diabo é isso de ideologia de gênero?', eu disse, 'deputada, isso é criação, não existe uma ideologia'. Ela me disse 'me dá os textos sobre isso'. Aí eu fui, mandei pra elas os livros, mandei pra elas os textos. Ela disse 'e a gente vai perder tempo com isso?' Eu disse, 'eu não sei de que maneira a gente faz'.

<sup>178</sup> Social Christian Party.

(...) if it has the word 'gender' it doesn't matter what the hell it is. <sup>179</sup>  
(BRc3)

### Reproductive rights

The importance of understanding gender, the perception of it by MPs, and how that affects their legislative production on women's behalf is particularly relevant when it comes to reproductive rights. Because these refer to women's role in the reproduction of humanity and their control over their own bodies, understanding gender as a social aspect of life is significant given that it shifts the view from "natural" to "constructed". If we take the Swedish rule that dictated that trans people who underwent gender affirming surgery had to also undergo sterilisation, that becomes evident, as it meant that trans men would not be able to become pregnant and trans women would not be able to impregnate cisgender women. This biological role is reserved to women, but this is not a right, it is a biological imperative, an obligation. A woman's autonomy exists insofar as society permits her to have it and laws, rights, and freedoms are the formal underpinnings of that permission. The law may say one thing, but practice may say another. Suffrage, for instance, was not a right of all women at first; if one woman may be denied a right, then so may all.

Briefly, in Brazil women are allowed to have abortions under three situations: in case of rape, danger to the mother's life, and foetal anencephaly. In fact, the first two legal exceptions

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<sup>179</sup> Original text: Elas têm muita dificuldade com algumas palavras, empoderamento, feminismo... Não, gênero nem, gênero é "hors-concour" mas palavras mais simples, por exemplo, feminismo ou empoderamento. Empoderamento. A palavra que elas têm dificuldade, vamos falar da igualdade entre homens e mulheres, sim, mas isso não é empoderamento. (...) Elas têm esse entendimento que é contraditório ser feminina e ser feminista, que não é a mesma coisa. Eu vou ser muito sincera, eu tenho muita pena delas. Elas vão sofrer muito no plenário. (...) Na terça feira, a gente vai lançar um relatório que o Fórum Mundial fez. Ele fala sobre o impacto da educação e até das próprias leis, pra o casamento infantil no Brasil. A recomendação que eu disse pra eles foi 'não põe gênero, só não põe gênero, só diz que as meninas casarem antes dos 18 e terem que constituir família antes dos 18 e ter filho antes dos 18 prejudica a vida delas pra sempre e que isso impacta na economia do país, põe que é na economia que tá ótimo'. A Bené mesmo, ela disse assim 'quisé, eu debato com a bancada evangélica', ela é da bancada evangélica, 'eu vou lá, debato e explico o que é gênero'. A secretaria de mulheres do PSC, eu passei pra elas uns dados em que as mulheres que se declaram evangélicas são as que mais sofrem violência doméstica. E conversando com ela em que medida isso era 'o pastor disse que o cara tá com demônio, ela tem que aguentar, que é uma questão de Deus que ela tem passar por aquela provação e aguentar aquilo ali e ela acaba se submetendo àquela violência'. (...) ...a gente precisa fazer alguma coisa com relação a isso, nem que seja uma cartilha para que essas mulheres entendam que não precisam se submeter a essa violência. E ela fez duas cartilhas que ficaram bem legais, inclusive. Aí eu falei, 'é isso, a gente tem, de que maneira a gente chega pra essas mulheres?' que ao mesmo tempo que elas vêm com um discurso empoderador, elas tem uma aversão a palavra gênero muito grande, é isso... se você falar gênero alimentício você ter problema na casa, ela tá falando a verdade, eles pesquisam, se tem a palavra gênero não interessa que diabos que é.

were made within the Brazilian Penal Code in 1940 (*Código Penal*, Art. 128) and the latter was made via a judicial resolution by the Supreme Court (ADPF 54). However, these are all dependent on judicial hearings, which can take a long time, and on access to the judiciary and adequate healthcare, which is not a reality in many areas of the country. In addition, emergency contraceptive has come under fire and one of the cases within the database is of PL 5069/2013, by Eduardo Cunha (PMDB-RJ) which attempted to criminalise the mere suggestion of the treatment or the possibility of abortion for victims of rape. The discussion of this bill made thousands of Brazilian women to take to the streets in protest and it was ultimately dropped.


In Sweden, abortion is permitted under any circumstance before 18 weeks; and until 24 weeks if there is a health reason to do so (*Abortlag* 1974:595). In the UK, abortion is a devolved issue, which in practical terms means that women in Northern Ireland do not have access to the same reproductive rights as other British women.<sup>180</sup> It can be done if two doctors agree, before 24 weeks of pregnancy, that it would be physically or emotionally harmful to the woman to go through with the pregnancy and is available through the National Health Service and private clinics (Abortion Act 1967).

The issue of reproductive rights most notably includes the right to abortion, although it also refers to the rights of voluntary sterilisation, humanised childbirth, sexual health, family planning, maternal mortality, etc. All these issues were included within the *reproductive rights* category, but a separate variable to single-out abortion was also created. The actions on abortion were 53.50%, 67.63%, and 59.12% of the reproductive rights category, for Brazil, Sweden, and the UK, respectively. With that in mind, the graph below shows the reproductive rights category over time, for each country. Both Brazil and the UK are more subjected to peaks of action; Brazil, once again drops off during election years, particularly in 2014, during President Rousseff's reelection campaign. Sweden has a steadier line over time, with softer edges, indicating that there are no sudden contextual changes.

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<sup>180</sup> At the time of writing, the House of Commons has just passed an amendment tabled by Stella Creasy (Labour Co-op) that legalises abortion in Northern Ireland should they remain without a government until 21 October 2019. <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/parliament-and-elections/devolution/abortion-and-same-sex-marriage-in-northern-ireland-do-westminster-votes-undermine-devolution/>

Graph 74: Reproductive rights mentioned over time, Brazil, Sweden, UK – 2000-2017



Source: the author. As with other timeframe data, the British percentages are calculated over the total until 2012 and then based on the total from 2013-2017.

The following tables compare actions mentioning abortion only and all the actions within reproductive rights, by gender and country and then by party ideology. The first two sets of columns give the results in reference to the total within the variable; the last two columns reference the total within group (men/women or left/centre/right). Unknowns and NAs were excluded. In Brazil, the majority of these actions come from men, especially ones on abortion, with 90.65%; 5.02% of Brazilian men’s actions about abortion, while women’s are only 0.88%. In Sweden, the situation is reversed, with 73.50% of actions regarding abortion and 76.30% of all reproductive rights actions coming from women; they spend 6.33% of their actions on reproductive rights. Although it is not uncommon that Brazilian men and Swedish women have more actions given their overall numbers within the dataset, this type of gap is quite striking. In the United Kingdom, the situation is relatively balanced and similar to other issues analysed. On the other hand, over 10.81% of all actions are about reproductive rights, almost double than the other two countries.

**Table 37: Mentions about abortion and reproductive rights by country and gender, Brazil, Sweden, UK – 2000-2017**

Brazil							
	Abortion	%abortion /gender	Reproductive rights	%reproductive rights/gender	Total in gender	%abortion /total	%reproductive rights/total
Men	97	<b>90.65</b>	156	78.00	1931	5.02	8.08
Women	10	9.35	44	<b>22.00</b>	1135	0.88	3.88
Total in issue	107	100.00	200	100.00	3066	3.49	<b>6.52</b>
Sweden							
Men	62	26.50	82	23.70	1987	3.12	4.13
Women	172	<b>73.50</b>	264	<b>76.30</b>	4168	4.13	6.33
Total in issue	234	100.00	346	100.00	6155	3.80	<b>5.62</b>
United Kingdom							
Men	302	54.51	517	55.18	4701	6.42	11.00
Women	252	45.49	420	44.82	3964	6.36	10.60
Total in issue	554	100.00	937	100.00	8665	6.39	<b>10.81</b>

Source: the author.

When it comes to party ideology, actions on abortion are 62.86% from the Brazilian right-wing, with a decrease to 54.55% in reproductive rights. The Brazilian right-wing used 9.68% of their actions on reproductive rights, while the left used 7.41%. In Sweden, the percentages are more evened out, however, the right-wing is still the largest contributor in actions on abortion (38.63%) and uses more of its actions for abortion and reproductive rights in general. The UK presents a completely different picture, with the majority of actions (more than 60%) within the abortion variable and the reproductive rights variable coming from the left; however, looking at the parties, the right-wing used more of its actions on these issues than the other ideological groups by far.

**Table 38: Actions about abortion and reproductive rights by country and party ideology, Brazil, Sweden, UK – 2000-2017**

Brazil							
	Abortion	%abortion/ ideology	Reproductive rights	%reproductive rights/ideology	Total in ideology	%aborti on/total	%reproductive rights/total
Left	36	34.29	84	<b>42.42</b>	1134	3.17	7.41
Centre	3	2.86	6	3.03	62	4.84	<b>9.68</b>
Right	66	<b>62.86</b>	108	54.55	1865	3.54	5.79
Total in issue	105	100.00	198	100.00	3061	3.43	6.47
Sweden							
Left	82	35.19	136	<b>39.42</b>	3022	2.71	4.50
Centre	61	26.18	108	31.30	2153	2.83	5.02
Right	90	<b>38.63</b>	101	29.28	931	<b>9.67</b>	<b>10.85</b>
Total in issue	233	100.00	345	100.00	6106	3.82	5.65
United Kingdom							
Left	348	<b>62.82</b>	573	<b>61.15</b>	5905	5.89	9.70
Centre	26	4.69	52	5.55	533	4.88	9.76
Right	180	32.49	312	33.30	2215	<b>8.13</b>	<b>14.09</b>
Total in issue	554	100.00	937	100.00	8653	6.40	10.83

Source: the author.

This brings us to the discussion of what is the content of these actions. What are MPs trying to do when they talk about or act on the issue of reproductive rights? In all datasets, references can be found to the protection of the *unborn child*,<sup>181</sup> rather than “foetus”, as a typical citizen and often without care for the protection of the mother.<sup>182</sup> In Brazil, the actions that use this expression also state that “life begins at conception”.<sup>183</sup> In Sweden, they mention protecting

<sup>181</sup> The *child* category did not filter these out.

<sup>182</sup> In Portuguese, the word is *nascituro*.

<sup>183</sup> PEC 571/2002 Paulo Lima, PMDB-SP; PL 6150/2005, Osmânio Pereira and Elimar Máximo Damasceno, PTB-MG, PRONA-SP; PL 489/2007, Odair Cunha, PT-MG; PL 478/2007, Luiz Bassuma and Miguel Martini, PT-BA, PHS-MG.



the mother and the family unit through the protection of the foetus.<sup>184</sup> In the UK, it is a rhetorical device, used to shirk referring to the foetus as such.<sup>185</sup>

Several in Brazil suggest financial aid to women who decide to carry out pregnancies that are the result of rape (PL 809/2003, Elimar Máximo Damasceno, PRONA-SP; PL 797/2011, Lauriete, PSC-ES). In Sweden and the UK, the issue of *why* a woman chooses to have an abortion is prevalent, under the guise of indignation over “sex-selective abortions” and “neonatal diagnosis”, including a PMB (Abortion (Sex-Selection) Bill 2014-15) by Fiona Bruce (Conservative).

To ask the Secretary of State for Health, what account he has taken of the research performed by Dubuc and Coleman in formulating a strategy for the assessment of the incidence of sex-selective abortion in England and Wales (Written Question 27/05/2015, Robert Ffello, Labour).


To ask the Secretary of State for Health, what research his Department has (a) undertaken and (b) evaluated on (i) the earliest point in its development an unborn child will experience pain, (ii) the earliest gestational age at which an unborn child may be capable of being born alive, (iii) the number of occasions when an unborn child is wrongly diagnosed as being handicapped and is subsequently born without disability or handicap and (iv) the suicide rate among women who have had an abortion since May 2010; and if he will make a statement. (Written Question 19/03/2014, David Amess, Conservative).

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<sup>184</sup> Motion 475:2008, Lennart Sacrédeus (KD); Written question 1104: 2016, Mikael Eskilander (SD).

<sup>185</sup> EDM 38/2004, Jim Dobbin (Labour Co-op); EDM 2236/2011, Fiona Bruce (Conservative); EDM 2220/2011, Jim Dobbin (Labour Co-op); Written Question 19/03/2014, David Amess (Conservative); Written Question 24/06/2014, David Amess (Conservative); Written Question 12675, 20/10/2015, Fiona Bruce (Conservative); Written Question 12676, 20/10/2015, Fiona Bruce (Conservative); Written Question 12676, 27/11/2017, Jim Shannon (DUP).

Graph 75: Means plot (ANOVA) - *reproductive rights* category, by gender and party, Brazil (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 6.517$  Sig. = ,000

There is also the over-medicalisation of the issue (AMERY, 2015), which in both European countries takes the shape of actions demanding that abortion limits reflect “current” science on premature births (Motion 548:2007, Lars Gustafsson, KD). These rhetorical frameworks allow MPs to argue against abortion without seeming to be against women’s rights, something particularly important in Sweden, but also in the UK. Therefore, they are against late-term abortion because medicine is sufficiently advanced or because women are making the “wrong” moral choice. There are some actions that use real-life examples of premature births in which the infants survived, despite being born only a week after the late-term abortion deadline. These examples do not make note of the mother’s health, access to pre-natal care, and the parents possibility to care for the child, just to name a few issues. Sex-selective abortions are an interesting frame, since these MPs are arguing that their position is actually in defence of girls’ rights – China is an example often mentioned. In the UK, MPs argued that doctors are not following the two-doctor rule and using pre-signed forms.

To ask the Secretary of State for Health, whether failure properly to disclose on an HSA1 form whether a patient has been seen by the two certifying

doctors constitutes a breach of the regulations governing abortion (Written Question, 05/03/2015, Gary Streeter, Conservative).


In the Brazilian dataset, there are several cases on humanised childbirth; many acting on the rights on incarcerated women to have access to contraceptives and to give birth without handcuffs (PL 1046/2007, Maurício Trindade, PR-BA; PL 4176/2015, Angela Albino, PCdoB-SC); others specifically propose changes to the *Lei do Planejamento Familiar* (Family Planning Law, 9263/1996). Voluntary sterilisation is available through this law, for people over 25 or with two living children and only after a “cool down” period of 60 days. People who are married must both consent to the procedure. The extent to which the law is actually practiced is unknown; many doctors are afraid of going through with procedures and many perceived the “married clause” as a way for husbands to have control over their wives bodies, rather than a mutual decision to not have children. There are also cases of involuntary sterilisation by judicial order. A famous case in 2018 made the issue public when a woman was sterilised upon the request of the prosecutor’s office with the claim that it was for her own protection and of any future children.<sup>186</sup>

In Sweden and the UK, the issues of endometriosis and midwifery were both salient, although the latter had several different aspects, including the possibility for midwives to be in charge of medical abortions and to conscientiously object to assisting with abortions (Motion 538:2003, Berit Högman, S). Many cases in the Swedish and British dataset claim that women are being pushed to have abortions either by the general culture or by healthcare providers. One way of bringing up the issue without seeming to want to remove women’s right to choose is by saying that they are not being given “full information”, specifically when it comes to adoption (Motion 547:2007, Annelie Enochson, KD; EDM 40/2008, Angela Watkinson, Conservative).

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<sup>186</sup><https://www.redebrasilatual.com.br/cidadania/2018/06/mulher-esterilizada-a-forca-pode-nao-ser-fato-isolado/>

Graph 76: Means plot (ANOVA) - *reproductive rights* category, by gender and party, Sweden (2000-2017)




Source: the author.  $F = 18.550$  Sig. = ,000

Another situation is MPs worried about delays and queues which essentially force women to undergo surgical rather than medical abortions (Motion 2665: 2015, Cecilia Widegren, M; EDM 81/2004, Annette Brooke, Liberal Democrat); on the other side, there are MPs trying to create a “cool down” period between making the decision and actually undergoing the procedure (PMB 41/2006, Nadine Dorries, Conservative). Both the Swedish and the British are also particularly concerned with women’s reproductive rights in other countries, with one action in Sweden mentioning the issue for Brazil (Written Question 303/2017, Sofia Arkelsten, M).

The discussion on reproductive rights shifts focus dependent on the goal of the legislator. As Amery (2015) points out, it was very difficult for feminist MPs in the UK to find themselves defending a paternalistic and poorly-worded law when faced with the possibility of losing it completely. MPs in all countries who are against the right to choose are careful about stating their goals, especially in Sweden and the UK. Consequently, they mention the rights of the “unborn child”, women’s rights in getting full information and adequate treatment, “cutting-edge” science, or immoral behaviour in choosing to undergo an abortion based on the sex or illness of the foetus, rather than their actual goal of blocking women’s access to abortion.

Graph 77: Means plot (ANOVA) - *reproductive rights* category, by gender and party, Sweden (2000-2017)



Source: the author.  $F = 8.143$  Sig. = ,000

In Brazil, although there is more explicit wording such as bills to prohibit abortion completely, the implicit wording can also be found, particularly in the idea of defending the “child”. All actions that attempt to legalise abortion have men as authors or first authors<sup>187</sup> with the exception of PL 1956/1996, by Marta Suplicy (at the time, PT-SP), which would allow abortion in the specific cases of impossibility of life outside the womb. Since abortion is already banned in most cases, there is little need to further hide their views with other types of rhetoric.

It’s always good when men propose, but that’s not a rule. (...) I faced the vote for Genoíno’s bill, Genoíno was still there in the welfare committee, the main actors from the left went to the committee and we were defeated. It was an intense debate and I actually said ‘look, the threats, the retaliations that the caucus is doing to us, blackmail and threats, I lived that in the dictatorship’, I said that in the meeting because it was a horror. (Interview with BRd1).<sup>188</sup>

<sup>187</sup> PL 3465/1989, José Genoíno, PT-SP; PL 1135/1991, Eduardo Jorge, PT-SP, Sandra Starling, PT-MG; PL 3609/1993, José Genoíno, PT-SP; PL 176/1995, José Genoíno, PT-SP; **PL 4304/2004, Eduardo Valverde, PT-RO; PL 882/2015, Jean Wyllys, PSOL-RJ.**

<sup>188</sup> Original text: É sempre bom quando homens propõe, mas isso não é uma definição. (...) Eu enfrentei a votação da proposta do Genoíno, o Genoíno inclusive ainda tava lá na comissão de seguridade, foram os principais quadros políticos da esquerda foram pra comissão e fomos derrotados. Foi um debate intenso e eu

On the other hand, when the matter of abortion is set aside, the issue of reproductive rights is wholly positive and can be found across the ideological spectrum. In Brazil, more actions from women MPs can be found. Plenty is discussed on issuing contraceptives, including for young people (EDM 46/2003, Liam Fox, Conservative; PMB 57/2007, Natascha Engel, Labour), to prevent abortions, and women's illnesses (Motion 212: 2012, Hillevi Larsson, S). One action in Brazil proposes to make voluntary sterilisation more accessible (PL 7020/2002, Wigberto Tartuce, PPB-DF); other than that the only mention of sterilisation comes from the Swedish database, discussing the forced sterilisation of trans people who underwent gender affirming surgery. There are actions on maternal mortality statistics (PL 600/2003, Geraldo Resende, PPS-MS; EDM 62/2008, Chris McCafferty, Labour) and how to improve women's childbirth experience (REQ 18/2016, Janete Capiberibe, PSB-AP; Motion 525: 2001, Rolf Olsson, V), with recent and strong debate on obstetric violence in Brazil (PL 8219/2017, Francisco Floriano, DEM-RJ; PL 2589/2015, Pastor Marco Feliciano, PSC-SP).

Given the intense variation in gender, ideology, and topics, the category of reproductive rights was chosen as the one to be evaluated in all countries, categorising the actions as positive, negative, or not applicable. Cases that were considered not applicable were excluded in order to not cloud the analysis; this means 191 cases for Brazil, 286 for Sweden, and 690 for the United Kingdom.<sup>189</sup> The results show that the majority of negative actions come from men, although the degree in which that happens is quite different for each country and from the right-wing. The time analysis shows that Brazil has a fluctuating context for both, with a particular increase in negative actions during 2005 (election year, before President Lula's reelection), 2007 (also a pre-electoral year), 2012, and 2016 (the year of the coup against President Rousseff). Sweden has a drop in negative actions during the Alliance government and an increase in both negative and positive actions after the return of the Social Democrats


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cheguei a dizer olha, as ameaças, as retaliações que a bancada tá fazendo com a gente, chantagens e ameaças eu vivi isso no período da ditadura também, eu cheguei a dizer isso na reunião porque foi um horror. BRd1

<sup>189</sup> While I have discussed how the categories were defined and positive and negative were constructed, it is important remind the reader about the scientist's subjectivity. All the data used is public, although not always easy to acquire, and can be easily replicated; however, another scientist might have different conceptualisations of what each category should entail, regarding both the themes analysed and how to assign them value. I have tried to be as objective as possible and as strict as possible in my definitions, but this debate is one that is always open, as it should be.


to the executive (with a peak in positive actions in 2006). The UK dataset shows a steady line of positive action throughout, but peaks in negative action. The first 12 years are affected by how small the dataset actually is; however, the peak in 2015 is a reflection of the high number of actions by Fiona Bruce (Conservative).

Graph 78: Percentage of positive and negative actions on reproductive rights by year – Brazil – 2000-2017




Source: the author.

Graph 79: Percentage of positive and negative actions on reproductive rights by year – Sweden – 2000-2017



Source: the author.

Graph 80: Percentage of positive and negative actions on reproductive rights by year – UK – 2000-2017



Source: the author.



**Table 39: Negative and positive actions in reproductive rights by country and gender of MP – Brazil, Sweden, UK – 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>							
	Negative	%negative/gender	Positive	%positive/gender	Total in gender	%negative/total	%positive/total
Men	74	<b>96.10</b>	74	64.91	148	50.00	50.00
Women	3	3.90	40	35.09	43	6.98	<b>93.02</b>
Total in issue	77	100.00	114	100.00	191	40.31	<b>59.69</b>

<b>Sweden</b>							
	Negative	%negative/gender	Positive	%positive/gender	Total in gender	%negative/total	%positive/total
Men	55	<b>55.00</b>	20	9.76	75	<b>73.33</b>	26.67
Women	45	45.00	185	<b>90.24</b>	230	19.57	<b>80.43</b>
Total in issue	100	100.00	205	100.00	305	32.79	67.21

<b>United Kindom</b>							
	Negative	%negative/gender	Positive	%positive/gender	Total in gender	%negative/total	%positive/total
Men	69	<b>58.97</b>	297	<b>51.21</b>	366	18.85	<b>81.15</b>
Women	48	41.03	283	<b>48.79</b>	331	14.50	<b>85.50</b>
Total in issue	117	100.00	580	100.00	697	16.79	<b>83.21</b>

Source: the author.

**Table 40: Negative and positive actions in reproductive rights by country and party ideology of MP – Brazil, Sweden, UK – 2000-2017**

<b>Brazil</b>							
	Negative	%negative/gender	Positive	%positive/gender	Total in gender	%negative/total	%positive/total
Left	20	26.32	63	<b>55.75</b>	83	24.10	<b>75.90</b>
Centre	3	3.95	3	2.65	6	50.00	50.00
Right	53	<b>69.74</b>	47	41.59	100	<b>53.00</b>	47.00
Total in issue	76	100.00	113	100.00	189	40.21	59.79

<b>Sweden</b>							
	Negative	%negative/gender	Positive	%positive/gender	Total in gender	%negative/total	%positive/total
Left	4	4.00	119	<b>58.33</b>	123	3.25	<b>96.75</b>
Centre	13	13.00	74	36.27	87	14.94	<b>85.06</b>
Right	83	<b>83.00</b>	11	5.39	94	<b>88.30</b>	11.70
Total in issue	100	100.00	204	100.00	304	32.89	67.11

<b>United Kindom</b>							
	Negative	%negative/gender	Positive	%positive/gender	Total in gender	%negative/total	%positive/total
Left	20	17.09	386	<b>66.55</b>	406	4.93	<b>95.07</b>
Centre	1	0.85	30	5.17	31	3.23	<b>96.77</b>
Right	96	<b>82.05</b>	164	28.28	260	36.92	<b>63.08</b>
Total in issue	117	100.00	580	100.00	697	16.79	83.21

Source: the author.

*How are they doing it?*

The executive branch has centralised power, ministries, research institutions, and an entire bureaucracy built to put its policies in action. Legislators have... themselves. While the legislative branch, considered as a whole, might be just as powerful as any other, its power is diffuse and unequally distributed. That distribution is dependent upon connections, networks, seniority, and party allegiances. There are few instances of power, and it is possible to have power and not have that translate into any legislative action. It is possible to have several actions proposed and to have none of them ever even come up for discussion. The cases presented here have several aspects to consider in these regards.

Brazil has a strong legislature, but a strong executive. While Brazilian legislators are able to propose laws and constitutional amendments as much as they want, they need to consider

their places within the party and the resources they would actually expend in getting that legislation across. With a strong patriarchal culture, legislation on women's rights and gender equality is hard to discuss and pass, with noted exceptions. Consequently, the cases presented here are often vague and scattered, without clear direction. Because women, and particularly women attached to social movements, tend to act a little different, they focus on having public hearings and seminars. Another interesting aspect is the use of constitutional amendments, which demonstrate the belief, by deputies, that a certain issue must be protected by the Constitution.

The Women's Caucus, despite its formal nature and important prerogatives, is more of an ad hoc coalition of women that comes together whenever they have topics they agree on, usually on violence against women and women's participation in politics. Its establishment as a permanent organism within the Câmara dos Deputados that has a voice and a vote might have weakened its status as an independent group, and made it a desirable position. Although even before meetings were sporadic, presently, the Women's Caucus is about the women who hold positions within it, rather than a constant effort by the women in the Câmara. In fact, one of the comments made the interviewee who works for the Women's Caucus was the fact that they are now able to open a session or block a PEC, which is an incredibly powerful position to be in, *if* they were to organise themselves to do so. As far as critical mass definitions go, rather than stand on a random percentage, the observation of how a minority is able to have an impact is empirical and depends on institutional rules and that minority's capacity to organise. One notable event was the bill produced by the Mixed Parliamentary Inquiry Commission (CPMI) on violence against women which would create a fund to help women victims of violence. The fund included a provision for abortion in cases when it is legal, which caused uproar with the male members of the evangelical caucus. The Women's Caucus, however, despite its religious members, blocked the vote in order to stay true to the legislation that had been written.

We have this bill that the CPMI on Violence Against Women presented which is the National Fund to Combat Violence Against Women. It was something that would give budgetary flexibility to programmes for women, because that fund wouldn't be dependent on the Union's budget, it would receive [money] from fines on certain practices, lottery installments. There's a bill, a deputy added an amendment. The first deputy, it was banning the use [of the fund] for abortion, for interruption of pregnancy in

legal cases. And this deputy, we talked and we managed to build, he's less radical and we managed to build. He accepted to change it to 'destined to the women's secretariat'.<sup>190</sup> Then another one came and added another amendment that it has to stay there, it can't be used for legal abortion. We didn't go. Because then they said 'we won't vote' and it's been in the plenary several times. They won't take it out and we won't vote on it with [the amendment]. You can imagine the victory they would have in approving a law that would forbid the use of resources in fulfilling the law. So we're there, at a standstill. (Interview with BRd1).<sup>191</sup>

Sweden, despite its fame as one of the most gender-equal countries in the world is nothing but when it comes to women's representation. Although all three countries showed that one of the "hows" for SRW is that women are the ones who usually do it, in Sweden the gender gap is quite large and in favour of women MPs. One particular instrument stood out within the Swedish dataset and that falls in line with paucity of resources available to individual MPs: actions tend to be repeated every year, that is, the same title, the same text, the same MP, but tabled two, sometimes three years in a row. Often actions come accompanied, usually a motion and a written question.

In the UK, the use of multi-pronged strategies when an MP is really invested in a topic is apparent. Although Brazilian actions share a similar trait, as it is easier for Brazilian MPs to introduce several actions at once, when a British MP does it, it usually means that they are serious about that legislation. In that sense, the idea of critical actors becomes much more salient in the House of Commons, although it is also notable in the Riksdag and the Câmara dos Deputados. However, in the UK, several issues peak in certain years because of the presence of certain MPs. Although Brazil has important critical actors, as does Sweden, it is

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<sup>190</sup> A reference to the Special Secretariat of Policies for Women, a ministry created by President Lula and dissolved in 2015, by President Rousseff in an attempt to calm the crisis that surrounded her government. Presently, there is the Ministry of Women, Family, and Human Rights, headed by the only woman in Bolsonaro's government and who is a religious extremist.

<sup>191</sup> Original text: Nós estamos com um projeto que a CPMI da Violência Contra Mulher apresentou que é do Fundo Nacional de Combate a Violência Contra Mulher. Era algo que daria flexibilidade orçamentária pros programas relativos à mulher, porque esse fundo não dependeria do orçamento da União e iria lá muitas referentes a determinadas práticas, parcela de loteria. Há um projeto, um deputado colocou uma emenda. O primeiro deputado, que era proibindo o uso para aborto, para a interrupção da gravidez nos casos legais. E esse deputado, a gente conversou e conseguimos construir, ele é menos radical e conseguimos construir. Ele aceitou botar 'destinado à secretaria da mulher. Aí chegou outro botou uma outra emenda que tem que ficar lá que não pode ser aplicado para o previsto no código, que não pode ser aplicado pra caso de aborto legal. A gente não foi. Porque aí eles disseram 'não deixamos votar' e já foi a plenário várias vezes. Eles não retiram isso e a gente não vai votar com essa [emenda]. Você imagina a vitória deles seria aprovar uma lei que proíbe o uso de recursos no cumprimento de uma lei. Então a gente tá lá, parado.

more qualitatively than quantitative the focus they give to SRW. One must consider the access to resources that each MP has in order to become the representative of a group or issue. In the case of the United Kingdom, it is much more time-consuming, given their obligations as the single representative of a district. Casework is much more salient in that legislature; consequently, to become invested in the representation of a group or of an issue could be an expenditure of time without electoral returns. In addition, questions to ministers and PMQs occur regularly, as well as just general plenary time, meaning that MPs have less free time. One particular aspect of how British MPs use their resources is the phrasing in oral questions, which are generally divided between calling the government to action on an issue or asking how a particular policy is going. The expression “make an assessment” is specifically curious as it seems to demand some form of position-taking from whoever is answering the questions. If that question was planted by a whip or comes from the opposition is a matter for a different research project. MPs also tend to use examples from their personal lives and use phrases such as “as a father/mother/professional” or from their constituencies and refer to their constituencies quite often.

This is the difference between majoritarian and proportional systems, of course. Who you represent, as it turns out, does affect how and what you represent. For Scottish representatives, for instance, one of the clerks interviewed mentioned the use of EDMs, since they are a smaller grouping within the House of Commons and must bring to light the issues of a devolved territory. Scotland is notably more progressive than England, and the Scottish National Party, a left-wing party. Therefore, it is possible that more than representing their individual constituencies, they feel the need to represent Scotland. This is similar to what can be found in Sweden and Brazil, as districts and states are not often mentioned. Even when they are, it is to refer back to something that might affect the whole – all the women in Sweden, all the women in Brazil. Interestingly, one of the men who were most famously engaged in representing women, Jean Wyllys (PSOL-RJ), used as a motto “the representative of Brazil”, given that he was born in the Northeast, is mixed-race, and gay. Although being elected by a single state, he saw himself as someone who needed to represent all the “others” in the country. Swedish MPs often use news articles, especially from *Svenska Dagbladet*, and while the use of examples from their districts occurs, they are not as common as with British MPs. One rhetorical device used often by Swedish MPs is United Nations’ documents

or treaties. In Brazil, more than anything, the appearance of impartiality and objectivity is important. Despite the fact that no speeches were analysed, even in public hearing requests, deputies do not refer to other parties or use negative rhetoric when referring to something they disagree with. One example is the requests to debate the “issue” of gender, which often would just say that – “a public hearing to discuss the issue of gender” – but had only men and clergy on the guest list.

Another important aspect is that both European countries demonstrate the importance of consciousness-raising within parties, something that did not come up in Brazil. The importance of including men from left-wing parties is quite clear from the European countries and large amount of actions from these groups. The presence of women in parliament, it is said, is important in order to share the perspective of women, all women, with male representatives and with the nation-state. However, despite the informality of negotiations, it does seem that the most valuable place to create a sense of shared perspective, to bring men in on the issues affecting women, is the party. It may be, then, that a critical place for women’s substantive representation is not the legislature, but the party.

Lastly, although each country offers different institutional affordances, either liberating or constricting MPs behaviours and their possibilities for action, all require a significant and immeasurable degree of informal negotiations. The most important “how”, undoubtedly, is a good rapport with your fellow MPs and an ability to talk to them outside of the plenary and the committee room. Another important aspect is connections with the executive, in all three countries, but especially in Brazil and Sweden. In addition, a good understanding of those institutional affordances, of how you can make the legislature function on your behalf is critical.

Different, I really have to say it, because we are mostly white and male congress, when you go to introduce racial issues you find some difficulty because the first defence is to say ‘that doesn’t exist in Brazil, it doesn’t exist, you’re trying to imitate the USA’. Now, I’ve never seen anyone want to imitate the United States like the new government, so now I’ll be able to do a lot, align with the American black community, then I wanna see what they’re gonna say. Even gender policies is a tough thing, we have gender politics today, it’s so combatted that we gave to talk with the leaders first, say ‘it’s not really like that’, then they look ‘no, you gotta get rid of this word gender, put men and women, cause it doesn’t matter’, but it does to them, so there’s that. So much so that we, in this election, we had a massive black women articulation in politics and we got a result, we already have

more black women now for 2019, we will have, because of the mobilisation of the black women movements. We're gonna have now the national convention of black women and in this national convention we draw up an agenda, you know, more black women in power, black women for democracy, black women for Free Lula. I mean, we have a position of fighting even because we recognise that it was exactly during the governments of Lula and Dilma that women, black or not, had a space for dialogue and we could implement public policies, the black women in the racial equality, in the ministry, and in the women's ministry, right, women as a whole. (Interview with BRd5).<sup>192</sup>

You have to talk with them in the corridor (laughs). You, you understand what I mean. Not exactly the corridor. But in another meeting. Not, not official meeting. That's easier then. Then you could ask them. 'What, what could we agree about?' and then 'we could also discuss some of the sentences'. 'Maybe we could write differently here'. 'Could you agree about that?' That's it. That's one-to-one meetings. It's very good too. Then you could agree with one of them. And then you could go to the next (laughs).

(...) So it's easier for them [women and ethnic minorities] for, also for us to discuss issues if everything isn't official. But you also have to discuss [officially] because there are some of those meetings [that] we don't like that they are closed because then we are afraid that those meetings decide too much. And it's already decided when we come to the to the official meetings. (Interview with SVd2).

We sort of asked vaguely, and so we were trying to find out a little bit about why they want it because that helps us to prepare something hopefully that fits the bill. So it's anything to do with their parliamentary duties. So that would be relating to speaking in a debate or perhaps help with drafting a parliamentary question or just the ideas behind the question. The table office is quite clear that if they can get information without putting in a parliamentary question they should. So sometimes they might ask us 'is information available on this area'. So they don't do questions. We'll also

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<sup>192</sup> Original text: Diferente, eu tenho que falar mesmo, porque nós temos um congresso majoritariamente branco e masculino, quando você vai introduzir questões de ordem racial você encontra uma dificuldade porque a primeira coisa a primeira defesa é dizer 'não isso não existe, no Brasil isso não existe, vocês estão querendo imitar os EUA'. Agora, eu nunca vi alguém querer imitar os Estados Unidos como o novo governo, agora eu vou poder botar bastante, vou fazer um alinhamento com a comunidade negra americana que eu quero ver o que eles vão dizer. Ainda a política de gênero é uma coisa difícil, nós temos a política de gênero hoje ela é tão combatida que nós temos que fazer uma conversa primeiro com as lideranças e falar, 'não é bem assim', aí eles olham, 'não, mas tem que tirar essa palavra gênero tem que botar homem e mulher que não faz diferença' mas pra eles faz, então existe isso. Tanto assim que nós, nessa eleição tivemos uma bruta de uma articulação de mulher negra na política e nós obtivemos um resultado, nós já temos mais mulheres negras agora pra 2019 nós teremos, porque, por conta da mobilização do movimento de mulheres negras. Nós vamos ter agora o encontro nacional de mulheres negras e nesse encontro nacional nós tiramos a pauta entendeu, mais mulheres negras no poder, mulheres negras pela democracia, mulheres negras pra Lula livre. Quer dizer, nós temos uma bandeira de luta até porque nós reconhecemos que foi exatamente no governo de Lula e de Dilma que as mulheres, isso independente de ser negro ou não, tiveram um espaço de diálogo e podemos implementar políticas públicas, tanto as mulheres negras na igualdade racial no ministério quanto o ministério das mulheres né, mulher como um todo.

help them if they're making a speech in the constituency, if they're visiting a school, and we also help with constituency casework as well. So if a constituent has an inquiry that the member doesn't know anything about, or needs additional information, or needs other views, or whatever, then we provide assistance with that as well, or information for that perhaps is a better way of putting it. (Interview with UKc2 and 3).

Although these seemingly simple conclusions are important in all situations, for a woman MP or for an MP acting on behalf of women, it is likely that all these informal and formal rules have to walk hand-in-hand and with dexterity to make something work. Taking an example from Brazil, the PEC 590/2006, by Luiza Erundina (now of PSOL-SP), would require that the Directing Board of the house and each committee have at least one woman and, when possible, women in proportional representation. For that PEC alone, three public hearings were held and its passing in the Câmara took ten years, coming up for vote both in committee and in the plenary only on 8 March, International Women's Day. When it finally passed through the Constitution, Citizenship, and Justice Committee, one of the speeches arguing in its favour mentioned passing it as a "gift for women". It is a rule that constitutional amendments are discussed in the CCJC but also get their own special committee if they are approved by the former. The special committee only had women, making the rhetoric used in each wholly different.

It had three public hearings with specialists from around the country and its special committee was populated with women MPs only. It was also authored by one of the few people and few women who have actually passed a PEC, Erundina, who has decades of experience, having even been the first woman mayor of a major Latin American city. Though of that work has been put into it, the PEC is still in the Senate, with no perspective on it passing because of the military intervention in Rio de Janeiro. This is just one example of how, in the country with most legislative prerogatives, it is almost impossible to pass legislation, especially women's substantive legislation. In the case of Sweden, it is even harder to track the "successes", since they are rare and usually appear as approval of reports, rather than votes on a motion. In the UK, passing a bill is more a matter of chance; getting the attention of government is the goal and that is not something that one can adequately measure. As the time data shows, there is an increase in backlash politics, with more MPs from the new-right attacking women's legal rights; however, that has been accompanied by action from women's representatives, which helps explain why things have taken a turn for



the worse. The actions of MPs for women's substantive representation exist within the "goldilocks zone of politics", where through effort, dedication, connections, time, and a stroke of luck, when everything is just right, something might happen.

Jag skäms över det svenska samhällets inskränkthet, när jag träffar alla människor som möter hinder i arbetslivet, segregation på bostadsmarknaden, och när skillnader mellan olika kulturer blir nya klassklyftor. Det handlar om politiskt arbete för att bryta det. Att ge alla barn ett språk redan i förskolan, att ge alla möjlighet till bra utbildning. Det handlar om att våga ställa krav – på alla som bor här, bland annat när det gäller kvinnors rättigheter. Det handlar om arbetsgivarnas och allas vårt eget ansvar för att sluta diskriminera!

I am ashamed of the Swedish society's limitations, when I meet all the people who face obstacles in working life, segregation in the housing market, and when differences between cultures become new class divisions. It's about the political work to change it. To give all children a language as early as preschool, to give everyone the opportunity for good education. It is about daring to make demands - for everyone who lives here, including when it comes to women's rights. It is about the employers' and everyone's own responsibility to stop discriminating!

*Anna Lindh (Swedish Foreign Minister, murdered in 2003)<sup>193</sup>*

## **Conclusion**

There were four main hypotheses that opened this research, proposing checks on the *number of women* in parliament, their *ideological leanings* of women and men, their *choice of actions*, both in *type* and *content*, and on *time and timing factors*. One of the dangers in using a most-different approach is finding that there is nothing comparable – that was not the case here. Beginning with the matter of women's presence it was clear that, despite other key studies that demonstrate the importance of critical actors and strategies of tokenism, the increased presence of women is a relevant factor in increasing women's representation.

Undoubtedly, the representation of women is done almost completely by women in all three countries. Specifically, in the case of United Kingdom, by left-wing women. Men participate in *qualitatively opposing ways* – they are either critical actors for women's representation or critical actors for backlash, and here strong ideological ties were found.

Despite the high presence of women and the bureaucratic practice of gender mainstreaming, the Swedish case indicates that the segregated representation of women is unlikely to diminish. That was an added expectation, that a country with comparatively less gender inequality would have less actions than not only the other countries, but a significantly

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<sup>193</sup> Anna Lindh was on track to be Sweden's first prime-minister when she was killed. Her killer still has not given a reason why she was chosen as his victim.

declining trend line. Sweden's efforts in quantitative terms are higher than either Brazil's or the UK's and an analysis of their trend would have to include a larger period of time, in order to adequately analyse changes in gender equality culture and number of actions.

Women's numbers were not strongly connected to their cross-party allegiances, one expectation that was hypothesised. Although some action was found in creating ad hoc coalitions when needed, women tend to stay within their own parties and the strongest case of that was Sweden. Given that the Riksdag does not have any type of institutional organisation that includes women or is focused on women's interests, this is possibly a factor in the difference between the countries. On the other hand, the reason why Swedish women do not work across party lines is most likely their strong party allegiances and internal organisations. Moreover, since their numbers are on par with men's within their parties, the need for cross-party coalitions is diminished. Were some type of cross-party organisation to emerge, it is possible that it would face the same issues the Câmara and the House of Commons have, with splits and reticence from its members.

When looking at party ideology, similarly to many other studies, most actions comes from left-wing women and men. However, rather than share perspectives and the burden of SRW, Swedish women in the Riksdag are the ones responsible for actions on behalf of women, with left and centre-left women sharing that responsibility. In the men's group, it is the ones in the left and centre-left that propose the majority of actions. This, along with the participation of the centre-left in the UK, lends itself to suggest that in-party discussions are much more conducive to broadening the perspectives of men towards women's issues. The legislature, on the other hand, is a place for minds that are already formed. In fact, the British case is quite striking in the contribution of men from the centre-left, much higher than in the Swedish case and possibly indicating a better integration of views within the Labour Party in particular.

The analysis presented here shows that strong women structures within parties that are able to influence party policy is the best strategy in achieving a shared social perspective on women's issues in society between women and men in politics. That being said, many right-wing parties in all the countries also have internal women's organisations; but as women are not a homogenous group, while they may share some beliefs with women in other parties,

they do hold the same ideology as their male counterparts. If a right-wing party has a strong internal women's structure, it will still be mediated by their ideological leanings towards individualism, trickle-down economics, and a smaller state, to name a few. More importantly, as "old-right" and "new-right" parties come together, these views become combined with social conservatism and a reinforcement of traditional gender roles. That perspective does not bring actions only against women's rights, though. As women's lives are still mostly based on traditional gender roles, legislation is needed to give them support and assistance.

Consequently, the issue of risk was mediated by issue rather than type of action. Especially in the parliamentary countries, but also in Brazil, the risk is in the content, rather than in its actual likelihood of becoming legislation. In that sense, risk is connected to polarisation and the ability of actors against women's rights to galvanise public opinion which, in turn, is connected to a rise in the reinforcement of traditional gender roles through the socially conservative perspective of new-right parties. Similarly to women's substantive representation, backlash against women's rights has its substantive representation as well, in the form of these parties and its MPs. This is particularly apparent in the divisive issue of reproductive rights, but with differences among countries. This is, in fact, the main issue identified as a bottleneck for women's rights in Brazil, mentioned by nearly all deputies. Swedish interviewees identified the slow pace of Swedish politics and its excessive focus on universalism and gender equality rather than identifying than needs of specific women (through intersectionality) and being able to develop targeted policies (particularly in the case of domestic violence). In the UK, the specialist interviewed identified the issue of economics, with women in poverty being the hardest problem to tackle as it means expenditures. The increase in right-wing parties means that each of these problems are discussed in the light of both old and new right ideologies.

This brings me to the three general conclusions that this study has allowed me to reach. The first two concern the premise/question set out in the first page: what do we expect from political representation? In selecting the countries initially using their electoral systems, the goal was to ensure a politically and culturally different case-selection by proxy. However, it is more than how they run their campaigns or network within their parties and how permeable the system is to new actors. *The electoral system offers the lens through which an MP focuses their attention.* A British MP, because they are meant to have a small, but strong, focus, have

to consider their actions as actors who have beliefs, but also are motivated to be re-elected, and advance their careers. They are caught between representing an issue and representing their district. A British MP with a wide focus on any issue would do better as a member of cabinet, but that is the fate of only a few. Swedish and Brazilian MPs, respectively, have wider focuses and are allowed to consider matters more broadly with slightly more freedom and less concern that their constituents will see that as “not working for them”. Consequently, it is possible for legislators from these countries, despite constituency ties, to focus on specific groups within these constituencies and in issues that affect the countries at-large. In both these countries, it seems that this also leads to a feeling of disconnection from politics from the majority of the citizens.

On the other hand, despite calls for electoral reform in the UK, its use of a plurality system has meant the exclusion from the House of Commons of the extreme-right, in the form of UKIP, although certain sectors of the Conservative Party have seen the shift in public opinion and have move towards that area of the ideological spectrum. The excessively broad focus of Brazilian MPs might be a factor in the vagueness of most of the legislation proposed, as they are often left to be regulated after being approved.

But, you need to see MPs as individual actors, with their own motivations. And those motivations may change but they're, they're individual actors, and they're assessing their own job description. And they've got lots of competing calls on their time. And they've got competing, immediate, calls on their time. And they've also got, I mean, they got to consider their immediate interest, and much longer term interests as well in achieving what they want to achieve. And those are the things that tend to get forgotten, because there's a tendency to focus on one decision and how a group of people are behaving. And sometimes an assumption that there are kind of homogenous group of people who are behaving in this fashion and analysing that particular decision, so forgetting the differences between them and competing interests, both immediately, in the longer term. I think it's just a bit more complicated... And it's and that's what you lose with a kind of 'how did so and so vote on this issue', that kind of really simple, easy analysis, it's a lot easier to do now is to look at that kind of thing in isolation. (Interview UKc1).

Taking this into consideration, I have found that each country has a *hegemonic feminist discourse* that allows MPs to put forth actions that are feminist, but without using the buzz-words that are considered negative in each country. In Brazil, that hegemonic discourse takes the form of “women’s rights” or, *direitos da mulher*, which serve to replace using “feminism” or “gender” when discussing actions that are, in fact, feminist. In Sweden, the accepted

discourse is of *gender equality*, make things equal for women and men, in order to advance the economy and the country. Gender equality, then, walks hand-in-hand with Swedish values and, occasionally, with liberal feminism. The United Kingdom tends to use the discourse of *liberal feminism*, which reinforces notions of individualism, meritocracy, and the ability of the woman to win on her own and “do it all”. Of course, these are generalised notions, and all are somewhat present in each country, but what I argue here is not the use of expressions or key words, but of the typical frame that is presented by MPs when defending their positions. Not only that, but particularly in Sweden, actors for backlash have been using this *sanitised feminism* in order to criticise actions that veer from the hegemonic view. In addition, these do not mean an acceptance of feminism or feminisms entirely or that there is a single feminism to be discussed in each country. What I have found is that there is *a particular rhetoric that facilitates the promotion of women’s substantive representation*, even ones that intend to lessen women’s rights, such as the example given to exclude Muslim women from community pools in Sweden. The figures below, made with the `quanteda` package in R, indicate the main word usage and its associations for each country. Each figure is made with the 50 most prevalent words.

Each node demonstrates how each countries’ efforts are concentrated and, of course, found success. In Brazil, we see pregnant women linked with companion, in the sense of being in the birthing room. Children’s legislation, as discussed, is off to another area. In the busiest node, “woman” is main word, from which all others are derived, having its strongest link with the word “violence”.

The figure for the UK<sup>194</sup> does not have the words “women” or “woman” at all and no separate nodes can be found in the top featured words. Although frequency-wise, “women” is the most used word (with the exclusion of stopwords and other common words such as “house” and “welcomes”), it does not appear in the network graph. When using the top 100 words, it does appear, but it is not centrally featured. In part, this is a result of “women” being a keyword and not necessarily appearing in the text. The figure corroborates the lack of


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<sup>194</sup> This figure does not include EDMs, as they have too many action verbs and ended-up clouding the figure.



Figure 14 shows the nature of the Swedish data, which is less wordy, but the same logic as the previous ones. Off to one side is a node on gender equality, integration, and expenses. In the larger section the binding theme is violence against women and children, in the largest node as sexual violence, and in the smaller node, where the word for women appears, domestic violence or, in the Swedish jargon, violence in close relationships. This figure demonstrates the need for piecemeal legislation and discussion on violence against women, although showing that this strategy has been successful.

Graph 83: Network of Swedish keywords in successful legislation in women's representation



The second general conclusion is that each of these countries have their own *policy-making style* which is derived, in part, from their electoral system and that has a direct impact on how women's representation is done. Brazil has a distinctive "putting out fires" style, in which everything is happening at once and problems from the past are still issues to be dealt with. Individual legislators take on extremely difficult and centuries-old problems in a way that ends up being simply ineffective and relies on future regulations of laws. In Sweden, the issue is quite the opposite, with problems being carefully studied by the government and then decided by the parliament, often taking years before a conclusion is reached. Both have advantages and disadvantages. When issues come up in the moment, Brazilian legislators are able to deal with them in ways that Swedish legislators are not. The British system lives in the middle of these extremes, with some possibility for preparation and study, especially now



with the new, expanded role of select committees, but is also attentive to matters that must be dealt with immediately. The possibility of the power dispersion and control over specific issues of select committees is definitely something to keep researching, although these committees are not allowed to make legislation.

The third general conclusion comes from using the most-different approach to select countries with different numbers of women representatives and different stability to that presence. Important, this would answer if we can we reasonably expect comparable results in countries that are similar to the ones used here? The results found here demonstrate that it is a reasonable expectation that if women are a *small minority*, they will be somehow *segregated* into a group of their own. Brazil has the Women's Caucus and the Women's Rights Committee; the UK, has the Women and Equalities Committee. This segregation can trump party ideology, but that is on a case-by-case basis and depends on women's electoral autonomy.

We can also expect that cases where women are a *larger minority*, they will be more adequately integrated into the chamber's political life. That, however, is a matter of degree and has happened in Sweden due to a particular cultural confluence. Although gender mainstreaming is a bureaucratic tool, it has also become a guiding post, something to aspire and live up to. Therefore, the notion of a women's caucus or women's issues committee goes against the political values of that country. In addition, because they are in larger numbers, women do not feel the need to work across party lines and prefer to make alliances with the men in their own coalitions (although we do not know what happens behind closed committee doors).

Gender mainstreaming, however, has not ended the need for attention to be paid and specific legislation to be made for women. It exists in two parallel realms, one of pragmatism for civil servants and one of idealism for politicians. Comparatively, in Brazil and the United Kingdom, there is more "room" to politicise gender inequality and to demonstrate it, as it has not made its way onto all the manuals and handbooks. These are, of course, trade-offs, with advantages and disadvantages in all three systems. On the other hand, despite its gains on gender equality and women's representation, Sweden seems to "take it for granted" and

assume cultural values are enough to sustain it, rather than, for instance, create a specific agency to handle matters of gender mainstreaming.

Overall, when studying other countries, these should be guiding hypotheses, based on women's numbers: are they integrated or segregated? Do they work together? What is the impact of political culture and of strategy? What are the political institutions involved?

Regardless of their numbers or alliances, women are still the ones doing the bulk of the work on women's issues, in all three countries. While it is relevant to consider the support of left-wing men, their role is just that, of support. Other men doing work on women's issues do so from the radical and extreme-right, in an attempt to scale back gender equality and multiculturalism achievements. And while it is tempting to see women as a strong, united front, it is important to recognise the work of critical actors on both sides – for gender equality and feminism, and for backlash against those.

Lastly, there is the matter of why women are segregated and why are women taking on “women's issues”. More research is required on women's motivation and their entry into politics. What the data presented here shows is that more men are taking on *soft issues* while women are still excluded from *hard issues*. What those issues are is often a contextual matter – in Brazil, healthcare is universal, so it comes with a large budget and private lobby. However, constitutional and financial matters are always on top of the list and should be the first looked at when analysing positions of power in a legislative chamber. The question now is: are women the women who self-select on entry to politics more likely to be interested in issues of care or are they being excluded from positions of power? The interviews conducted show that it is both, but that without enough women to do both, that is unlikely to change soon. Positions of power within a legislative chamber are distributed based on political capital, which is built with financial and symbolic capital, including seniority. Without a pathway that ensures women's presence in places of power, that is unlikely to change soon, even in more gender equal countries.

In continuing to consider future research possibilities, I would suggest that any similar studies keep in mind the need for more expansive key word lists, as “women” is insufficient in defining what are the actions on behalf of women. The trajectories of women and men still are an unanswered question, especially where it concerns their motivations for politics. The

increased polarisation between left and right seems to be a global phenomenon, making centre parties a particularly interesting field of study. Finally, I would argue that the research into women's substantive representation would benefit greatly from more research using process-tracing and analysing "backwards in time" in order to identify strategies and critical actors.

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## APPENDIX

### *Party ideology*

<b>Brazil</b>				
<b>Left</b>	<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>	<b>Right</b>
PSOL	PDT	REDE	MDB	PRB
PCdoB	PT	PV	PODEMOS	PP
	PSB		PR	PTB
			PPS	PSL
			PMN	PSC
			PSD	DEM
			AVANTE	DC
			PROS	PRTB
				PHS
				PMB
				PTC
				PRP
				PSDB
				PATRIOTA
				PRONA
				SOLIDARIEDADE

<b>Sweden</b>				
<b>Left</b>	<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>	<b>Right</b>
V	MP	C	KD	SD
	S	FP		
		L		
		M		

<b>United Kingdom</b>				
<b>Left</b>	<b>Centre-left</b>	<b>Centre</b>	<b>Centre-right</b>	<b>Right</b>
Green Party	Labour (Co-op)	Alliance	Conservative Party	Democratic Unionist Party
Plaid Cymru	Labour Party	Liberal Democrats	Ulster Unionist Party	UKIP
Scottish National Party	Social Democratic and Labour Party			

## ANOVA

### Brazil

#### **Test of Homogeneity of Variances**

		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
SRW	Based on Mean	483,324	3	13711	<b>,000</b>
	Based on Median	253,871	3	13711	<b>,000</b>
	Based on Median and with adjusted df	253,871	3	4153,414	<b>,000</b>
	Based on trimmed mean	397,665	3	13711	<b>,000</b>

#### **ANOVA**

SRW					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	835,465	3	278,488	253,871	<b>,000</b>
Within Groups	15040,541	13711	1,097		
Total	15876,007	13714			

#### **Robust Tests of Equality of Means**

SRW				
	Statistic <sup>a</sup>	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	53,927	3	1749,783	<b>,000</b>
Brown-Forsythe	71,160	3	1573,937	<b>,000</b>

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

### Sweden

#### **Test of Homogeneity of Variances**

		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
SRW	Based on Mean	95,514	3	6582	<b>,000</b>
	Based on Median	86,733	3	6582	<b>,000</b>
	Based on Median and with adjusted df	86,733	3	4700,145	<b>,000</b>
	Based on trimmed mean	81,334	3	6582	<b>,000</b>



### ANOVA

SRW					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	3364,220	3	1121,407	83,419	<b>,000</b>
Within Groups	88482,493	6582	13,443		
Total	91846,714	6585			

### Robust Tests of Equality of Means

SRW				
	Statistic <sup>a</sup>	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	79,539	3	3304,743	<b>,000</b>
Brown-Forsythe	79,264	3	4397,536	<b>,000</b>

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

### United Kingdom

### Test of Homogeneity of Variances

		Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
SRW	Based on Mean	96,061	3	8758	<b>,000</b>
	Based on Median	62,574	3	8758	<b>,000</b>
	Based on Median and with adjusted df	62,574	3	6520,082	<b>,000</b>
	Based on trimmed mean	67,366	3	8758	<b>,000</b>

### ANOVA

SRW					
	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1780,442	3	593,481	67,394	<b>,000</b>
Within Groups	77124,070	8758	8,806		
Total	78904,512	8761			

### Robust Tests of Equality of Means

SRW				
	Statistic <sup>a</sup>	df1	df2	Sig.
Welch	42,322	3	2128,954	<b>,000</b>
Brown-Forsythe	48,331	3	2961,257	<b>,000</b>

a. Asymptotically F distributed.

### Negative binomial regression

#### Brazil

#### Goodness of Fit<sup>a</sup>

	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	4252,092	10772	<b>,395</b>
Scaled Deviance	4252,092	10772	
Pearson Chi-Square	14503,655	10772	<b>1,346</b>
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	14503,655	10772	
Log Likelihood <sup>b</sup>	-5661,733		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	11335,467		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	11335,475		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	11379,178		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	11385,178		

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender, Co-authorship, Left

a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.

b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

#### Estimated Marginal Means: Grand Mean

Mean	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval	
		Lower	Upper

-1,677	,038	-1,751	-1,603
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Covariates appearing in the model are fixed at the following values:

Year =2010,59; Co-authorship =,71; Gender=,10; Left =,36

### Sweden

#### Goodness of Fit<sup>a</sup>

	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	5416,859	6580	<b>,823</b>
Scaled Deviance	5416,859	6580	
Pearson Chi-Square	9486,726	6580	<b>1,442</b>
Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	9486,726	6580	
Log Likelihood <sup>b</sup>	-10027,610		
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	20067,220		
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	20067,233		
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	20107,976		
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	20113,976		

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Session, Gender, Left, Cosponsor

a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.

b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

#### Estimated Marginal Means: Grand Mean

Mean	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval	
		Lower	Upper
,277	,030	,218	,336

Covariates appearing in the model are fixed at the following values:

Cosponsor=,81; Gender=,46; Left=,49, Session\_CAT=9,94

### United Kingdom

#### Goodness of Fit<sup>a</sup>

	Value	df	Value/df
Deviance	6986,524	8755	<b>,798</b>
Scaled Deviance	6986,524	8755	
Pearson Chi-Square	12035,231	8755	<b>1,375</b>

Scaled Pearson Chi-Square	12035,231	8755
Log Likelihood <sup>b</sup>	-11053,688	
Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)	22121,376	
Finite Sample Corrected AIC (AICC)	22121,389	
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)	22170,923	
Consistent AIC (CAIC)	22177,923	

Dependent Variable: Women's substantive representation

Model: (Intercept), Year, Gender & Party Ideology, Co-authorship

a. Information criteria are in smaller-is-better form.

b. The full log likelihood function is displayed and used in computing information criteria.

### Estimated Marginal Means: Grand Mean

Mean	Std. Error	95% Wald Confidence Interval	
		Lower	Upper
-,095	,028	-,149	-,040

Covariates appearing in the model are fixed at the following values:

Year=2009,89; Co-authorship=,63

### *Word list*

#### Brazil

Aborto; direitos reprodutivos; trabalho; aposentadoria; LGBT; gay; homossexual; lésbica; trans; travesti; mulher; prostituição infantil; turismo sexual; tráfico; trabalho doméstico; empregada doméstica; menino; menina; indígena, quilombo; quilombola; negro; negra; pedofilia; pornografia; gênero; gravidez, grávida, gestante, lactente; sexo; sexual; violência; estupro; exploração; abuso; atentado ao pudor; assédio; violência doméstica; lei maria da penha; lei 11.340; violência contra a mulher; feminino; feminina; homem; masculino; masculina; pais; filho; filha; criança; mãe; maternidade; pai; paternidade; família; guarda; tutela; adotante; custódia

#### Sweden

Abortion; reproduktiv; jämställ-; genus; arbet-; sysselsättning; arbetsmarknad; arbetslivet; föret-; jobb; arbetslösa; vård-; barn; förskola; vårdnadsbidraget; RUT; man; män; manlig-; äktenskap; endometriosis; HPV; bröst; HBTQ; lesbisk; gay; homosexual; transpersoner; sexuell läggning; homo-; bisexual; kvinnofridskränkning; våld i hemmet; mäns våld mot kvinnor; samtycke; sexhandel; våld i nära relationer; brott; sexuella övergrepp; sexuella trakasserier; sexualiserat; våld; förföljelse; könsstympning; invandr-; flykting; muslim; utrikes födda ; utlandsfödda; nyanlända; slöja; tvåårsregeln; integrationen; sami; kvot; feminis-; kvinnor och män; flickor och pojkar; prostituerat; sexturism; sexuella tjänster; sexköp; kön; föräldr-; gravid-; familj; adoption; barnomsorgen; far; son; fäder; faderskap; moderskap; mödrar; vårdnad-; förlossningsvården; preventivmedel; sex-; pojk-; omskärelse; flick-; kvinn-

### United Kingdom

Abortion; contraception; contraceptive; morning after; right to choose; termination; reproduct-; gender; sex; men; child; children; pension; pensioner; poverty; econom-; employ-; nursery; childcare; midwife; breast; cervical; uterus; endometriosis; ovarian; marriage; hijab; veil; burqa; BME; BAME; BAMER; refugee; immigrant-; ethnic; South Asian; minorit-; Muslim; asylum Affirmative action; pay gap; equal pay; maternity pay; discrimination; father; mother; pregnant; maternity; paternity; parental; pregnancy; male; female; domestic violence; rape; sexual offences; violence; abuse; gender-based violence; gendered violence; violence against women; genital mutilation; LGBT; transgender; transsexual; lesbian; gay; boy; sexual health; sexualisation; girl; gender; men and women; women and men; women; anniversary; commemorates; congratulates; award; applauds; prostituerat-; lap danc-